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IV 
SUMMARY 
This thesis addresses the multivariate version of the group decision problem (French, 
1985), where the opinions about the possible values of n random variables in a problem, 
expressed as subjective conditional probability density functions of the k members of a 
group of experts, are to be combined together into a single probability density. 
A particular type of graphical chain model a bit more general than an influence diagram 
defined as a partially complete chain graph (PCG) is used to describe the multivariate 
causal (ordered) structure of associations between those n random variables. It is assumed 
that the group has a commonly agreed. PCG but the members diverge about the actual 
conditional probability densities for the component variables in the common PCG. From 
this particular situation we investigate some suitable solutions. 
The axiomatic approach to the group decision problem suggests that the group adopts 
a combination algorithm which demands, at least on learning information which is com- 
mon to the members and which preserves the originally agreed PCG structure, that the 
pools of conditional densities associated with the PCG are externally Bayesian (Madan- 
sky, 1964). We propose a logarithmic characterisation for such conditionally externally 
Bayesian (CEB) poolings which is more flexible than the logarithmic characterisation 
proposed by Genest et al. (1986). It is illustrated why such a generalisation is practically 
quite useful allowing, for example, the weights attributed to the joint probability assess- 
ments of different individuals in the pool to differ across the distinct conditional probability 
densities which compound each joint density. A major advantage of this scheme is that 
it may allow the weights given to the group's members to vary according to the areas of 
prediction they can perform best. It is also shown that the group's commitment to being 
CEB on chain elements can be accomplished with the group appearing externally Bayesian 
on the whole PCG. Another feature of the CEB logarithmic pools is that with them the 
impossibility theorems related to the preservation of independence by opinion pools can 
be avoided. Yet, in the context of the axiomatic approach, we show the conditions under 
which the types of pools that satisfy McConway's (1981) marginalization property, i. e. the 
linear pools, can also be CEB. 
Also, the expert judgement problem (French, 1985) is investigated through the Bayesian 
modelling approach where a supra-Bayesian decision maker treats the experts' opinions 
as data in the usual Bayesian framework. Graphical representations of standard combi- 
nation models are discussed in the light of the issues of dependence among experts and 
sufficiency of experts' statements in certain cases. Most importantly, a supra-Bayesian 
analysis of uncalibrated experts allows the establishment of a link between the axiomatic 
and Bayesian modelling approaches. Reconciliation rules which are externally Bayesian 
are obtained. This result most naturally extends those rules to be CEB in the above 
mentioned multivariate structures. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND 
HISTORICAL REMARKS 
In view of the vast field in which the research we do here stands and the methodologies 
employed in this thesis, we shall start by describing some historical remarks on both the 
aggregation of experts opinions and the graphical statistical models. The objective is also 
to put the results we obtain in a historical context. So, the Section 1.1 is dedicated to 
the combination of opinions for decision making with some of the difficulties and the main 
methodologies being mentioned. The Section 1.2 deals with the evolution of graphical 
models with emphasis on decomposable structures, chain graphs and influence diagrams. 
In Section 1.3 the structure of the thesis is presented. 
1.1 Historical Remarks on Combining Opinions. 
According to Bacharach (1979), one of the earliest works on combining probability 
distributions is due to Laplace, to whom the linear pool is attributed. Naturally, works 
on combining opinions (as expressed by subjective probability distributions) for decision 
making could only start to develop from the late 1920's after Ramsey (1926), and more 
effectively from the early 1950's after Savage (1954a) laid the foundations of the modern 
Bayesian decision theory. This is because before preferences (utilities) or opinions (prob- 
abilities) can be combined, they must first be elicited and expressed in some quantitative 
form. Basically, Savage (1954a) -encompassing the works of Von Neumann and Morgen- 
stern (1944) on game theory, of Wald (1950) on statistical decision functions, of de Finetti 
(1937) on subjective probability, and of Ramsey (1926) in general- proposed that through 
an axiomatic definition of rationality, preferences and beliefs of an idealised decision maker 
(DM) who has to choose amongst actions to take under uncertainty, should be modelled by 
utility functions and subjective probability assessments. In effect, the extension of those 
concepts to questions related to group decision making or to the aggregation of opinions 
and preferences as an expression of group consensus started then being formulated in the 
light of Savage's rationale. The problem here is that the Bayesian theory is a coherent 
normative theory for the individual (rational DM); and groups of individuals are left in 
difficulties since no concept equivalent to the classical notion of objectivity is available to 
them. 
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1.1.1 Impossibility results in group decision theory. 
In 1951, Arrow showed an impossibility theorem (reconfirmed later in 1963 in a re- 
vised second edition) related to group decision theory in which there was no unrestricted 
algorithm able to give fair and democratic pooled group preferences. That is, a group's 
ranking (based on the group's expected utility) R9 could not be formed from the members' 
individual rankings Ri (i = 1, ..., k) of strategies 
(actions) in a group decision problem 
[see also Kelly (1978)] unless it was a dictatorship. However, despite its evident drawback 
for the consensus of preferences, this result was proved under the assumption that there 
are no restrictions on the possible forms of the R='s. 
Also, impossibility results related to the aggregation of beliefs then started being ob- 
tained. For example, Dalkey (1972,1975) showed that the linear opinion pool could only 
be extended to conditional probabilities if it were a dictatorship. Later, Lehrer and Wag- 
ner (1983) proved a similar result for independent events. Other impossibility theorems 
associated with linear pools can be found in Bacharach (1975), Genest (1984b) and Wagner 
(1984). More closely related to our work, Genest and Wagner (1984) proved that only dic- 
tatorships can accommodate pooling operators with a certain functional form when they 
are also required to hold for a property Laddaga (1977) called independence preservation 
property. This property requires that the pooling on joint events must equal the product 
of the poolings marginally for each event (in the same spirit of the statistical independence 
for probability functions), whenever the individuals preserve the events independence in 
their subjective assessments (see Section 2.2.1). 
In general, contrarily to Lehrer's (1975,1976,1983) claims, all those impossibility 
results mean that no pooling rule for preferences or beliefs works sensibly well in all 
situations. Combining rules general enough to satisfy certain `desirable' axioms, on the 
other hand, can fail to be democratic. Since the arrival of these results there have been 
two lines of work trying to circumvent those problems. One line, attempted to weaken 
group behavioural assumptions (Pill, 1971) in the hope that the impossibility results would 
vanish but with little success (Winkler, 1968). The other line, to which this thesis is also a 
contribution, has looked at weakening the insistence on universal applicability. In fact, by 
assuming that the group consensus is obtained for agreed belief networks with a particular 
type of structure, the application of the related impossibility theorems to our case can be 
prevented as we shall see in Section 6.6. 
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Because we will be concentrating on the issue of combining beliefs, we shall assume 
throughout this thesis that although the members of the group may disagree on their 
beliefs, they share the same preferences for the possible outcomes of unknown quantities. 
This implies that the group members agree to share the same utilities for the problem under 
consideration, and thus prevents Arrow's (1951) impossibility theorem (Raiffa, 1968, and 
Bacharach, 1975). 
1.1.2 The axiomatic and the modelling approaches. 
Some authors (de Finetti, 1951, and Lindley, 1985a) refer to the problem of aggregating 
the opinions (beliefs) of the members of a group of individuals expressed by subjective 
probability functions as the reconciliation of probability assessments while others (Winkler 
et al., 1986) as the expert resolution, the opinion pooling (Stone, 1961) or the combination 
of subjective probability distributions (Genest and Zidek, 1986). 
There are basically two distinct forms of dealing with this sort of problem (French, 1985 
and Winkler et al., 1986). One way is to adopt what is called the axiomatic approach, where 
basically the group is assumed to choose certain `desirable' and `reasonable' conditions 
(axioms) that the aggregating formula should obey and which at the end will characterise 
its form. Another possibility would be to adopt the Bayesian modelling approach where 
expert opinion is to be treated as information (data) in the Bayesian paradigm. To avoid 
operational problems with the modelling approach such as who specifies prior densities and 
likelihood functions (French, 1985 or Winkler, 1968) we shall employ the figure of a supra- 
Bayesian (SB) decision maker who at the end will be the responsible for performing the 
aggregation method. In particular, the use of the figure of a SB gives us the abstraction 
to study the circumstances under which reconciliation formulas obtained via modelling 
approach can be identified with opinion pools in group decision situations (Chapter 8). 
See Section 2.4.1 for further comments on the SB. Particular aspects of both the axiomatic 
and the Bayesian modelling approaches are investigated in this thesis. 
There has been a lot of discussion in the literature about the merits of adopting one 
approach or another (Winkler et at., 1986, Lindley, 1985a, French, 1985 and Genest and 
Zidek, 1986). We shall not enter this discussion. However, we claim that the methods we 
propose, and therefore the results we obtain in this thesis, are not general purpose but 
appropriate to the specific configurations (situations) of the problems we define. In fact, 
it is well known (Winkler's comments - quoted below - on Genest and Zidek, 1986, pp. 
3 
139) that there is no general prescription which is suitable for every kind of aggregation, 
problem, but "different combining rules are suitable for different situations, and any search 
for a single, all purpose, `objective' combining procedure is futile". In fact, there are several 
factors which can influence the form of the most suitable combining model to be used in 
a practical situation, as for example: 
(i) the nature of the problem itself (group decision or expert judgement problem), 
(ii) the characteristics of the underlying sample space (finite or infinite), and even 
(iii) the form in which the members express their opinions (full density functions, point 
estimates, log odds or a collection of quantiles), together with 
(iv) other issues like dependence, calibration, coherence and honesty of the group mem- 
bers (Section 2.1). 
1.2 Historical Remarks on Statistical Graphical Models. 
The use of graphical association models to represent probabilistic information was first 
proposed in statistical physics by Gibbs (1902), and in genetics by Wright (1921,1923, 
1934). The latter developed a method called path analysis for the analysis of linear equa- 
tions of continuous random variables. This method makes use. of directed graphs where 
the random variables represented by vertices are linked by directed arcs (arrows moving 
from parents to children) indicating correlation and causality in a one-to-one correspon- 
dence. Rules were developed which allowed measurements of influence along each path in 
the graph as well as the degree to which an effect was determined by a particular cause. 
Later, path analysis ideas were further developed and applied in social sciences, eco- 
nomics and statistics (Wold, 1954 and 1960, Blalock, 1971, and Kiiveri and Speed, 1982, 
amongst others). The discrete cases were also investigated by Birch (1963), Goodman 
(1970,1973), Haberman (1974) and others. Those authors together with Vorobev (1962) 
realized that some decomposition characteristics of statistical tables could be best ex- 
pressed in graphical terms for log-linear models. 
Good (1961) used directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) to represent causal hierarchies of 
qualitative variables with disjunctive causes. A DAG, when representing a conditional 
independence structure, allows the associated joint probability function to be uniquely 
factorized into conditional probability functions (Smith 1989,1990). Lemmer (1983) sug- 
gested the use of trees for Bayesian updating, and Spiegelhalter (1986) proposed the fill-in 
algorithm to transform Bayesian networks into join trees. 
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The development of Markov fields presumed that the graphical model (network topol- 
ogy) was given and the problem was to characterise the probabilistic behaviour of a system 
complying with the dependencies prescribed by such a model (Darroch et al., 1980, Wer- 
muth, 1980, Lauritzen et al., 1984, and Lauritzen and Wermuth, 1984). A survey of 
Markov fields can be found in Isham (1981). Also, Lauritzen (1982) applied the theory of 
Markov fields to the analysis of statistical tables and derived some theorems for indepen- 
dencies embedded in strictly positive probability distributions. The Markov properties on 
DAGs were systematically studied by Kiiveri et al. (1984), Pearl and Verma (1987), Verma 
and Pearl (1990), Smith (1989), Geiger and Pearl (1990a) and Lauritzen et al. (1990), to 
name but a few. 
1.2.1 Decomposable graphical models. 
An interesting class of models are ones called decomposable, introduced by Darroch et 
al. (1980) for undirected graphs and further developed by Lauritzen and Wermuth (1984) 
for graphs with mixed (both qualitative and quantitative) variables and Leimer (1985, 
1989,1993). They have some attractive properties such as that their statistical analysis 
can be broken down into small analyses of sub-models in an elegant way. Also, models 
in this class can, under certain restrictions on the form of input data, retain conditional 
independence structure in prior-to-posterior analyses (as we shall see in Chapter 5). This 
fact is used intensively to create quick algorithms for calculating posterior distributions in 
high dimensional systems (David, 1992, Jensen and Jensen, 1994, Smith and Papamichail, 
1996). Other algorithms for manipulating decomposable graphs in an efficient way can 
be found in Rose et al. (1976) and Tarjan and Yannakakis (1984) for verifying decompos- 
ability and finding their cliques; in Tarjan (1985) and Leimer (1993) for finding optimal 
decompositions; and in Kjaerulfl' (1990,1992) for finding decomposable subgraphs. 
1.2.2 Chain graphs. 
Chain graphs (CGs), a special class of mixed graphs characterised by having no di- 
rected cycles (see Section 3.3), were first introduced in the literature by Lauritzen and 
Wermuth (1989) and Wermuth and Lauritzen (1990). Special classes of CGs are the par- 
tially complete CGs we define in Section 5.2 and the influence diagrams (see Section 3.5). 
The Markov properties of CGs can be found in Frydenberg (1990) as well as in Andersson 
et al. (1996) where further results on the conditions of Markov equivalence of CGs are 
5 
obtained. 
1.2.3 Influence diagrams. 
Howard and Matheson (1981), from their experience in decision analysis, proposed 
the representation of a decision problem by an influence diagram (ID), that is, a DAG 
representing conditional independence statements. They showed the connection between 
decision trees and IDs as well as established the notion of arc-reversal corresponding 
to the application of Bayes theorem in IDs. More recently, Shachter (1986) proposed 
simplifications of the IDs and the related decision problem by introducing barren nodes 
and general results for arc-reversal and other operations. In this context, Verma (1987) 
proposed an elegant way of applying Bayes theorem to graphical models in general. 
The Markov property of IDs was studied amongst others by Pearl (1986a) which pro- 
posed the d-separation theorem (see section 3.4) for characterising relevances in IDs. Also 
Smith (1989) generalised earlier results on factorisation of joint probability densities as- 
sociated to IDs to arbitrary distributions (not necessarily strictly positive). 
The modelling aspects of IDs which are in fact a very natural representation of Bayesian 
models were studied by Oliver (1986), Barlow (1986) and Rege and Agogino (1986) to name 
some but a few. 
Other important results concerning efficient computation in probabilistic expert systems 
as represented by IDs are summarised in Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter (1988). 
1.3 The Thesis Structure. 
After presenting in this chapter some historical remarks on the topics we shall be dealing 
with in this thesis, the theory and the concepts related to the most important approaches 
to the aggregation of beliefs are revised in Chapter 2, together with the main weighting 
schemes for the axiomatic approaches. In Chapter 3, the notation and terminology as well 
as the basic theory of CGs and IDs are introduced. 
A motivation for the proposed generalisations of EB to CEB opinion pools is shown in 
Chapter 4. Some intermediate results for the examples in this chapter are found in the 
Appendices A4.1 and A4.2. 
In Chapter 5, the partially complete chain graph models are defined and the conditions 
for their a posteriori conditional independence preservation are stated. 
The definition of conditional external Bayesianity and its characterisation by CEB pool- 
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ing operators are shown in Chapter 6. The proof of such characterisation is presented in 
the Appendix A6. In Section 6.5, it is shown how some particular linear opinion pools 
(LinOps) can allow the joint density of variables associated with a conditional indepen- 
dence structure, to be factorized into conditional densities on that structure, that is, how 
LinOPs can be CEB. 
In Chapter 7, we make use of influence diagrams to introduce the Supra-Bayesian 
(SB) analysis of the expert judgement problem. The issue of dependence among experts' 
information sources is revised through the modelling of diverse situations characterised by 
the way those sources overlap. The role played by the diverse overlapping structures when 
obtaining the posterior distribution for the quantity of interest is investigated through 
considerations of sufficiency of experts' statements in a degenerate situation. Also, it 
works as an introduction to the following Chapter 8 where a SB analysis of uncalibrated 
experts is employed to characterise those reconciliation rules which can also be externally 
Bayesian. This establishes a link between the axiomatic and the Bayesian modelling 
approaches to the aggregation of beliefs. 
Chapter 9 contains comments on the main results and indicates some directions for 
further research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
A REVIEW ON THE 
AGGREGATION OF BELIEFS 
In this chapter we not only present a review about the main axioms for group decision 
situations as the external Bayesianity and the marginalization properties (that characterise 
the logarithmic and the linear opinion pools respectively), but also describe the main 
Bayesian modelling approaches for the aggregation of beliefs such as those of Winkler 
(1981) and Lindley (1985a). The notation and terminology related to the aggregation of 
beliefs which will be used throughout the thesis are introduced. 
The revisions we make here are not extensive but orientated towards the assumptions 
and generalisations we propose in the thesis. In addition to that, we also provide short 
descriptions of some important well-known properties (axioms), concepts and methods 
which are relevant in the area although not employed directly in our developments. In 
those cases, the reader should refer to the provided bibliographies for further details on 
the particular subject of interest. Alternatively, the paper by Genest and Zidek (1986), 
for example, provides a comprehensive review and annotated bibliography for axiomatic 
approaches, while French (1985) defines the classes of problems most commonly found in 
aggregating opinions and reviews the main concepts and methods on both the axiomatic 
and the modelling procedures (French et al., 1989). Clemen (1989) also provides a review 
and an extensive bibliography for combining forecasts. Naturally the above mentioned 
reviews are of results obtained up to the date they were written. Also, the papers by 
Winkler et al. (1986) discuss the main issues about expert resolution in the Bayesian 
modelling methodology. Other surveys of related topics include those of Winkler (1968) 
on consensus of dependent subjective probability functions, Pill (1971) on the Delphi 
method, Beach (1975) on expert judgements, Hogarth (1975) on cognitive psychology and 
Weerahandi and Zidek (1981) on Multi-Bayesian decision making. 
In Section 2.1, some issues of importance on the aggregation of beliefs are described such 
as the assessment of subjective probability quantities, coherence, calibration, honesty and 
non-independence between group's members. In Section 2.2, the most important axiomatic 
approaches are revised with some impossibility results being presented in Section 2.2.1, 
while McConway's (1981) marginalization property (MP) that leads to the generalised 
linear opinion pools (generalised LinOPs) of Genest (1984b) is revised in Section 2.2.2. 
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Madansky's (1964,1978) external Bayesianity property is described in Section 2.2.3 and in 
Section 2.2.4 we can see the only type of pooling operator, the modified logarithmic opinion 
pool (modified LogOp), which under certain restrictions satisfy the external Bayesianity 
property. In Section 2.3, some methods for obtaining the weights in opinion pools are 
presented. A description and a review on the some Bayesian approaches can be found in 
Section 2.4. 
2.1 Some Fundamental Issues in Aggregating Beliefs. 
There are some issues which are of fundamental importance for any combination model 
in the aggregation of beliefs such as how the beliefs or uncertainties can be quantified, how 
good those quantifications are in expressing beliefs, as well as the amount of dependence 
between them. In fact, those models generally expect as inputs expert opinions coded as 
probability functions of one form or the other which are informative, somehow comparable, 
obey the laws of probability, tend in the long run to the true probability function of the 
target population and truthfully express the individuals' opinion. In many practical cases, 
none or just some the above assumptions hold. However, there are a number of ways of 
dealing with this problem as we shall see below. 
2.1.1 Quantifying degrees of belief. 
The question of how probability functions (probabilities, densities or mass functions) 
can be chosen to represent the structure of an individual's beliefs is inherent to the Bayesian 
paradigm and as such has been investigated by Ramsey (1926), Savage (1954), de Finetti 
(1970), Fine (1973), French (1982) and Lindley (1982c), amongst others. Because re- 
peated independent measurements cannot be obtained from the same individual who is 
likely to remember his previous reasonings, the law of large number cannot be applied 
to reduce the measurement errors. Therefore, pragmatic tests (comparisons with reality) 
usually employed for estimating objective probability functions are not applicable. How- 
ever, semantic and syntactic tests have been suggested (Lindley et a1., 1979) which help 
in improving the quality of the assessments as can be seen in the following Sections 2.1.2 
and 2.1.3. Some other difficulties encountered in the experimental elicitation of opinions 
are reviewed in Savage (1971). 
The issue of whether probability functions are adequate to summarise individuals' or 
groups' information has also been the object of discussion with some arguing against (e. g. 
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Baird, 1985) and others supporting its use (Savage, 1954, de Finetti, 1970, French, 1986, 
Gardenfors and Sahlin, 1988 and Cooke, 1991). See also Apostolakis et al. (1988) and van 
Steen and Oortman Gerlings (1989) for discussions on this. 
Certainly, the nature of the underlying measure space associated with the problem of 
interest, can help in determining the most suitable form for the probability quantity to be 
adopted. For example, if f denotes a collection of disjoint events, exactly one of which is 
true at a certain time, then a probability function P which obeys the axioms of probability 
over Sl should be assessed to each possible subset E of fl, according to the degree to 
which this subset is believed to contain the fixed, but unobserved realization, say, 0EQ. 
However, in general, more than just point estimates will need to be produced with at least 
some measure of the individual's confidence in his/her assessment being also required. 
Moreover, important correlations may be lost if point estimates are used when several 
events are considered. Other alternatives to single probabilities might include confidence 
intervals, quantiles, cumulative distribution functions, and density functions, although 
it seems that single probabilities, odds and log-odds are equivalent as are cumulative 
functions and mass or density functions. 
Note that the form in which the group members express their beliefs can influence not 
only the type of aggregation rule most suitable to be adopted in a problem but also its 
form (Genest and Zidek, 1986). In most of the cases in the thesis (first 6 chapters) we 
assume that the belief or uncertainty assessments are provided in the form of probability 
density functions (either discrete or continuous) by the members of the group of experts. 
In Chapter 7, the experts provide summary statistics as their statements and in Chapter 
8 their probability assessments. 
As far as the Bayesian modelling approach for the aggregation of beliefs is concerned, 
there are two levels in which uncertainty must be encoded. One, is that the group's 
members must encode their beliefs, and the other, is that the SB analyst must encode her 
synthesis of these (see Section 2.4). Naturally, in principle, there is no reason why the 
same methodology should be employed for both elicitations. 
In some axiomatic approaches, in addition to the group members' belief assessments, 
the weights attributed to those members in the combination rule, can be interpreted 
as probabilities and as such must also be elicited, sometimes subjectively by the group 
(Section 2.3). 
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2.1.2 Calibration : measures and corrections. 
Empirical results have shown that without training, few individuals are good probability 
assessors and even with training there is no guarantee that any individual expert can assess 
probability well and thus communicate his beliefs accurately (Kahneman et al., 1982, Arkes 
and Hammond, 1986, and Wright and Ayton, 1987). However, it is worthwhile pointing 
out that papers highlighting the difficulties are much more frequently cited (citational 
bias) than those showing what people can do well as probability assessors (Beach and 
Christensen-Szalanski, 1984, Beach et al., 1987). In fact, there is evidence that, with 
training, many people can effectively make better assessments (Alpert and Raiffa, 1982, 
Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, 1980a, and Phillips, 1987), especially in areas in which they 
have expertise (Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, 1980b, Christensen-Szalanski and Bushyhead, 
1981, Cooke et al., 1988, and Cooke, 1991). 
The quality of subjective probability assessments can be evaluated in terms of a semantic 
criterion called calibration. Briefly, a person is said to be well-calibrated "if the proportion 
of correct statements, among those that were assigned the same probability, matches the 
stated probability, i. e. if his hit-rate matches his confidence" (Lindley et al., 1979). See 
also Dawid (1982). 
Perhaps the main factor that contributes to people (even experts) being miscalibrated 
is over-confidence (Lichtenstein et al., 1982). Other factors are the difficulty of the task, 
the experience and expertise in the area of interest, and training in encoding uncertainty. 
Several methods for measuring calibration have been proposed. The most known mea- 
sure is a quadratic scoring rule called Brier score proposed by Brier (1950) for meteorolog- 
ical forecasts. Murphy (1973) generalised the Brier score to multi-alternative items and 
showed that it can be partitioned in additive parts which measure not only calibration 
but also the assessor's ability to sort the events into sub-categories. Similar measures have 
been proposed by Adams and Adams (1961), by Oskamp (1962) and more recently by De- 
Groot and Fienberg (1982,1983) who adopt proper scoring rules for comparing forecasters. 
In DeGroot and Fienberg (1982) there is a definition of conditionally well-calibrated fore- 
caster in multivariate forecasting. Discussion about proper scoring rules with references 
is given by Stael von Holstein (1970). However good they are those methods rely on past 
data being available such that the assessor's performance can be measured by successive 
comparisons between statements and occurrences. 
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The interest in empirically investigating the calibration of assessments in terms of prob- 
ability density functions started in 1969 with a paper only published later by Alpert and 
Raiffa (1982). Some other papers here are those by Brown (1973), Hession and MacCarthy 
(1974), Selvidge (1975), Moskowitz and Bullers (1978), and Lichtenstein and Fischhoff 
(1980b). For log-odds assessments see Seaver et at. (1978) and for a review on all of these 
see Lichtenstein et al. (1982). 
In the context of correcting miscalibrated assessments Morris (1977) suggested, within 
the expert resolution problem, that it should be done through the use of calibration func- 
tion obtained by the decision maker. The calibration function is obtained from an auxiliary 
experiment where exchangeable experts are asked to provide probability assessments on 
many unrelated variables and a performance function is built. Lindley (1982a) defines cal- 
ibration as the process of adjusting a decision maker's likelihood function for the experts' 
assessments and, as Morris (1977), suggests the use of an auxiliary experiment. Agnew 
(1985) uses a similar approach for uncalibrated experts whose assessment errors have a 
multivariate normal density. Also, Cooke et al. (1988) propose a classical approach which 
considers measures of relative information to form a calibration score. 
In Section 7.7 we also make use of calibration functions to obtain reconciliation rules in 
the context of the Bayesian modelling approach described in Section 2.4 (see also Section 
1.1.2), which can be identified with multiplicative pools originated from the axiomatic 
approach (Sections 1.1.2 and 2.2). 
2.1.3 Coherence and honesty. 
Basically, coherence has to do with the members' probability assessments following the 
axioms of the probability theory. For example, the sum of probabilities of disjoint sets of 
events over their underlying sample space must add up to unity. Although in some simple 
situations it is relatively straightforward to obtain coherent probability assessments for a 
person with just basic knowledge of probability and statistics, in many other cases it is 
a difficult task even for well trained and experienced assessors. Specially in multivariate 
situations as the ones we deal with in the thesis, the joint probability functions can be 
broken down into conditional probability functions and the task of assessing them can be 
very demanding since the sample space in those cases is a product space (Section 6.2). In 
the case of probability assessments, Lindley et al. (1979) provide the means for. which a 
coherent "investigator" can correct for a subject's incoherence. 
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There may be situations where it is advantageous for an assessor to deliberately mis- 
state his/her probability function. A dishonest statement of opinion certainly has its 
implications when used in any decision making situation. A solution to this problem has 
been proposed with the use of proper scoring rules. which would encourage the assessor's 
honesty. In fact, it is only by giving the actual subjective probability function as the 
true opinion that the assessor can maximise his/her expected score. However, this has its 
problems, for example, if the assessor's utility function is not a linear function of his/her 
score (Stael von Holstein, 1970, and DeGroot and Fienberg, 1983). Also, French (1985) 
gives an example when the use of proper scoring rules are not sufficient to ensure honest 
statements. 
2.1.4 Non-independence between experts. 
As mentioned before, inherent to the aggregation of multiple probability statements is 
the issue of non-independence (or dependence) among the assessors. 
Within the Bayesian modelling approach, the non-independence between expert state- 
ments must be assessed by the decision maker through the specification of a joint likelihood 
function for those statements. This is not an easy task and simplifications have been pro- 
posed by several authors as Winkler (1981) and Lindley (1985a) -see Section 2.4. Also, in 
Chapter 7 we make use of graphical models to represent diverse situations of dependence 
and conditional independence between experts. 
In the context of the axiomatic approaches, the issue of dependence has been avoided 
and none of the pooling formulas known so far takes explicit account of it. It seems that 
the only way in which the pooling rules could deal with the dependence issue, would be 
through the weights allowing for some discrimination on that basis. However, this still 
would be a non-elegant, vague and ill defined way. On the other hand, one might argue 
that it is rather unlikely that a group of individuals with conflicting opinions can reach an 
agreement on the amount their opinions overlap. For example, Genest and Zidek (1986) 
claim that "the absence of a group leader or an external decision maker may be one 
practical reason for avoiding the issue of opinion dependence". 
Concerning its origins, the dependence between experts can come from experts having 
(i) overlapping data or information, (ii) overlapping methodology, and (iii) direct interac- 
tion with exchange of viewpoints. Overlapping information results from many situations 
where the assessors have access to the same basic information sources, that is, they use 
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the same data to make their assessments. Overlapping methodology may exist if assessors 
have similar academic and professional training, when even having non-overlapping infor- 
mation they are expected to use many of the same modelling methods or the same sort 
of reasoning. Certainly, the direct observation of other assessor opinions, the presentation 
of public reports and the open discussion of viewpoints will add to the overlap among 
the assessors judgements. In this thesis we shall not consider the problems where direct 
interaction between experts occur. Also, we shall assume the overlapping of information 
as the only cause of dependence. 
Note that, when the issues of dependence and miscalibration are jointly considered, it 
may well be reasonable for a decision maker to treat uncalibrated experts statements as 
being independent, even if those experts have overlapping information. 
2.2 The Axiomatic Approach. 
As mentioned before in Section 1.1.2, the axiomatic approach focuses on certain axioms 
or properties that a fair and democratic combining rule should obey in order to look 
appealing. The usual starting point of this approach is to consider a general hyper- 
function T called pooling operator (see Definition 2.1 below) which maps the k members 
assessed probability measures on 92, i. e. fl, ..., 
fk where fi :Q -+ [0, oo) (i =1,..., k), 
and possibly the underlying a-algebra S of events defined over SZ, into the interval [0, oo). 
This hyper-function T has then its form shaped according to the axioms the group chooses 
to follow. 
In fact, the axioms (properties) are restrictions applied to T. We describe in Section 
2.2.1 the main axioms found in the related literature and show that certain properties 
when required to apply simultaneously can restrict the class of eligible pooling operators 
to the extreme degree of dictatorships being the only possible solutions. 
2.2.1 Pooling operators, axioms and impossibilities. 
Now, we define T as a class of pooling operators which are essential components of the 
usual characterisation of some of the properties we describe in the following sections. 
Definition 2.1 (Pooling Operator). Let (St, p) be a measure space. Let A be the 
class of all p-measurable functions f: S2 -4 [0, oo) such that J'fdu =1 with Ec almost 
everywhere (a. e. ). A pooling operator T: Ak -3 0, is that one which maps a vector of 
functions (fl, 
..., fk), where f, EA 
(for all i=1, ..., 
k), into a single function also in A. 
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Because a pooling operator can also be defined for when A is the class of functions 
f: 1? -p [0,1], we shall indicate when this is the case in the text below. 
As examples of restrictions on T we can mention McConway's (1981) Weak Setwise 
Function Property (WSFP), viz. : 
T (fi, ..., 
fk)(x)= F[x, fi (x), ... , 
fk (x)] fix ES, (2.1) 
where it = If : St -4 [0,1]}, and F: SZ X [0,1]k -. + [0,1], which is equivalent to the 
Marginalization Property (MP) we define in Section 2.2.2, when the underlying Q-field S 
is tertiary. The WSFP together with the Zero Probability Property (ZPP), viz : 
fi(x) = ... = fk(x) =0= T(. fl, - --, 
fk)(x) =0 Vx ES, (2.2) 
is equivalent to the Strong Setwise Function Property (SSFP), viz : 
T (fl, 
..., 
fk) (x) = G[fi (x), ..., fk(x)] 
Vx ES, (2.3) 
where G: [0,1]k -- [0,1]. The important result here proved by McConway (1981) is that 
the MP together with the ZPP is equivalent to the SSFP and restricts T to be a linear 
combination of fl,..., ff (Section 2.2.2). 
On the other hand, Wagner (1982) showed that for tertiary a-fields the WSFP, together 
with the external Bayesianity property (Definition 2.3 in Section 2.2.3), restricts T to 
a dictatorial form, i. e. T(f1i..., fk) = fi for a fixed i. However, Genest (1984c) and 
Genest et al. (1986) circumvented this impossibility by introducing a normalised form 
of both WSFP and SSFP which together with external Bayesianity leads a form of T 
to a logarithmic (multiplicative) form, as we shall see in Section 2.2.3. Obviously, the 
logarithmic pools take the ZPP to the extreme, being sufficient that just one of the fi's 
be zero. To avoid this undesirable fact, we shall invoke Cromwell's rule (Lindley, 1982b) 
to support our assumption that fi >0 for all i=1, ..., 
k in the logarithmic pools. 
Another property called Independence Preservation Property (IPP) was proposed by 
Laddaga (1977). It requires that one should have 
Z'(fi, ""-ý fx)(ý n y) = T(fý, ---, fx)(x) T(fi,... ý fx)(y) : 
(2.4) 
whenever fi(x n y) = fi(x) fi(y) for some x and y in S (i= 1.. ., 
k). Note, that Laddaga's 
IPP demands the pooling rule to preserve the independence amongst distinct events and 
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not the independence among the members' (experts') opinions about events. In fact, the 
works on axiomatic approaches avoid the issue of dependence between the members of the 
group which is better investigated within the modelling approaches - see Section 2.4. Also 
in this regard, Lehrer and Wagner (1983) proved that linear pools cannot satisfy the IPP 
unless they are dictatorial, i. e. T (fl, ..., 
fk) = fi for some fixed i. This impossibility result 
is indeed related to that of Dalkey (1972,1975) who showed that only dictatorships could 
satisfy the SSFP when it is also required to hold for conditional probability functions such 
that 
7'(fiý fk)(ýýy) = Gýfi(ýýy)ý fk(xI y)ý (2.5) 
Bordley and Wolf (1981) in a critical review of Dalkey's work, argue against the SSFP 
in which it is inconsistent with the way probabilities are aggregated in Bayesian models. 
They claim without proof that Bayes' theorem results in an equation of the form (2.1), 
the WSFP. On the other hand, McConway (1981) argues against Dalkey's impossibility 
theorem in that it requires the same G to apply to both conditional and unconditional 
probability functions. 
A more general and stronger result is that of Genest and Wagner (1984), we mentioned 
in Section 1.1.1, in which no pooling operator of the form 
F'(fi(x),..., fk(Xi)] 
ý'(ýiý --", 
fk)(xi) = Ej=11'i[fi(xi), 
..., 
fk(xi)] 
(2.6) 
where Fj : (0,1) k -> (0,1) is also allowed to depend on the identity of xj (j = 1, ..., n), 
except dictatorships can also obey the IPP when S2 is at least quarternary (continuous 
case included). For Sl with exactly four points, they showed that the only class of pools 
which satisfy both (2.6) and IPP has the form 
k 
T (fl, 
."", 
fk)(xj) « 
rj[f=(x5)]b. 
e{a. 
fs(zi)El-f; (xi) }, (2.7) 
i-1 
for ai and bi arbitrary real constants and for at least one of the Ft's in (2.6) Lebesgue 
measurable (j = 1, ..., n). Note that the 
logarithmic pool is a particular case of (2.7) 
when all the ai's are set to zero. 
Although the IPP can look appealing at a first glance, it is a very demanding criterion. 
In particular, it demands that if experts happen to assign probability distributions which 
agree that any two functions are independent -even if this is an accidental artifact of 
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the probability assignments- then T must preserve this independence. Although this 
may well be, it is exceedingly fierce to demand independence preservation for all events 
in the case where the agreement of independence originates from commonly held logical 
arguments that the group would like T to preserve. 
However, in this thesis -and also in Faria and Smith (1994,1996,1997)- we propose 
much weaker conditions for the prior-to-posterior preservation of conditional independence 
structures. The preservation is demanded only for logical associations encoded by partic- 
ular types of chain graphs or influence diagrams (see Chapter 5). The pooling operators 
that are devised are conditional on a form which is a generalisation of the WSFP for 
conditional variables with the equality sign being replaced by a proportionality symbol in 
(2.1) -see formula (6.1) in Section 6.2. They also obey the external Bayesianity property 
on those conditional variables and are limited to be applied only to components of a given 
conditional independence preserving structure which is agreed to be logically supported 
by the group. The consensus on a variable conditioned in another, say xjJy may depend 
on occurred (fixed) values of the conditioning variable yi which influence outcomes of xj 
(Chapter 4). Thus, the type of impossibility results obtained by Dalkey (1972,1975) and 
Genest and Wagner (1984) are only very loosely connected to our characterisation. 
2.2.2 The marginalization property and the linear opinion pool. 
Suppose that, in the context of the expert judgement problem or in the context of the 
group problem where a supra-Bayesian (SB) is assumed to perform the pooling, a combi- 
nation of the group members opinions must be obtained from their subjective probability 
assessments over some space S2 of states of nature. The members agree not only on the 
space 1 but also on the a-algebra S over f they use. 
A a-algebra of events S over f is characterised by an infinite set of events X1, ..., 
Xn, ... 
belonging to S such that Ui 1Xt E S. In this sense, the marginalization of a probability 
measure defined on a v-algebra S to a probability measure on a sub-v-algebra V of S 
consists of simply restricting its domain from S to V. If the probability measure is a 
density function, the marginalization can be obtained by summing or integrating out the 
events or quantities in S but not in V. The resulting density is then called a marginal 
density. 
Now, we can define the marginalization property as follow: 
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Definition 2.2 (Marginalization property). If the same combined probability density 
function for the group is obtained whether (a) the members opinions are first combined 
into a single density over S and then a marginal density taken, or (b) the group members 
each give their marginal densities over V and a combination is formed from these, then 
the combined density is said to obey the Marginalization Property (MP). 
As mentioned in the last section, McConway (1981) proved that the linear opinion pool 
(LinOp) of Stone (1961), to which Bacharach (1979) attributes to Laplace, 
k 
(2.8) 
tai 
where Ejý_1 wi =1 with wi non-negative, is the only pooling formula to satisfy both 
the WSFP in (2.1) and the MP when SZ contains at least three points. Generalising this 
result, Aczel et at. (1984) and Genest (1984b) proved that the generalised linear opinion 
Pool (generalised LinOp) below, is under the WSFP the only type of pool to satisfy the 
MP for a tertiary o-field on S2 : 
kk 
T (fl, 
... , 
fk) (x) =Z wjfi(x) + 
[1 
-E w=] 9 (x) 
(2.9) 
i=l i=l 
for all fl,..., fk E0 and xES, where gEA is a fixed arbitrary probability measure and 
the weights w= E [-1,1] are such that I Ek 1 wil < 1. Obviously, the LinOp is a particular 
case of the generalised LinOp when Fjý-1 w; = 1. This corresponds to the ZPP being 
required for (2.9). 
The possible negative weights in (2.9) are of difficult interpretation as pointed out by 
Genest (1984b) despite the efforts of Winkler (1981) and Genest and Schervish (1983) to 
give them some meaning in specific contexts. However, if the pooling is also required to 
follow a dominance principle (Aczel et al., 1984) in which 
T (fi, ..., 
fk)(x) < ß'(4i, ..., 4k)(x) , 
whenever f; (x) < qj (x) for all i=1, ..., 
k, then the weights in (2.9) will be nonnegative. 
Genest (1984b) showed that negative weights may only occur if the a-field associated with 
f is finite. 
Also, regarding the weights in LinOps some authors (e. g. Laddaga, 1977 and. Bordley 
and Wolf, 1981) have argued that because the experts opinions may change from one event 
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to the next, that the weights should be allowed vary with it, that is wi(x) should replace 
wi in (2.8) and (2.9) above. However, albeit intuitively appealing this is incompatible 
with the results of McConway (1981) and Genest (1984b) which imply (2.8) and (2.9) 
with weights not depending on x. 
2.2.3 The external Bayesianity property. 
In the context of the group decision problem, a hypothetical case is considered where 
a group of Bayesians jointly receive new information Y about a random variable X and 
agree a common likelihood function 1(XIY) associated with the data y. Thus, the external 
Bayesianity property can be defined as follows 
Definition 2.3 (External Bayesianity property). If whatever the common likelihood 
function 1(x1y), the group's combined probability density function, updated by Bayes rule 
using 1(x1y), produces the same posterior density as if the combination has been performed 
after each individual in the group has revised his opinion also using Bayes rule on 1(xly), 
then that group is said to obey the external Bayesianity property and is called an externally 
Bayesian (EB) group. 
Briefly in other words, an EB pooling policy ensures that the combination rule will give 
the same result a posteriori, independently of being obtained before or after the members 
of the group update their beliefs when receiving a new data y for which they agree an 
associated likelihood l(x1y) on the variable x. 
Madansky (1964,1978) characterised the EB pooling operators as those synthesising the 
diverging individual opinions fl,..., fk into a group opinion expressed by a single density 
f=T (fl, ..., fk) that must satisfy 
T 
1. f, ("' I- A_ LT(fl, ".., fk) a. e. (2.10) f 1"fidL f 1-fkd1t f l. T(fl,..., fk)d1z 
where 1: fI -+ (0, oo) is the group's common likelihood function for all the data that all 
the members observe, such that 0<f1. f=dµ < oo (i = 1, ..., k). Condition 
(2.10) has 
also been considered under other denominations like data independence preservation by 
McConway (1978) and weak likelihood ratio axiom by Bordley (1982) and Morris (1983). 
Notice that as the condition (2.10) allows the pooling of posterior densities to be achieved 
by the pooling of prior densities through the commonly agreed likelihood 1, T can be said 
to be a prior-to-posterior coherent (PPC) pooling operator (Weerahandi and Zidek, 1978). 
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In fact, the PPC property is more general than the external Bayesianity property in 
that the requirement of a common likelihood for the group is relaxed. In this sense, a 
PPC pooling operator must satisfy 
lila lkfk 
- 
T(11.... i Ik)T (fl, ..., fk) T ýf 
116dµ' : Ilkfkdlz f T(1l,..., lk)T(fl,..., fk)dµ µ a. e. (2.11) 
where li : SZ --} (0, oo) is the i-th member likelihood for the new data y informative about 
x such that 0< 
,fl; 
f; d; z < oo (i = 1, *.... k). This means that the group's combined 
probability density function, updated by Bayes rule using the group's combined likelihood 
T (j) where j= (11, ..., 
Ik), produces the same posterior density as if the combination had 
been performed after each member i in the group has revised his opinion also using Bayes 
rule on li(xly) (i = I, -, k). Note that the external Bayesianity property is a particular 
case of PPC when l= =l for all i=1, ... ,k and 
T (j) = 1. 
Also, notice that while the external Bayesianity property can be invoked only when 
the likelihood I is common knowledge to the group (see Chapter 5), the PPC property 
demands all the individual likelihoods 11, ... ilk to 
be common knowledge to the group. 
2.2.4 The modified logarithmic opinion pool. 
Genest et al. (1986) proved that the following modified logarithmic opinion pool is, 
under certain regularity conditions discussed later, the most general externally Bayesian 
logarithmic pool satisfying (2.10) : 
gll1 fi-i 
. 
fk) =kw; dµa. 
e. , 
(2.12) 
f 9ýt_i fi 
where g: f --} (0, oo), in general, is an arbitrary bounded function on Q and wi, i= 
1, ..., 
k, are arbitrary weights (not necessarily nonnegative) adding up to one. The wt's 
are experts' opinions weights in the combination and must be suitably chosen to reflect 
relative expertise. They should possibly be elicited by the experts based on their common 
knowledge about their own relative predictive capabilities. 
One of the above mentioned regularity conditions on (St, µ) is that for an existing 
Lebesgue measurable function P: Sl x (0, oo)k --> (0, oo), the pooling operator T: [1k -+ A 
is such that 
T (fi, ..., fig) (z) = 
P[x, fl (x), ..., fx(x)) 
, li a. e.. 
(2.13) f P(-, fi, 
..., 
fk)dll 
This condition, a relaxation of the WSFP in (2.1), is called likelihood principle.. This is 
because it restricts the likelihood of the combined density T at a particular point x in St to 
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depend, except for a normalising constant, only on that x and on the individual densities 
f= (i = 1, ..., 
k) assigned to x, and not upon other points and densities of the points which 
might have occurred but did not. It is illustrated in Examples 4.1 and 4.4 in Chapter 4, 
that (2.13) is a strong and rather arbitrary requirement particularly in the case where T 
is a multivariate density modelling a causal structure of associations between variables. In 
the generalisation we make in Chapter 6 we require (2.13) to hold only for marginal and 
conditioned variables related to individual nodes in a graphical representation structure. 
Another assumption which they make here is that the underlying space (St, y) can be 
partitioned in at least four non-negligible sets. In this case such a measure space is called 
quarternary. This therefore includes the case where p is Lebesgue and many (but not all) 
cases where y is a counting measure. 
McConway (1978) proved that in the case where f is countable and µ is a counting- 
type (purely atomic) measure then the formulas of the type (2.13) would be the only ones 
to qualify as EB if (2.13) holds. In the case where fl is purely continuous (excluding 
thus the case where the sample space is countable), Genest (1984) showed that the only 
non-dictatorship externally Bayesian pooling operator satisfying (2.13), but when P is not 
indexed by x, i. e. 
(fl,..., fk) (x) = 
P[fl(x), ..., 
A(X)] 
a. e. , 
(2.14) 
f P(fl, ", fk)dy 
is the logarithmic opinion pool (LogOp) : 
lli-1 
fi 
(1 T(fll... 
ýfký = rrk 
1 
a. e. ý 12.151 
where wi >0 (i = 1, ..., 
k) are arbitrary constants such that >= 1 wi = 1. 
The major intrinsic problem with the modified LogOp (2.12) in practice, is the difficulty 
of choosing the essentially bounded function g (which is even difficult to interpret). At 
a first glance one could be tempted to conclude that the function g could represent a 
decision maker's prior distribution for X. But according to Genest et al. (1986), even 
if the pooling rule (2.12) is adopted by a decision maker, there is no reason to assume 
in advance a bounded prior density. Nevertheless, in the context of our group decision 
problem, if unanimity preservation is required, i. e. T(f,..., f) = f, Vf E d, then g would 
be forced to unity and (2.12) would be reduced to an ordinary LogOp of the form (2.15). 
We shall employ combination rules which preserve unanimity of conditional independence 
structures in the examples related to the axiomatic approaches in this thesis. 
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2.2.5 A problem with external Bayesianity. 
The EB group has several advantages. For example Raiffa (1968) illustrated how the 
relevance over the order in which the pooling and updating are done can lead to subjects 
trying to increase their influence on the consensus by insisting that their opinions be 
computed before the outcome of an experiment is known. Being EB all such argument 
would be pointless. Also, as Genest (1984a) points out, if such a pool can be agreed then 
it has great practical advantages. For example its members need not meet again after data 
has been observed. 
Unfortunately as currently developed, EB pools have serious drawbacks. Perhaps the 
most obvious one is that, as Lindley (1985) points out, it appears perverse that the weights 
w= (wl,..., wk) must a priori be common knowledge to the group (see Section 2.4.5). 
Surely as evidence appears which sheds light on the relative expertise of its members, the 
group should agree to adapt its weights to favour the better forecasters. 
In Chapter 4, we use some examples to show the above mentioned difficulty with EB 
pools and to point out how an extension of external Bayesianity to conditional external 
Bayesianity in multivariate group decision situations can allow the weights to adapt re- 
flecting the members' relative expertise. Other issues specific to multivariate problems are 
outlined in Chapter 6 where we generalise the external Bayesianity properties so that on 
the one hand they are suitable for the analysis of multivariate structures and on the other 
they allow the group to learn about the combination weights vector w. 
2.3 Some Weighting Schemes. 
One of the major difficulties associated with the opinion pools in the axiomatic ap- 
proach, is the question of obtaining the group members' weights to be used on those rules, 
like formulas (2.8) and (2.15). This is because there is, up to date, no normative theory 
behind them to support their choice. However, there are several operational methods 
proposed, most of them specifically developed for linear pools. 
Winkler (1968) suggested four possibilities : 
(i) attribute equal weights to all the members, 
(ii) set the weights proportional to a ranking based on the members' "goodness" as 
assessors, 
(iii) allow the members to weight themselves, and 
(iv) use of proper scoring rules. 
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Also, DeGroot (1974) developed a more mathematical than practical procedure for Win- 
kler's suggestion (iii) in which each member provides weights for a LinOp and the pools 
then obtained are applied repeatedly to the members' judgements. Other methods on 
appropriate updating of weights can be found for example in Mendel and Sheridan (1987), 
Bayarri and DeGroot (1988), DeGroot and Mortera (1991) and Cooke (1991). Also, Cooke 
(1991) comments on the main problems in developing a theory of weights. 
The objective of this section is to illustrate some weighting schemes that could be 
employed together with the axiomatic approaches we have described above as well as with 
the generalisation we will be proposing of external Bayesianity to conditional external 
Bayesianity. As we shall see, this generalisation is such that it allows the group to learn 
about the combination's vector of weights. This responds at least in part to some of the 
criticisms (see Section 2.4.4) about the inflexibility of the weights on the well discussed 
LogOps which usually are not allowed to vary with the members' individual expertise (see 
Section 4.1). Some examples on how the weights are allowed to be updated based on the 
individuals' relative expertise on causal variables are given in Chapter 4. An example with 
deterministic weights is given in Section 4.2. 
It would be interesting in group decision situations that the group itself could choose the 
weights on the basis of its members commonly held information about their specialities and 
expertise. However, a group which cannot or is not prepared to agree about the member's 
relative expertise may prefer to adopt a class of combination rules which sequentially 
adapts the weights based on each individual relative predictive performances as done by 
methods such as the optimal combination of Bates and Granger (1969), the quasi-Bayes 
approach of Smith and Makov (1978), and by the outperformance of Bunn (1975,1978), 
we describe in the following sections. 
For the methods we describe below, we shall assume that for an independent time 
series Xt, the variables X1, X2, X3,... are strictly comparable in the sense that success by 
member i in predicting Xt, after having seen xi,..., xt_1 is strictly comparable with his 
success in predicting Xt+1, after having seen xl,..., xt. Examples when this assumption 
is reasonable include the case when X1, X2, ... is a homogeneous time series. 
2.3.1 The optimal combination of Bates and Granger. 
The first general analytical linear model for combining forecasts (point estimates) was 
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proposed by Bates and Granger (1969). Because it minimises the variance of the combined 
forecast error for estimating the weights of each individual forecast in the linear pool, this 
model was called optimal combination. In this method the weight of each forecaster i in a 
particular time t, can be given by the convex combination 
Wi, t = ýw:, t-i -F (1- . ý) 
i_1 
-i 
(2.16) 
where Si _ Eý_to e,, 2; et, j = xJ - IE[fi (x1)]; to is an arbitrary initial time; f; (xj) is 
the i-th forecaster predictive density for the random variable X at the time j and A is a 
factor used to give relative weight between the past wi and the function of the squares of 
(t - 1) - to past errors. 
The optimal combination has been shown to be a robust and efficient method (Newbold 
and Granger, 1974, and Winkler and Makridakis, 1983). It is also expected to present 
good performance over medium and large samples (Menezes and Bunn, 1990,1991) which 
motivates its use for comparison with other methods (Faria and Souza, 1995). 
2.3.2 Bunn's outperformance approach. 
The need for a not very complex Bayesian approach that would allow the incorpora- 
tion of subjective opinion into the synthesis of forecasts has justified, at least in part, the 
appearance of the outperformace method proposed by Bunn (1975), also for linear combi- 
nation of forecasts but based on probabilities with a simple non-parametric interpretation. 
Outperformance interprets a component w;, t (i = 1, ..., 
k) of the weights vector wt as 
the probability that the member i will produce the most appropriate forecasting model 
(the closest to a good model) of X. The sufficient statistics with which to learn about wt 
is assumed to be both wt-1 and the identity of the member whose model produced the 
closest forecast of Xt. This identity, viewed as a random variable, is assumed to follow a 
Multinomial (1, B) distribution while the wt is interpreted as the prior mean of 6t. The 
parameter vector wt is then successively updated in the usual Bayesian framework in the 
light of forecasts. Using this method with the assumption that the i-th member relative 
expertise about Xt is independent of every other member expertise about Xf, it is easily 
checked that for t>1 
wi, t = (1 - pt-I)wt, t-i + pt-i (t - 1)-lri, t-i (2.17) 
for i=1,..., k, where p=_1 = (t - 1)/[ät_1 + (t - 1)], with ät_1 =1 ai, t_J, where 
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ai, t_1 are the parameters of the conjugate Dirichlet prior distribution of 6t, and r;, t_1 is 
the number of successes of forecasting model i up to time t-1. 
A more attractive formulation of this approach (Bunn, 1978) allows the probability 9; t, t 
that the member i will produce a more appropriate model than member I at time t, to 
be revised in the light of all the members relative performances. Pairwise comparisons 
between models are set up and a relative performance ranking is obtained. The weight 
wtl, t is assumed to be the posterior mean of the 8it, t_1 whose density function is now 
assumed to be a beta with parameters (ail, ait). These parameters are updated in the 
usual Bayesian way. Also assuming outperformance independence among estimators, the 
estimate of the probability of model i outperform all other models, wi, t, can be obtained 
forl ias 
k 
wi, t a 
ri 
wjt, t 
i=i 
(2.18) 
Such a method of updating weights transfers directly onto both the bin Op (2.8) and the 
modified LogOp (2.12) discussed in Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.4 above. 
Notice that the rule is fair to members in the group in that it is symmetric in their 
success if a priori we set wi, o = wt, o for i, 1= 1,... 3k. It also 
has the desirable property that 
a member whose models consistently produce closest forecasts has those models ever more 
closely followed by the group. However, there has been some criticism of this approach on 
the basis that while other methods such as the quasi-Bayes we describe in the next section 
are intentional approximations, the outperformance is an out ranking method built upon 
unintentional mistakes (French and Bunn, 1980). 
2.3.3 The quasi-Bayes approach of Smith and Makov. 
Although originally developed for signal detection and pattern recognition, where un- 
supervised learning and sequential classification play an important role, the quasi-Bayes 
approach of Smith and Makov (1978) is suitable for any situation where it is possible 
to make an extensive study of the distributions of observations belonging to individual 
populations, so that it can be completely specified but the mixture of these populations 
is unknown. 
The quasi-Bayes consists of a simplification of the sequential Bayesian estimation pro- 
cedure, which presents a serious problem in the calculation of the posterior probability 
distribution for the vector of weights wt in linear pools. In fact, Bayes rule applied for 
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estimating those weights gives at a time t the posterior distribution 
(wtý? t-1) (2.19) f(wtkt) a G(xtlwt)f 
where x' x,. ), f (zvtlxt-1) is the weights predictive distribution at time t-1 
and . 
C(") the likelihood function. However, successive computations of (2.19) cause a 
combinatorial explosion of terms in the likelihood function when this likelihood is identified 
with the linear pool (2.8) applied to xtjwt. The quasi-Bayes approach simplifies (2.19) by 
attributing a Dirichlet with parameters (al, ..., ak) as a prior 
distribution for the weights 
which are then sequentially estimated by a posterior update on those parameters. This 
gives for i=I, -, 
k 
wilt = 
a`'t (2.20) k t+ Ej=l aj, t 
where 
+k 
Mxt)«t, t-i (2.21) aý, t = crt, t-i / Ej-1 fj(xt)aj, t-1 
Therefore, the weights in this approach are obtained by considering the likelihoods 
of the individual predictive densities as measures of distance between observations and 
population means. 
2.4 The Bayesian Modelling Approach. 
The Bayesian modelling approach for combining the opinions of the members of a group 
treats the individuals probability assessments as data within the usual Bayesian framework. 
For this, because a likelihood function for those individuals assessments must be elicited, 
we shall make use of the figure of a Supra-Bayesian (SB) decision maker who is supposed 
to be herself (at least) an expert on the members' assessing abilities (see Section 2.4.1). 
The first conceptual and methodological Bayesian framework for "the use of experts in 
decision situations" was introduced by Morris (1974,1977) -see also Roberts (1965)- 
and built upon by Lindley et al. (1979), French (1980,1981), Winkler(1981), Bordley 
(1983), Lindley (1982c, 1983,1985a, 1987), Agnew (1985), Clemen and Winkler (1985), 
Mendel and Sheridan (1987), West (1989), Wiper and French (1995) and Wiper and Pettit 
(1996), among others. 
After introducing the general Bayesian modelling approach (Section 2.4.2) we refer to 
the question of how the SB's likelihood function for the members can be simplified when 
conditional independence assumptions can be made (Section 2.4.3) and then describe in 
more detail some modelling methods we refer to in the thesis (Sections 2.4.4 and 2.4.5). 
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2.4.1 The supra-Bayesian decision maker. 
The term supra-Bayesian (SB) was first used by Keeney and Raiffa (1976) referring to 
a fictitious decision maker who would represent the "synthetic personality" of a group of 
individuals (Hogarth, 1975, p. 282). 
We use that term here as a general designation for the (feminine) figure of a Bayesian 
decision maker (fictitious or not) who is responsible for somehow collating the group 
members' beliefs. 
In group decision situations where there is a group leader then this leader is the natural 
SB decision maker. In other cases, such as the "jury problem", there may be enough 
cohesion (or affinity) in the group albeit some differences of opinions so that a fictitious 
SB would be justifiable. The problem with the virtual SB within the Bayesian modelling 
approach is that a likelihood function for the members' statements must be elicited as well 
as a prior distribution for the variable (or vector) of interest and this task would fall on 
the group. French (1985) proposes a benevolent SB who would start with a vague prior 
over the u-field S of interest and then would learn about S only through the members' 
beliefs. The absence of a group leader or an external decision maker would imply in the 
group itself having to construct the SB by agreement about how she should behave. 
2.4.2 The general supra-Bayesian analysis. 
A quite general way of viewing the SB analysis of the aggregating problem is to see it 
as the problem of a SB decision maker seeking for expert advice to make use of the most 
relevant information available to effectively make better inferences about the unknown 
parameters 0= (B1, ..., B)' of statistical models she attributes to uncertain 
(future) 
events or quantities of interest X= (X1, ..., X,, 
)'. The parameter matrix 0 is composed 
of vectors 9= (O, , ..., 6j, d(j))' of 
dimension d(j) where each element 01 (1 = 1, ..., 
d(j)) 
represents the unknown parameter of the model attributed to X3 (j = 1, ..., n). 
Typically, the relevant information associated with the expert problem consists of : 
(a) other events or quantities Z= (ZI,..., Z7, )', not in X, which are also informa- 
tive about 0 (these could include past observations of X), and whose parame- 
ters associated to their underlying statistical models are (P _ (cpl, ..., 
)', where 
cps = ((p"ji, ..., ýPjd'(j)) is of dimension d'(j) for j=1, ..., m; 
(b) experts' statements, Q Q, ), which can be objective reports or subjective 
opinions they have related to 0, and which could possibly be obtained from Z; 
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and 
(c) how the SB has access to what information (about variables, parameters and the 
experts) and how for the SB that information relates to each other in the particular 
configuration of the problem being considered. 
On the other hand, an expert statement Qi = (ql1, .., q n), where each component vec- 
tor q.. = (q=jl, ..., qi, j, d(j))' with gjji 
being the expert's EL statement about the parameter 
0j1 of U (i = 1, ..., k; j=1, ..., n and 
I=1, 
..., 
d(j)), is usually based on all information 
he has about quantities associated to X and which characterises his information base Ii. 
Those statements can be characterised by : 
(i) summary statistics obtained from random samples of Z (Clemen, 1987), 
(ii) subjective discrete probabilities when X is a vector of events (Lindley, 1985a), 
(iii) quantiles partially specifying density functions (Mendel and Sheridan, 1987), 
(iv) the values of parameters fully specifying subjective probability density functions 
(Winkler, 1981), or 
(v) measures of location and scale only, where specifications of density functions are 
not required (Lindley, 1983). 
We shall assume throughout the paper that observations of the quantities X and Z 
have the same underlying dominating measures associated to the product space fl of 
spaces related to components of X and Z. 
2.4.3 Conditional independence and Bayes rule. 
Usually, before consulting a group of experts and beginning to receive their statements 
Q, the SB has already her prior opinion about the unknown parameter matrix 0, as ex- 
pressed by a density function f (O). As a Bayesian, if she has other information (Z, 11)) 
somehow informative about 0 then she would incorporate this information into her model, 
by updating her prior f (0) to the form f(0,4) through her assessment of a conditional 
joint density function f (z, -tPJ0). Moreover, if she consults experts and still wants to be 
Bayesian, then she must treat their reported statements Q as data and proceed the updat- 
ing of f (6[a, -P) to the posterior form f (6lQ, z 4P), now through her likelihood function 
f (QJ6, z, f) for Q given 0, Z=z and 4P, by using Bayes theorem again. Neverthe- 
less, this sequential approach assumes implicitly that Q and (Z, -[P) are all independent 
given 0. Thus, if there is a structure of conditional independence between Q, and 4, 
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then an appropriate approach would be to update her prior f (01-1ý) to a posterior form 
f (E)IQ, z, P) through her conditional joint density f (Qýz, 4), Ü), taking that conditional 
independence structure into consideration. When there are no conditional independence 
restrictions, the posterior density would have the general form 
f(ýIQ, z, ý')= 
f(QI2,4, e)f(eIz, 4) 
(2.22) 
f(Qlz, e) 
Henceforth, every density function f (-) refers to the SB's probability density. 
Certainly, the most difficult task related to obtaining the posterior density for e con- 
ditionally on Q, Z, 1) in (2.22), is the SB's assessment of f (QJz, -ID, O). However, sim- 
plifications of that function can be achieved if the SB is prepared to make additional 
conditional independence statements about those variables. For instance, if a particular 
class of problems is modelled such that Z is independent of 0 given Q and/or 4), then the 
SB's reconciliation rule (2.22) could be simplified to 
f (0(Q, z, 4ý) =f 
(QI", ®)f (elg) 
. f(QIf) 
Note that even a simpler density function of the form f (01Q) =f (QIO) f (O)/ f (Q) is 
in general difficult to obtain. Perhaps the main difficulty occurs when Q is a vector (or 
matrix) of density functions for which the SB must specify a likelihood function f (Q10). 
In this case, f (Q 10) must represent a joint probability distribution for density functions, 
that is, an hyper likelihood function. 
In Chapter 7, we characterise diverse univariate situations in the modelling approach 
context where (2.22) can be further simplified and the SB's task of assessing the likelihood 
function for the experts is facilitated. 
2.4.4 Winkler's consensus model for dependent experts. 
Winkler's (1981) consensus model with dependence was developed for the univariate set- 
ting where the variable of interest 0ER could be either a parameter of a statistical model 
or a future observation. The model's general formulation considers that the experts are 
calibrated and provide the Bayesian decision maker their continuous probability densities 
q= (ql,..., qk) for 9. The decision maker then assesses her joint likelihood function , C(e) 
for the experts' errors e= (el, ..., ei, 
)' where ei = pt -0 and pi = Ei [Bj =f±. 8q; (8)dO 
for i=1, ..., 
k is taken as the experts' point estimates for 0. Winkler assumes that e is 
location invariant so that £(e), the decision maker's likelihood function for the experts' 
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errors, can be assessed. If fo(O) represents the decision maker prior density for 0 then her 
"consensus distribution" is given by 
.f 
(O q, J, fo) a /2(e)fo (e) " (2.23) 
Although this formulation seems to be a good solution to the problem of assessing an 
hyper joint likelihood function for the experts' densities q, information provided by the 
experts (their confidence on their assessments) are being lost by the use of just point 
estimates obtained from those densities. However, Winkler proposes that this also could 
be solved if , C(e) is chosen such that 
+00 
C(e)des 
... dej_lde1+1 ... 
dek = q; (µi - e, ) 
Another alternative proposition that Winkler makes and which would enable the mod- 
elling of the dependence among the experts and the decision maker herself is to treat her 
as the k+ 1th expert with qk+l (B) = fo (9), in which case the consensus distribution would 
be f (Ojqi, 
..., qk}l, . 
C) oc , C(µ1 - 9,. .., µk+l - B) and that then would reflect 
her prior 
information. 
Restricting 
.C 
in (2.23) to the family of k-variate normal densities with a mean vector of 
k zeroes and a positive definite covariance matrix E with variances aj for i=1, ... ,k and 
covariances Tjj for i, j=1, ..., k, i j, Winkler obtains, 
for when E is known and the 
prior density for 0 is an improper diffuse density, a standard normal density ¢[(0-tC*)/o *] 
for the consensus where 
Irr, -1ß 
(2.24) 
and 
v'2 -1 (2.25) 1, r, _l i 
The vector 1= (1, ..., 1)`. 
Note that, It* is a linear combination Ek 1 w; pt of the experts' means, where 
3=1 Tip (2.26) w= == ýIk 
=1 
ýj=17 
with E-1 = (r; 1). 
For E not known, applying the natural-conjugate analysis with the assumption that E 
and 0 are independent, we have for an inverted Wishart density for E with parameters 
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(So, Eo), a multivariate normal density for jt E, 0 as above, and an improper diffuse prior 
density for 0, that the posterior consensus is at density with Jo +k -1 degrees of freedom, 
mean m* and variance (Jo +k- 1)s*2/(bo +k- 3), that is 
where 
.f 
(eI µ) a 
I(jo 1+ (9 - m*)2 i -(öo+k)/2 (2.27) 
+k- 1)s*zJ 
ilr 11 
(2.28) 
and 
s"2 = 
bo + (m*1 - µ)fr'o lit 
(do +k- 1)1`Eý' 1 
(2.29) 
If the decision maker's prior density for 0 is normal or t then the posterior density is poly-t 
(Dreze, 1976) and can be evaluated numerically. The subjective assessment of covariance 
coefficients is studied by Gokhale and Press (1982). The above results overlap with those 
of Lindley (1983). 
Also, Clemen (1987) shows by using the above formulation of Winkler in a degenerate 
situation (see Chapter 7), where the experts report to the decision maker the summary 
statistics they obtain from samples they have observed, that the Bernoulli model for non- 
independent experts corresponds to a mixture of beta distributions. He then studies the 
effect of different overlapping patterns to conclude that commonly observed data "intro- 
duce dependence among the experts and produce a confounding effect that more than 
offsets the additional information, resulting in the mixed distribution being more spread 
out ... 
". 
In Chapter 7, we also illustrate several possibilities of overlapping of information be- 
tween experts by using influence diagrams. In particular, the above mentioned degenerate 
situation of the expert problem is investigated under considerations of sufficiency. 
2.4.5 Lindley's reconciliation of discrete probability distributions. 
Lindley (1985a) analyses the case of finite O= (Or, ..., 
9,, ) by assuming a joint multi- 
variate normal density for the experts' log-probabilities qjj = log[pri(O )] (i = 1, ..., 
k; j= 
1, ..., n). This gives, with further assumptions about expectations (and conditional expec- 
tations) and by applying Bayes formula, a posterior log-probability for O which is linear 
in the elements q; j. That is, 
logp(BSIQ, H) = c+>, ßij5g11-i- a3 +-ys (2.31) 
t, i 
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where p("I") denotes the SB's conditional probability of its arguments; Q= (qij) is akxn 
matrix; H represents the SB's knowledge of the situation before consulting the experts; c 
is a normalising constant; 
Nijs = 
1: 
Tijmf/Imis i (2.32) 
m, l 
Tijml are the elements of the SB's precision matrix for Q, i. e. the inverse of the SB's 
covariance matrix r, = (crjj ) for Q; ;i z8 = lE[q,,, i10s, H] is the SB's expectation for q,,, j 
given 05 and H; 
I 
as = -2 PijsTijml/lmis 1 
(2.33) 
and 75 = logp(O5IH) is the SB's prior log-probability for O. The covariances aijil from 
which the precision terms r; jml were obtained, are not supposed to depend on the true 
event 8s, that is, Ujjml = cov[q=j, q7 l10,, H]. In all the above, i, m=1, ..., k and j, 1 = 
1,..., n. 
However, because the q; j are negative, Lindley proposes to use the results for contrasts 
(i. e. linear forms Ej cjgij with >j cj = 0) instead. With that the normality assumption 
can hold if further restriction are imposed. Thus, by defining the contrast Q* = (q*.. ) 
with q*ij = qij - qin for i= 1,..., k and j=1,..., n- 1 so that Q= (Q*, q,, ) for qn = 
(qln, 
..., qkn)', and assuming that IE[gnIQ*, 
01, H] does not depend on 1, the reconciliation 
rule (2.31) applies if some "coherence" requirements hold. The above results subsume 
those of French (1980,1981) who developed analogous formulation but for log-odds in 
univariate settings. 
Although (2.31) allows, via /lijm and Oiji1, for the modelling of dependencies among 
both the experts themselves and the experts and events (experts' calibration), it does 
not consider a possible conditional independence structure among the future events or 
parameters 0j. 
Note, as pointed out by Genest and Zidek (1986), that (2.31) corresponds to the LogOp 
(2.12) if we take anti-logarithms on both sides of (2.31) and identify p(B3I Q, H) with T, 
p(93IH) with g and flii, with the weights considered proportional to the independent 
`information content" of each assessment (Freeling, 1981). 
However, despite the fact that (2.31) expresses the SB's opinions about the experts' 
beliefs (she is not just doing the pool of their opinions), Lindley (1985a) verifies his results 
against the MP and the EB property to conclude that both criteria are faulty. It can be 
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seen readily that (2.31) does not obey the MP, and it is only EB if F_, j, 13= 5=1. Also, 
he claims with reason that "the fallacy in external Bayesianity is not to recognise that T 
changes with new information". T is the pooling operator in (2.12). 
In Chapter 8 we characterise particular types of SB models in which reconciliation rules 
can be identified with logarithmic pools for which external Bayesianity applies. 
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CHAPTER 3 
A BASIC REVIEW ON GRAPHICAL MODELS 
In this chapter the main concepts in graph theory are described and the definitions 
of graph related terms that are used in the thesis are then introduced. The emphasis 
here is on the theory associated with chain graphs (CGs) and influence diagrams (IDs). 
The notation and terminology employed are based on those described by Lauritzen (1989, 
1996), Frydenberg (1990) and Wermuth and Lauritzen (1990). A particularly important 
result for directed acyclic graphs or IDs, the d-separation theorem of Pearl (1986), which 
allows for statements of conditional independence as well as the issue of preservation 
of the conditional independence structures in prior-to-posterior analyses of IDs are also 
presented. However, because the type of CG for which conditional external Bayesianity 
applies, the partially complete CG (PCG) defined in Chapter 5, can be treated as an 
ID, the Markov properties for CGs are not reviewed here. The reader should refer to 
Frydenberg (1990) or Lauritzen (1996) for a complete description of those properties. In 
fact, the subgraphs induced by the chain elements of a PCG are complete and the possible 
conditional independence restrictions can only originate from the PCG's underlying ID 
(Section 5.2). 
It is assumed that the set of random variables whose associations of conditional inde- 
pendence are represented by a graphical statistical model, is homogeneous in the sense 
that all variables are of the same type, i. e. they are all qualitative or all quantitative vari- 
ables. Mixed graphical association models are studied by Lauritzen and Wermuth (1984), 
Lauritzen (1989) and Wermuth and Lauritzen (1990). 
3.1 Notation and Terminology. 
A graph C9 is characterised by a pair (V, E) of a finite set of vertices V and edges 
E= {(a, ß) :aEV, PEV and a /j}, i. e. a subset of the set VxV of ordered pairs of 
distinct vertices. 
An edge (a, ß) EE is called undirected if both (a, ß) EE and (ß, a) EE; while an 
edge (aß) EE with (p, a) ýE is directed. The notation a -p Q and aN /i is used to 
represent directed and undirected associations between vertices respectively. 
When drawing a graph, we shall use circles to represent vertices and arcs (lines with 
arrows) or just lines to represent directed or undirected edges respectively. Also, double- 
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circles are used to represent vertices of a particular type (Section 3.2). 
A graph G with only undirected edges is an undirected graph Gu, whereas a graph with 
only directed edges is a directed graph gdi 
A complete graph is the graph which has all its vertices connected between themselves 
either by directed or undirected edges. Let AEV be a subset of vertices of a graph G. 
The induced subgraph cA = (A, EA) is such that EA =E fl AxA. A subset of vertices 
of a graph is a complete subset if it induces a complete subgraph and a maximal (with 
respect to C) complete subset defines a clique. 
A vertex a is a parent of ß, if there is an arc from a to /3 (a -+ ß). In this case, 
aE pa(/3) the set of parents of ß. The vertex /3 is then a child of a. Two parents of ß are 
said to be married if they are connected by an edge (directed or not). The vertices a and 
/3 are neighbours if they are connected by an undirected edge (a - ß). The boundary of a 
subset AEV is the set of all vertices V not in A (V\A) that are parents or neighbours of 
vertices in A. 
As an illustration, in Figure 3.1 we have a graph where for example, a -+ ß but ß 74 a, 
that is, aE 7r(ß). Also, 6-X and thus /3 and X are neighbours and the boundary set of 
0 is (a, X) 
9' 
FIGURE 3.1. A graph ! 9' where a= pa(ß), X is the neighbour of /3, whose 
boundary set is (a, X). 
It is said that in a graph = (V, E) there is a path of length n from a to 0 if there is 
a sequence a= ao,..., a =ß of distinct vertices in V such that (ai_i, cad) EE for all 
j=1,..., n, i. e. 3aj_1-+ajVj=l,..., n. 
35 
The ancestors an(, ß) of a vertex ß are the vertices a such that there is a path from a 
to ß and the descendants of a are the set of all vertices such that there is a path from a 
to p. 
A set A is an ancestral set if the boundary of all aEA is a subset of (C) A. Thus, in 
a directed graph the set A is ancestral if and only if an(a) EA for all aEA. 
A chain of length n from a to f3 is a sequence of distinct vertices a= a0,. .., a, - (3 
such that there is an edge (a line or an arc) between a5_1 and a3 for all j=1, ..., n, i. e. 
either (ai_1i a1) EE or (a1, aß_1) E E. In 9' of Figure 3.1, there is a chain of length 2 
from a to 0. 
If all chains from aEA to QEB intersect SEV, where A, B and S are subsets of 
V, then S is said to separate A from B. Thus in G' of Figure 3.1, we can say that (6, 
separates a from 0 whereas b or c alone does not. 
A cycle is a path such that a=ß, that is, it begins and ends in the same vertex. 
3.2 Chain Graph Models. 
A graph when used to represent a set of conditional independence relationships be- 
tween random variables in a statistical model is called a graphical model. Wermuth and 
Lauritzen (1990) defined a graphical chain model as a statistical model characterised by 
a graph representing a conditional independence structure. The vertices (circles) of that 
graph represent random variables (or parameters of statistical models related to random 
variables) and the edges (arcs or lines) associations between variables. A missing edge 
in this graphical model is interpreted as a conditional independence. Thus, complete 
graphs do not imply any conditional independence restrictions. Deterministic variables 
are represented by double-circles. 
Chain graphs are graphical chain models in which the vector X of variables can be 
partitioned into ordered sub-vectors X 1i ..., Xn called chain elements 
(or components) 
such that 
(i) within subsets there are only undirected edges connecting the variables, and 
(ii) the subsets themselves are connected by directed edges (arcs pointing) from a set 
with lower index to one with higher index number. 
A chain element Xj for which directed edges can be pointed to is called a response set. 
Similarly, an influence set is a chain element which has arcs pointing out to a response set. 
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The direct associations of chain elements according to (ii) above constitute a dependence 
chain. Also, because of the ordering imposed by (ii) above, the CGs do not contain any 
directed cycles (Frydenberg, 1990). 
As an example, in Figure 3.2 below we can see a CG G with n=3 chain elements 
X1= {Xii, X 12, X13}, 
X= {21, i22,23} and X3= {X3} forming a dependence 
chain X1 --+ X2 -p X3. While X1 is an influence set and X is a response set, X2 is both 
a response set to X1 and an influence set to X. 
A12 
1 
X11 
X13 
X1 
I X23 I 
XZ 
g 
r-----' 
II 
11 
II 
I1 
I 
X3 
1 
f1 
1 
A3 
FIGURE 3.2. A chain graph 9 with 3 chain elements X 1i X and X3 forming 
a dependence chain. 
One of the features of CG models is that they can capture the association structure 
between variables being described by an individual in a way that can be elicited directly 
from a verbal description of the problem by the client. They require no numerical inputs 
early in the modelling process. Several authors (e. g. Smith, 1990) have argued that this 
property makes them more primitive than probability for specifying perceived relationships 
(an assertion which is exploited later in this thesis). 
An important concept for the characterisation of conditional independence relationships 
between variables in IDs (as we shall see in Section 3.4) is that of a moral graph. The 
moral graph obtained from a CG G= (V, E) is the undirected graph g' = (V, Em) with 
the same vertex set V but with a and ß made neighbours in gm if and only if 
(i) they were neighbours in 9, or 
(ii) they both were parents of vertices in the same chain element. 
Note that both the undirected and the directed acyclic graphs are particular charac- 
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terisations of CGs. A CG with a single chain element and no dependence chain forms an 
undirected graph, while a CG with uni-dimensional chain elements constitutes a directed 
acyclic graph. The moral graph of a directed acyclic graph is built up by joining with a 
line all vertices that have a common child and replacing all directed edges by undirected 
arcs (i. e. arcs by lines). 
3.3 Conditional Independence. 
As mentioned in the last section, missing edges in the underlying graph of a graphical 
model can be used to represent probabilistic conditional independence (Cl) between the 
random variables in that graph. 
A notation which is commonly used to represent probabilistic Cl is that of Dawid (1979) 
where for the random variables X, Y and Z, 
X1 Y1Z 
reads : given Z, X is conditionally independent of Y. 
(3.1) 
When (X, Y, Z) is defined on a probability space (S2, . 
P) with joint distribution P on 
(f), Y), the usual definition of (3.1) is expressed in terms of the factorisation of the condi- 
tional joint distribution of (X, Y) given Z: for A, B, 
P(X E A, YE B(Z) = P(X E AIZ)P(Y E BIZ) . 
(3.2) 
In his systematic study of Cl, Dawid (1979,1980 and 1996) has shown that the following 
properties hold for (X, Y, Z, W) defined on (SZ,. F) where h(. ) is a function of its arguments 
only : 
(P1) X IIY(X, 
(P2) X II YIZ t= Y II XIZ, 
(P3) X II YJZ and U= h(Y) X II U(Z, 
(P4) XH YIZ and U= h(Y) =XU YI (U, Z), and 
(P5) XIIYIZandXIIWI(Y, Z) XII(Y, W)IZ. 
It is possible to obtain other properties of CI by regarding the above properties as axioms 
in a logical system. One of the most appealing reasons for doing so is that complicated 
manipulations of conditional probability distributions can be avoided in favour of clarity. 
For example, Dawid (1979) showed among others that the "nearest neighbour" property 
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of a Markov chain can be expressed as : 
X3IIX1IX2, X4II(Xi, X2)IX3i and X5II(Xi, X2, X3)1X4 = X3H(Xl, X5)ß(X2, X4)" 
Many other results obtained through the use of (P1)-(P5) alone are given in Dawid (1979, 
1996) where no other properties of Probability than those expressed in terms of conditional 
independence are employed. In effect, the above properties have been adopted as the 
standard set of Cl axioms in most of the works in this area. In the case where X, Y, Z 
are disjoint subsets of a finite set and U= h(Y) is replaced by UCY, (P1)-(P5) define 
an algebraic structure called serni-graphoid (Pearl, 1988). If in addition to (P1)-(P5) the 
following property (P6) is considered, 
(P6) XIIYIZandXHZIY XII(Y, Z)jYnZ, 
then the set (P1)-(P6) is called graphoid (Pearl, 1988). However, property (P6) does not 
hold universally, except under the additional condition that fl is discrete with P({w}) >0 
for all wE fl (Dawid, 1996). 
Although it appeared for a certain time that all properties of probabilistic CI could 
be derived from the above set (P1)-(P5) alone (Pearl and Paz, 1987), Student' (1992) 
showed that no finite set of axioms can completely characterise probabilistic CI. However, 
(P1)-(P5) appear to be adequate for many purposes and can be considered as a reasonable 
set of axioms applicable in most situations where the concept of CI is required. See also 
Geiger and Pearl (1993) for a systematic study of the logical implications of CI. 
In fact, depending on the interpretation given to the tertiary operator " II +, it is 
possible to broaden the range of applications of CI to other domains other than the purely 
probabilistic one. For example, if S2 is a linear space then X 1IL Y1Z can be written to 
represent that the coefficient of Y in the linear regression of X on (Y, Z) may be taken 
as 0. Smith (1990) calls this interpretation linear CI while Dawid (1996) names it as 
zero partial correlation. Some other terms employed in other applications are : meta CI, 
for families of distributions on (1, Y) and hyper CI for prior distributions in Bayesian 
analysis (Dawid, 1996). See Lauritzen (1996) for an example of properties of geometric 
orthogonality being represented by the above formulation. 
3.4 The d-separation Theorem. 
We have already seen that graphical models can be used to represent. probabilistic Cl 
structures. Now, the important issue of how CI relations can be read from given graphs 
39 
will be presented. For CGs there are Markov properties which allow for this. However, 
for the particular case of directed acyclic graphs, which is the object of our interest here, 
there is a criterion called d-separation stated as a theorem by Pearl (1986a, 1986b) and 
fully formalised in Verma and Pearl (1990a, 1990b). See also, for example, Kiiveri et 
al. (1984), Pearl and Verma (1987), Smith (1989), Lauritzen et al. (1990) and Lauritzen 
(1996). Geiger and Pearl (1990) showed that the d-separation is the sharpest criterion for 
CI and therefore cannot be improved. 
The version of the d-separation theorem presented below corresponds to a Proposition 
in Lauritzen et al. (1990) where the proof can be found : 
Theorem 3.1 (d-separation). Let X, Y and Z be disjoint sub-vectors of a directed 
acyclic graph gdi' Then Z d-separates X from Y if and only if a separates X from Y in 
('An(XUYUZ))"`, the moral graph of the smallest ancestral set containing XUYUZ. 
For an illustration, refer to the directed acyclic graph gdi' of Figure 3.3(a). To inves- 
tigate whether the statement (X4, X5) H X1(X2 is valid, we build up the moral graph 
of the smallest ancestral set containing (X1, X2, X4, X5), see Figure 3.3(b), to verify 
that X2 alone does not separate (X4, X5) from Xi because of the path X1, X2, X5 in 
(ýgri(xl, x2, x,, x5))7n. Therefore the above statement is not valid. However, note that if 
we include X3 in the `separator set' together with X2, then (X4, X5) II Xil (X2, X3) is a 
valid statement. Is X2 II X3 in gdir valid ? The answer is no, because in (ýAdir n(x2ix3))m 
there is the unblocked path X2i X1, X3. But X2 II X3IXi is valid. 
3.5 Influence Diagrams. 
As in Smith (1989), an influence diagram (ID) Z on a set of random vectors X. = 
{X1 
i ..., X} can be defined as follows: 
Definition 3.2 (Influence diagram). Let gd`r be a directed acyclic graph characterised 
by the pair (X,,, E) and let a: Xn -3 {1, ..., n} 
be a numbering of the vertices in gdir 
such that a(X2) < ce(Xj) for a directed edge (Xj, Xj) E E. An ID I on Xn is a pair 
(cdir, a) together with the following n-1 CI statements : 
X. II {K : a(Xj) < a(X)}lpa(X ); a(Xr) = 2, ..., n. 
(3.3) 
Because of the ordering imposed by the directed edges between the variables in an ID, 
it can also be called a causal network (Jensen, 1996). Also, according to Definition 3.2, 
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ý-± dir (aý dir (b) (y An(]ii, X2, X+, Xs))m 
FIGURE 3.3. (a) A directed acyclic graph, and (b) the moral graph of the small- 
est ancestral set containing (X1, X2, X4, X5) to verify the statement (X4 i 
X5) II 
Xi1X2- 
an ID can be viewed as a particular chain graph model where the dependence chain is 
formed by single elements (i. e. each chain element has just one vertex) in some compatible 
ordering. 
The joint probability density function f (X, z) of the random variables in an 
ID T, can 
be factorized according to (3.3) such that 
f ýK1 
o 
K) = 11 f [xa I pd(X )]' ý3.4) 
as 
where each conditional density f (xJpa(x ), as well as f (x jO) =f(), is strictly positive. 
According to this, it is not difficult to see that for a fully specified ID, there exists a unique 
joint distribution corresponding to it, whereas the inverse does not hold. According to the 
ID in Figure 3.4, the joint density function f (2L), where X= (Xi, X2i X3, X4, X5), can 
be factorized as 
J 
(xl, x2, x3, x47 x5) =f (xi)f (x2)f (x3lxl, x2)f `x41 x3, z5)f 
(x5) 
When the Bayesian framework is applied in calculating the conditional densities in the 
RHS of (3.4), the ID which characterise that breakdown in f (X, ) can be called a Bayesian 
network or a belief network. 
One important issue related to the calculations of conditional densities associated to 
nodes of IDs is how new evidence entering the model can be efficiently propagated through 
41 
FIGURE 3.4. An ID on X= (X1, X2i X3, X4, X5) for which the Cl statement 
(X1, X2) II (X4, X5) JX3 holds and the joint density function factorizes as f (x) _ 
f (x1)f (x2)f (x3! -C1, X2)f (X41 X37 X5)f (x5)" 
the network. In particular, we will be interested on the question of preservation of ID 
structures in terms of the original set of Cl statements being kept valid in prior-to-posterior 
analyses on those structures. For that, a review on the class of decomposable graphs is 
essential as we shall see in the next section. 
Bayes theorem applied to an ID may correspond to an arc reversal. The arc reversal 
operation in IDs was first addressed by Howard and Matheson (1981) and more formally 
by Shachter (1986a). The problem in reversing conditioning orderings in IDs is that 
information concerning Cl can be lost. For example, Shachter (1986a) showed that for 
a directed arc (Xi, X3) in an ID to be replaced by (Xj, Xi), both nodes must inherit 
each other's parents. This can clearly introduce loss of Cl statements in the original ID. 
However, a result due to Verma (1987) makes the application of Bayes theorem in graphical 
models a lot easier as we shall see in the following section. 
3.6 Decomposability and Structure Preservation. 
The class of decomposable graphical models introduced by Lauritzen et al. (1984), is the 
one which under certain restrictions on the form of input data, retains the structure (coded 
in terms of CI statements) in a prior-to-posterior analysis. This fact is used extensively 
together with the construction of junction trees, to create quick algorithms for calculating 
posterior distributions in high dimensional problems (Dawid, 1992, Jensen et at. 1994, and 
Smith and Papamichail, 1996). However in this thesis we shall use this same property for 
IDs (which are used to represent the informative side -in terms of Cl- of more general 
structures defined in Section 5.2) to define classes of combination rules which are, in a 
partial sense, externally Bayesian (Chapter 6). 
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An ID I is said to be decomposable if the parents of any node in the graph of I are 
married (i. e. they are all pairwise connected by an edge) in that graph. 
Verma (1987) defined a Verma graph as one in which all the directed edges are substi- 
tuted by edges except the ones leaving nodes which are unmarried parents of a common 
child, and proved that if two graphs have the same Verma graph then they have exactly 
the same set of CI statements. This result corresponds to the application of Bayes theorem 
to graphs. See also Pearl and Verma (1987). An illustration can be seen in Figure 3.5 
where the graphs G1 and G2 have the same Verma graph 9 and thus carry the same CI 
information, despite having some edges pointing in different directions. Note that both 
graphs g1 and 92 have the directed edges in their corresponding Verma graph pointing in 
the same direction. 
(aý Gi (b) Q2 (c) g 
FIGURE 3.5. Two non-decomposable graphs (a) Gl and (b) Q2i with a common 
Verma graph (c) 9. 
Certainly, if two decomposable graphs have the same Verma graph then they imply the 
same CI statements even if they have all their arcs pointing to different directions when 
compared. 
Now, Smith (1989) showed a particular case of Verma's result for similar IDs, that 
is, the ones which have the same underlying undirected graph when all their arcs are 
substituted by lines. He proved that if two similar IDs Zl and 12 are decomposable then 
all CI statements contained in one can be deduced from the CI statements in the other. In 
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practical terms, this result means that a decomposable ID can have its structure preserved 
in a prior-to- posterior analysis with no information being lost when `conditioning out' 
random variables if a certain conditioning order is obeyed. 
(a) yd (b) gm(Zd) 
FIGURE 3.6 (a) A decomposable ID Zd on 0 and X, and (b) its moral graph 
Gm(1d) showing that CI on 0 is preserved under any sampling of X. 
As an example, consider the decomposable ID Zd of Figure 3.6(a) where the CI between 
the parameters 01 i 62,03 and 04 is considered under a form of likelihood called 
"separable" 
(Smith, 1990) for X= (Xi, X2, X3, X4). The corresponding moral graph G' (Zd) is shown 
in Figure 3.6(b). According to this, the joint density of X, 0, where 9= (0l, 02,03,94), 
f (x, B) =114_1 f [0iI pa(©i)] f (xil0; ), is such that the CI properties on 0 are not affected by 
sampling on X. 
On the other hand, Figure 3.7(a) shows the non-decomposable ID of Figure 3.4 with 
additional parameter nodes 0, (i = 1, ..., 5) considered as independent random quantities 
(as in Smith, 1990). For example 0= P[Xil pa(X; )]. In this case the full ID corresponds 
to a joint density factorized accordingly 
5 
P(j e) =H P[xil pa(xi), oi]p(oi) 
i=l 
Figure 3.7(b) shows the moral graph of Y. Note that, the independence between the 
parameters 9i is preserved only under (i) complete sampling, or (ii) sampling over ancestral 
graph, of the variables Xi (i = 1, ..., 5) . 
For instance, if X3 is observed first then the 
only valid CI statement between the parameters would be that (01 i 02,03) 
11 (04 1 
05) 1 X3 
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(a) I (b) Gm (z) 
FIGURE 3.7. (a) a non-decomposable ID with parameters 9 considered as 
independent random quantities, and (b) its moral graph showing that CI on 8 
is preserved under complete or ordered (taken over ancestral set) sampling of 
X. 
but, for example, 01 1{92 II03IX3. However, if Xl is observed first, followed by X2, and 
then X3 and so on, then the independence would be preserved as when all the variables 
are given at once. 
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CHAPTER 4 
GENERALISING EB LOGARITHMIC POOLS 
The reasons we initially chose the external Bayesianity criterion on which to base group 
pooling rules for members who agree on. a conditional independence (CI) structure for a set 
of variables were twofold. The first reason was a pragmatic one. The types of multiplicative 
pools which result from external Bayesianity tend to preserve the CI structures related to 
the associations of variables in a problem, whereas other pools, like the linear opinion pools 
described in Section 2.2.2 do not (see Section 6.5). Second, by using a loosened form of the 
external Bayesianity criterion with a Cl structure allows a generalisation of the modified 
LogOp that answers some of the criticisms of its use (see Sections 2.2.5 and 2.4.5). In 
particular we will show that with our generalisation for a multivariate modified LogOp 
(the conditional modified LogOp) it is possible to include an algorithm that learns on the 
weights given to different group members and allows different weights to be attributed 
to group members depending on their particular expertise in different components of the 
problem. Since external Bayesianity forms an axiomatic basis for group consensus, our 
approach can be viewed as essentially normative. 
4.1 A Generalisation of External Bayesianity and LogOps. 
We shall start our generalisation by showing the need for such an extension using some 
hypothetical examples for the bivariate case in a situation where experts have very distinct 
levels of expertise. The first example considers the problem of forming consensus about 
two independent random variables. The second considers the case when these variables 
are related in a dependence chain representing a consensus as to the causal relationship 
linking the two observations. In both these examples we assume that the pooling rule 
preserves unanimity. 
Example 4.1 (independent random variables) : Suppose that a group of 3 experts are 
to reach consensus about the probability distribution of the occurrence of undetected ac- 
cidents in a nuclear plant. Any leakage at the nuclear reactor is to be detected by a 
measurement instrument. Let the random variable Xl represent the quantity of leakage 
that might occur in a given scenario. Let X2 be the error of an instrument measuring that 
leakage. The expert 1 is a physicist with particular knowledge of the nuclear plant, the 
expert 2 is a manager of the plant and the expert 3 is the maker of the measuring instru- 
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ments. All the experts agree that Xl and X2 can be assumed independent of each other 
and each one expresses his own beliefs about the densities of Xl and X2, i. e. fi(xe) and 
fi (x2) respectively, for i=1,2,3. A natural way of deriving the consensus distribution is 
to note that the joint density f(11 i x2) can 
be expressed in the form f (xl, x2) = f(XI)f(X2) 
by the agreed independence assumption. If we require EB to hold individually on both 
Xl and X2 and that the combination rule preserves unanimity, the result (2.15) demands 
we set 
3 
f(xi) = al 
fJ[fi(xi)]i 
i-1 
3 
f(x2) = a2 
ff [fi(x2)jwi2 
i-1 
where al and a2 are proportionality constants for f (xi) and f (x2) respectively, which allow 
these distributions to integrate to one. The weights wij (i = 1,2,3, j=1,2) would then be 
arbitrary positive constants such that Eß1 wij =1 for j=1,2. Note that in the setting 
of this example, given the different skills of the three experts, it would be unreasonable to 
demand that wil = w; 2 (i = 1,2,3). Instead we would like to set w31 < w32, for example. 
The combination rule thus sets 
3 
f (x1, x2) =a 
fJtfi(x1)]"'iI [fj(x2)]w. 2 ý4.1) 
i=1 
where a is also a normalising constant as al and a2 above, and the weights wil and wt2 
(i = 1,2,3) are allowed to take arbitrary values on the simplex. 
Now under the condition (2.13) imposed by Genest et al. (1986), such a rule cannot 
be EB on the joint density f (xl, x2) unless wt1 = wie, i=1,2,3. One reason for this 
is that unless wil = wi2, i=1,2,3 , we cannot guarantee that two points x= 
(x1, x2) 
and x* = (xi, x2) giving the same value of f will be combined in the same way. However 
this is a rather dubious and restrictive regularity condition to force the result (2.13) and 
certainly in this context appears unreasonable. A second reason why the demand of 
EB forces this is that a likelihood associated with an observation Y whose distribution 
depends on both Xl and X2, may introduce a dependence between Xl and X2 conditional 
on Y=y. The combination of densities after the individual accommodation by each 
member of information y is then not even defined by (4.1). The demand that EB holds 
for likelihoods of the type described above seems to us too strong in contexts like the one 
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in this example. Note however that the rule (4.1) is clearly EB with respect to sampling 
distributions which separate in Xi and X2, i. e. for which f (yjx1, x2) = 11(x1 Iy)12 (x2I y)f (y) 
where li and 12 are functions of their arguments only. So provided we restrict the PPC 
(prior-to- posterior coherence) to apply only to data which preserves, in the mind of each 
group's member, the independence across the variables they are considering, new pooling 
rules, reflecting diversity of ability across experts, can be devised. This is one motivation 
for the rules developed in Chapter 6. 
Example 4.2 (dependence chain) : Now suppose that instead of agreeing to the inde- 
pendence of Xl and X2, the group makes a weaker agreement that the release X1 causes 
the measurement error X2, i. e. that there is a directed association from Xl to X2. Each 
member has his own particular expertise and individual beliefs about the two variables. 
With such a causal structure, it is natural for each expert to give his beliefs about X2 
conditional on each value of the variable Xl causing it. So assume each expert is prepared 
to provide a density for X1, and a density for X2 given a value of X1. It is natural for the 
group to construct its combined density f (xl, x2) on (Xl, X2) from a combined density 
f(xi) on Xl and a combined density f(x2Jx1) on X2JX1 using the formula 
f(9) = f(x1)f(x2 z1) (4.2) 
Thus we can write that for PPC and unanimity on likelihoods involving Xl and not 
X2 we obtain a pooling formula 
3 
f(xi)=alfl fi"'(xi) ' 
(4.3) 
and for PPC on a likelihood where X2 is a controlled and conditioned variable where 
unanimity is required we obtain 
3 
f (x2Jx1) = a2 (x1) 
J fw. z(xi) (x21x1) 
" 
(4.4) 
i=1 
The proportionality terms al and a2 are such as in Example 4.1. Note now however that 
a2 is possibly a function of the given value x1. The weights wil and wie (i = 1,2,3) must 
reflect the experts' relative expertise in predicting the variables Xl and their abilities to 
predict X2 once given fixed values xl of X1. Due to the ordered association between the 
variables, it is natural to allow for the possibility that any i-th's expertise on X2, coded by 
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the weight wi2, be allowed to be a function of an observed value of Xl : for example, an 
expert may forecast X2 well when xl is small but not so well when xl is large. Obviously 
however the restrictions on these weights summing to one, E3^1 wil =1 (j = 1,2) still 
apply. 
The former relations (4.2) to (4.4) imply that 
3 
f\x) = a(xi) fiw; i(xl)Jiwi2(xi)(x2Ix1) (4.5) 
i=1 
where a(xi) allows f (x) to integrate to one. 
It is interesting now to compare equation (4.5) with (2.15). Clearly (4.5) is more general 
than (2.15) which can be obtained from (4.5) by setting wt2(x1) functionally independent 
of xl for i=1,2,3. Notice that, unless we have this lack of dependence, equation (4.5) 
violates Genest's requirement in (2.15) that the LogOp, f, defined as f=T (fl, f2, f3), 
would only be a function of the range of distributions (fl, f2, f3). We have already stated 
in Section 2.2.4, and the same arguments of the last paragraph of Example 4.1 can be 
used here to show how unnatural this regularity condition is when applied to multivariate 
densities. Here, our chosen transform is a composite of two transforms, one on the margin 
of X1, and the other on the conditional density of X2 given xl. In this case, a weaker 
restriction such as 
T2 (A) fz, f3)(x2I xi) = 
P[xi, fi (02 [xi 1fi, 
f27 fsjäx2 
(x2 1xi)) 
would be more pertinent in that it allows the consensus on x21x1 to also depend through 
w; 2(XI) on occurred values of xl which may cause or directly influence outcomes of X2. 
In Chapter 6a n-variate formula for a more general causal structure will be presented. 
4.2 Deterministic Weights in LogOps. 
We argued above that the weights associated with the combination on X2 should be 
allowed to depend on the observed value of the causal variable X1, i. e. wt2(Si) for i= 
1,2,3. Here is another example to reinforce this argument. 
Example 4.3 (deterministic weighting) : Let Xl be the level of blood sugar in diabetes 
patients in a certain clinic. Let X2 be the precision of a treatment imposed to reduce that 
level of blood sugar to its proper value administered to those patients. Assume it is well 
known that X2 depends on X1. The clinic has two doctors, Dl and D2. Dl only ever 
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sees patients for which X1 > 100, while D2 only sees patients for which Xl < 100. Then 
a sensible rule for a consensus between the two doctors about their joint distribution for 
X= (XI, X2) is, according to the consensus probability breakdown for the common ID 
(Section 3.5), set to be 
f (xi, x2) =f (xl)f (x2I xi) (4.6) 
where f (xj) is set under some criterion, but 
r fl(x21x1)' for xl > 100 
f(x2ýx1) 
I 
(4.7) 
t f2(x2 xl), for xi < 100 
or 
f(121x1) = a(xl)[f1(x2Ixl)]wl2(271)[f2(x2Ixl)]w22(xi) 
where fl and f2 are the doctors Dl and D2 respective individual conditioning beliefs about 
X2 1x1. The a(xi) is a proportionality term allowing for the f (x2Jx1) to integrate to one. 
The individual levels of expertise of both Dl and D2 on Xl and consequently on X2 
are very distinct and, thus, a natural rule for choosing the weights would be to set 
( 1, for xl > 100 
W I&I )t0, for xl < 100 
(4.8) 
and w22(x1) =1- w12(xl)- 
More generally, if the two doctors had records which gave different expertises depend- 
ing on Xl (e. g. they had some overlapping experience about the effect of treatments for 
patients with the same level of blood sugar), then a more elaborate function of xl might 
be made. 
In fact, these weights should be chosen by the doctors on the basis of their commonly 
held information I about their specialities and expertises. Nevertheless, as we have seen, it 
is natural given this I to allow the weights regarding the relative expertise on the variable 
X2, to depend on x1. For more complex graph structures, it is natural for the weights to 
be allowed to depend on the parents of variables as we shall see in Chapters 5 and 6. 
4.3 The Bivariate Normal Model. 
To obtain some insight into how such conditional weighting methods combine, it is 
helpful to consider a standard case. So assume that the members of the group assess 
normal probability density functions as their expert opinions for the involved variables. 
We shall now see that the group consensus density is not multivariate normal as it was 
under the LogOp. We shall denote a normal probability density function with. mean p 
and variance a2 by n(It, Q2). 
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Example 4.4 (bivariate normal : Suppose that in Example 4.3 the doctors Dl and D2 
assume the process of treating patients with different blood sugar levels as being normally 
distributed. Thus each one, D1 and D2, specifies a marginal density for X1, f=(xl), as 
n(pil, ß'i12), i=1,2, and a conditional density for X21 xl, fi(x2+xl), as n(p 2 
(xl), o 22), 
i=1,2. Notice that alternatively the doctors could have assessed joint normal densities 
for X= (XI, X2), fi(xi, x2), as n(p., E; ) where it, = (µ; l, 1t12) is the mean vector and 
Qil2 PiZ 
Pi Qi2 
is the covariance matrix of X, i=1,2. The pi's are the assessed correlation coefficients 
for the variables. In this case, the parameters of the conditional densities n(i42 (xl), vi22), 
i=1,2, would be : 
P: 2 ("i) = pt2 +2 pj[Xi - P=i) (4.9) cIti 
2az 
Qi2 = vi2 (1- p; ) 
where the µ=2 are the regression functions in x1. 
We know from (4.6) that the doctors consensus about the joint distribution of the 
variables is f (xl, x2) = f(X1)f(X2111) where 
flxlý = al[fl(x, )]"'[f2(xi)]'21 4.10) 
and 
f (z2 jxi) = a2 (xl)[fl (x2 Ixl)]v 12(x1) [f2 (X2lxl)]w22(xn) ý4.11ý 
with al and a2(xi) being proportionality constants which allow the functions above to 
integrate to one, and w=j being the weights where w12 is possibly a function of xl, i. e. for 
i, j = 1,2, w=2 = wi2(xi)- 
The functions of the right-hand side of the above equations are normal densities and 
by the results of the Appendix A4.1 we have that f (x1) is also normal. In fact, by the 
results of the Appendix A4.1 applied to the marginal density of X1, we have that 
[fi(xi)]u'"' - bihi(xi) 
where bi = (. / 2ircr1)1--il/ w- and 
hi(xi) - n(f. z+i, oti2lwii). 
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And so, f(xl) = clhi(xl)h2(x1) where cl is a proportionality constant such that f(xl) 
integrates to one. By Theorem A4.2.1, 
n(mi, vie) 
with cl =1 and, where, according to equations (A4.2.1) and (A4.2.2) with n set to 2, 
W1 1/111621 
2+ W21/1210,112 
MI = 
W11cT212 + w2147112 
and 
I 
U. E 
U. E 
0.4 
U. 2 
Therefore, using the same approach for the conditional of X21xl, we have that 
f (x2I x2) '" n[m2 (x1), v22 (XI)] 
where 
and 
V12 =1= 
01112U212 
rl w110'212 + W21C112 
M2(XI) _ 
W12(Xl)1i2(X1)ýi22 + w22(x1)i22(x1)o 22 
l1 
'U)12(x1)Q222 + w22(x1)a122 
1'2'2 
_= 
12 v22 V22(xl) _v 
r2 w22(x0o122 + w12(x1)o222 
with the 14.2 (xl)'s and ai22's, i=1,2, obtained from (4.9). But notice that the parameters 
of the conditional mean m2 as well as the conditional variance v22 are functions of xl, 
the values of X1, such that m2(xl) may be quadratic in xl through the weights wi2(xl)'s 
and the means p2 (xl)'s. Because of this, the joint density of the consensus f (xl, x2) 
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FiGURE 4.1. W12(24) 
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(a) (b) 
FIGURE 4.2. (a) the joint consensus density and (b) its contour curves. 
f (xl) f (x21x1) is not a multivariate normal despite the fact that f (xi) and f (x2 1xl) are 
normal densities. Sometimes these contours are very non-elliptical in approximate non- 
regular ellipsoid forms, in other cases the distributions are close to normality. 
As an illustration, suppose that at a certain stage D1 assesses Iii = 105, all = 5, 
µ12 = 70, v12 =4 and pl = 0.4 ; while D2 assesses 1121 = 95,0'21 = 3,1122 = 60, a22 = 2.5 
and p2 = 0.75. Also assume that the doctors have distinct specialities such that Dl only 
treats extreme cases where X1 < 70 or X1 > 90, while D2 treats patients whose blood 
sugar level falls in the range 70 < X1 < 90. Suppose this distinction is expressed by 
setting w12(x1) =1- e--'['L l2 (see Figure 4.1) and that at this time w11 = . 35. 
In 
this case the joint consensus density f (xl, x2) =f (xl) f (x2Jx1) and its contour curves take 
the form shown in Figures 4.2(a) and 4.2(b) respectively. 
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APPENDIX A4.1 
The Conditional Normal Density Raised to a Power 
In this Appendix we find that a conditional normal density raised to the power w, 
in E R+, is proportional to a normal density. The conditional densities themselves are 
of a particularly simple nature since the mean depend only linearly on the variates held 
fixed and the variance-covariance do not. depend at all on the values of the fixed variate. 
In fact, for a normally distributed random vector .X which can 
be partitioned into two 
component sub-vectors X1 and X2 of sizes (q - p) and p respectively, it is well known 
(Anderson, 1971) that 
f(x2I 11) _ (2r)2p 
lI 
X22.1 
exp - 2[(12 - 
E2) - 
E21El1 (111 
- /ý1)ýJ 
(A4.1.1) x ü22 1 
012 
` L2) - 
E21-E111(111 
The conditional density f(x2jxl) is a p-variate normal density with mean 
E, 
2(lý1) _ M2 
+ 
-E21E1i 
(1- lf1) (A4.1.2) 
and covariance matrix 
Esa. 1 = r-22 - r. 21Eii pia (A4.1.3) 
where, µl and Ec2 are the component mean sub-vectors of p (the X mean vector) relative 
to X1 and . 
Y2 respectively. Similarly, the X covariance matrix is 
Eii E12 
E21 E22 
Let wE »i+, be a non-negative arbitrary constant, possibly a function of the fixed 
variates xl, w(xl). Thus, (A4.1.1) raised to w(x1) give 
9(22 [KO If021xl)1w(x1) 
_1 
w(xt) 
-ý (27r)' P lr22., Iý 
X exp 
{- 2wýýiý[C? 
2 -p (zi))} E22 1[(? 2 - (xi))}}. 
Defining 
&(x2I1L1) 
.fg- 
(1ý2 1I ß)d12 
we have that h(x2Jz1) is a p-variate normal density with mean vector p (xl) and covariance 
matrix w1(x)E221 " 
That is, 
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h(121111) = 
-21P 
(x 
exp {-1W(xi)[x2 - µI (Ei))ýý22 i(ý2 - µ'(xi)]} " 
(A4.1.4) 
(2ý -E22.11 -2 
This is because, 
b(KI) =19 
= ll/l(27r)Zp 
[ 
22.1f] I 
w{r1) 
f 
exp {_w(IL1) [112 - EZ(ý1)lrý'22 llx2 - 
20ý1ý1 }dx2 
j1 lw{? ý) (27i)2p +E 
22.1f 'Vl 
L(27r) w(xl} 
Notice that (i) b(x1) depends on xl only through w(x1) and (ii) g(K21x1) is not a normal 
density but h(x21x1) is. 
If Xl and X2 are independent random vectors then E12 = E21 =0 and f (x2Jx1) _ 
f (x2). In this case, we have that h(12) = y[f 
(x2))u' is a normal density with mean E2 and 
covariance matrix w-1E22, where b=f [f (z2)]"'dx2 does not depend neither on xi or x2. 
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APPENDIX A4.2 
The Product of Normal Densities 
Theorem A4.2.1. Let he(x), i=1, ..., n, 
be normal probability density functions with 
both means pi and precisions T; = 1/u 2 held fixed. Then q(x) _f1 h=(x) is a normal 
probability density function with mean m and precision r, n(m, l/r), where 
m_ 1T 
t 
E 
, Ti 
(A4.2.1) 
and 
n 
i-1 
(A4.2.2) 
proof. Follows by induction over n based on the development by DeGroot (1970, pp. 167) 
for the case when n=2, where m= (Tlill +r2ji2)/(Ti +T2) and r= 71 ß-T2. Q 
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CHAPTER 5 
COMMON KNOWLEDGE Cl STRUCTURES 
In this Chapter we define a particular class of graphical models, the partially complete 
chain graphs (PCGs), which we use to represent the conditional independence (CI) struc- 
ture for the random variables in our problem. Conditions are imposed over the sampling 
in the problem in order to preserve that structure a posteriori. The notation, terminology, 
definitions and important results related to chain graphs (CGs) and influence diagrams 
(IDs) were introduced in Chapter 3. 
Chain graphs are a useful tool for the Bayesian statistical modelling as well as for the 
decision analysis. They are drawn to follow ordered directional associations (dependence 
chains of response and influence variables) among the variables in a problem (Section 3.2). 
This is done by a graph whose vertices represent random variables and whose directed 
(undirected) edges between vertices represent the directional (undirectional) associations. 
It has been argued (Smith, 1990 and Pearl, 1993) that the relationships of associations 
represented in a graph describe beliefs at a coarse enough level to expect that informed 
individuals may well agree about the structure of associations represented in a CG, at least 
in many straightforward situations, even if they disagree about distributions of variables 
within that graph. 
In the following Sections 5.1 to 5.4, we define special subclasses of both CGs, the PCGs, 
and likelihood functions related to sampling on the elements of the PCGs. These defini- 
tions allow us to state conditions that a group might obey in order to obtain combination 
rules more appropriate than the EB ones in multivariate problems like those illustrated 
in Examples 4.1 and 4.2. In particular we demand that external Bayesianity only holds 
when the agreed likelihood does not destroy the conditional independence (CI) structure 
on variables represented by the group's agreed PCG. 
The conditions we shall state here are assumed to be common knowledge (CK) to all 
members of the group. According to Aumann (1976), "two people, 1 and 2, are said to 
have common knowledge of an event E if both know it, 1 knows that 2 knows it ,2 
knows 
that 1 knows it, 1 knows that 2 knows that 1 knows it, and so on". See also Geanokoplos 
(1992). 
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5.1 Associations and Chain Graphs. 
We saw in Chapter 4 that a more useful set of EB combination rules than the LogOp 
ones characterised by (2.15) could be obtained for multivariate problems. Nevertheless, two 
basic conditions on the group's members beliefs about the set of uncertain measurements 
X= (A'r, 
..., 
X) must be met. The first is that all members agree on the association 
structure on X such that : 
Condition 5.1. 
(i) The vector X can be represented as an ordered list of sub-vectors X 1, ..., X, where 
it is CK to all members of a group G that for j=1, ..., n, the random vector X 
receives a directed association from (or more loosely is caused by) pa(Xj) where 
pa(Xj) is a sub-vector of (X1 iX,..., Xß_1), 
henceforth called the group parent set 
of the chain element Xj; 
(ii) it is CK to the group G that Xj is conditionally independent of the elements in 
(Xl, 
..., 
Xj_I) which are not in pa('i ), given its parent set pa(Xj), i. e. in the 
usual notation (Section 3.3) 
ýu X 
In Example 4.1 we saw the simplest association structure of this kind where it was 
agreed that Xl II X2. So pa(X2) =0 where 0 is the empty set. In the second example, 
pa(X2) = Xl is that the statement in (ii) were vacuous, and therefore automatically 
agreeable by the group but substantive because the dependence between Xl and X2 was 
causally ordered in the sense given in (i). 
If it is assumed that all members have a common dominating measure then we can 
assert that the i-th member of the group can write his joint density over X, fi(x), in the 
form 
n 
fi(x) rJfii(zLJpa(xj)) 
j=J 
where xj and pa(11j) are defined above for j=2,..., 7c and pa(il) _ 0. Henceforth we shall 
impose the usual positivity condition that f j(x5+pa(x, )) >0 for each value of pa(x5) at 
all values of zj in this space, which is common to all members of the group. 
The association structure described by (i) and (ii) above define a class. of multivariate 
structures which are a subclass of CG models (Section 3.2). 
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Now in our context, it is not implausible to assume that in many structures it will be 
possible for the members in a group of experts, who possibly interact between themselves, 
to agree this association structure but differ on their quantification of the probabilities 
within this structure. This will be our starting point. 
5.2 A Useful Subclass of CG Models : the PCGs. 
All CGs can be represented in an evocative way using mixed graphs - with both directed 
and undirected associations. In our context we will consider only CGs which represent 
associations and conditional independencies a bit more general than those described in the 
last section, in that undirected associations represent unconditional dependencies within 
chain elements with the subgraph formed by the components (of a chain element) being 
complete, i. e. all the components are associated between themselves. These will be called 
PCGs (partially complete chain graphs). Note that they are ones which, by judicious 
changes of definition, can be represented by IDs on vectors of variables (Smith, 1989, and 
Queen and Smith, 1993). The PCGs are defined as follows (see Figure 5.1 for an example): 
Definition 5.2 (PCG) :. A chain graph GP(X) with nodes labelled by its chain elements 
is called a partially complete chain graph if, for each j=1, ..., n, all the 
components of the sub-vector (chain element) Xj of GP(X) are connected together to form 
a complete undirected subgraph. A directed edge connects XE Xi to YE Xj if and only 
if Xi is a sub-vector of pa(X5), where pa(X5) is the parent set of 2. 
cp 
FicURE 5.1. A partially complete CG GP. 
The ID induced by the PCG defined above consists of the statements of Condition 5.1 
in Section 5.1, together with a directed graph whose n nodes are labelled X 1, ..., X and 
where X= is connected by an edge to Xj if and only if X. is a sub-vector of pa(Xj). Figure 
5.2 shows the ID induced by the PCG g of Figure 5.1. 
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Z 
FIGURE 5.2. The ID Z induced by Gp of Figure 5.1. 
We shall call a PCG decomposable, gPd(X), if the ID induced by gP(X) is decomposable, 
i. e. when for some k (k = 1, ..., n) , 
Xi, Xj are both sub-vectors of pa(Xk), i j, then 
either X= is a sub-vector of pa(. 1'j) or Xj is a sub-vector of pa(Xi). 
Note that because components of the chain elements Xj of a PCG GP(X) form a com- 
plete undirected graph, any new information about a set of such components is informative 
about all the other components of that chain element and no CI assumption is destroyed 
within that chain element. 
A practical statistical analysis which uses PCG models is given in Queen and Smith 
(1994) where dynamic graphical models are derived for multivariate time series and applied 
to brand sales forecasting of products in supermarkets. 
5.3 The Cutting Likelihoods and External. Bayesianity. 
As mentioned before in Section 5.1, to generalise external Bayesianity, it is also nec- 
essary to introduce a second condition, as illustrated in Example 4.1, which will act on 
the class of likelihoods for models defined on a PCG 9P(X). In a general setting, these 
likelihoods, which we shall call cutting, are those which can be informative about one chain 
element Xj and/or its parents pa(Xj) only, of the group's common PCG. 
Definition 5.3 (Cutting likelihood). Say that l(xlz) is in the class of cutting likelihoods 
related to a PCG GP(X), henceforth denoted by G(GP), if it is a likelihood function which 
could have resulted from a sample Z whose density g(&x) can be written in the following 
form : 
9(-ZI1) Z-- 91 (Ki 1111) 92 (z21112, pa (x2), 11)... 
where x= (x1, ..., x,, 
) are values of the components of X in Gp, pa(zj) are fixed values of 
the parents of Xj in 9P(X) and z' = (z1, z2i ..., zl), 
for k>1, are the observed values of 
Zi=(Z1,..., Z). 
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What does this class of cutting likelihoods £(GP) look like ? Well, first note that if g 
is complete then £(9P) is the class of all likelihoods. So we only constrain our class of 
likelihoods when there is some substantive agreement between the members about some 
lack of association between certain sets of variables given another. 
In the case when 9P(X) is not complete there is an ordering of X to (Xj,..., Xn) 
such that XL can be thought (loosely) of as being caused by pa(X, ), a sub-vector of 
(XI 
I 
X21 
..., 
X=_1), i=2,..., n. When 1(gJ3) E £(c'(X)) we assume that we have taken 
an observation Z which, possibly after some transformation (see Example 5.1 below), can 
be represented as (Z1, ..., Z) where Zi is 
dependent on X only through Xi and the values 
of its direct causes pa(X ). Observe that in this case, the ID induced from gP(X) must 
be decomposable otherwise original relevances may not be valid anymore after sampling. 
Example 5.1 : Gaussian linear models of the form Z= AX + E, where Z is a vector of 
observable random variables, A is a matrix, X is a vector of independent random variables 
and E is the error vector whose components are independent and normally distributed, can 
be represented by IDs which may not be decomposable if A is not diagonal. Therefore, 
by the d-separation theorem, edges between components of X can be induced in the 
moral graph when Z is observed, thus appearing to destroy the original independence 
assumptions on X. Nevertheless, in the Gaussian case, it is always possible to find an 
orthogonal transformation L which diagonalizes the matrix A (Anderson, 1971). The 
transformed model, Z' = L'ALX + 17, where 27 = LE and for which Z* is also normally 
distributed, can now be represented by an ID with components of Z"` being separable 
observables of the respective components of X and the independence assumptions on X 
are preserved a posteriori. 
The class of cutting likelihoods may look contrived. However such types of likelihood 
functions arise naturally in a number of situations as we shall see in Section 5.5. They can 
also be thought as having occurred from designed experiments where pa(X J) have been 
fixed. 
When Xi,..., X are mutually independent, then pa(xj) _0 (the empty set) for j= 
1, ..., n. So G(GP) just contains likelihoods arising from an independent observation on a 
single chain element Xj for some j (see Example 4.1). In Example 4.2, the condition on 
the likelihood is automatically satisfied. So all we require is that external Bayesianity on 
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X2 is demanded for all observations y2 about X2, which are observed after the cause x1, 
is known. 
Now, the mentioned second condition the group is required to obey regarding the like- 
lihoods obtained from sampling over a decomposable PCG is that ; 
Condition 5.4. External Bayesianity is required to hold only with respect to incoming 
information ZJ, about the chain elements Xj of a decomposable PCG Gpd(X), for which 
the value of the ancestral set An(zj) = (h, ..., zj_1) is already known, and whose likeli- 
hood lj(. Izi, pa(Kj)), j=1, ..., n, is a component of a cutting likelihood l(III) related to 
grd(x). 
Note that in particular, the form (5.1) prevents a variable Xk in a decomposable PCG, 
GPd, not belonging to the parent set of . X, - which is associated with the index of the 
product component gj in (5.1) - pa(Xj), to condition the observation zj in gj, or in 
other words, to be directly associated with zj in c %XJZ). This in its turn, avoids the 
introduction of any new association in the moral graph of GPd(XIZ) not originally present 
in cpd(X 
5.4 - PCG Preservation After Sampling. 
The class of cutting likelihoods is a very natural one to consider in the context of PCGs, 
for CGs GP whose induced ID is decomposable, c d. This is because, provided condition 
5.4 is satisfied by the group, the class is determined by those data sets which, for each 
member, are guaranteed to preserve the Cl structure implicit in GPd after data assimilation. 
Thus it is simply information which does not destroy the association structure agreed by 
members of the group (see Example 5.1). Now we present the formal statement and proof 
of this result. 
Theorem 5.5. 
(a) If condition 5.4 is satisfied by the group G for likelihood functions 1(1j) related to 
the variables of a PCG whose induced ID is decomposable, GPd(X), then for each 
member of G, gpd(XJZ) is a CG of his joint density of KIZ ; 
(b) if condition 5.4 is not satisfied then, for some member of G, gpd(XJ2) may not be 
the CG of XJZ. 
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proof. 
(a) First we draw the ID J(X, Z) whose nodes are 
_n). 
The ID of 
Xl, 
..., 
X,,,, J(X), is the one induced by gpd(X). A node Y is a parent of Zj (j = 1, ..., n) 
if either (i) Y= Xj or Y 'E pa(X5) or (ii) Y=Z (1 = 1, ..., j- 1). See Fig. 5.3 below 
for an example. 
FIGURE 5.3. ID induced by a PCG GPd() with added nodes Z. 
Now use the d-separation theorem (Section 3.4). New edges inducing the marriage of 
parents of Z (j = 1, ..., n) can only occur 
between aZ node and an X node, since because 
cPd(X, Z) has an induced decomposable ID within J(X, Z, , the subgraph on sub-vectors 
of (pa(Xj), Xj) is complete. It follows that all new paths in 9(X, Z) between nodes on 
the subgraph J(X) of , 7(X, Z) induced 
by marrying of parents are blocked by {Zl, .., Z}. 
Also because the value of the ancestral set An(Zj) is assumed to be already known when 
Z is observed (condition 5.4), there will be no unblocked new path linking X nodes which 
were not linked in the original association structure. This in turn implies that if a CI 
statement is implied in , %(X) on X it is also implied on 
(b) If 1(xj) ý £(GPd), then for some index j (j = I, -, n) there exists aZ such 
that the parents of Z will have an edge induced to Xj after moralization. Marrying 
parents on conditioning on Z will now produce an unblocked path between another node 
X 
_k 
(k =1,..., j) not connected to Xj in , 
7(X), and X j. Thus whereas a priori all members 
agreed that 
Xi 11 X Ipa(X5) 
now, after observing ZJ we can no longer deduce this. Q 
5.5 The Class of Decomposable PCGs. 
In this section we shall illustrate some cases in which, whenever the group needs to 
combine its beliefs about the chain element XX, j=1, ..., n, in a 
PCG 9P(2[), it will 
have already observed the value of the parents pa(Xj) of X3. When this is so it is very 
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natural for the group to combine beliefs conditional on pa(xj). By demanding external 
Bayesianity on these conditional densities, we shall see in the next chapter, gives the 
conditionally externally Bayesian combination rules. So in this context the direct use of 
those rules is both straightforward and natural. 
In fact although the restrictions we impose to our Cl structures impose limitations in 
their applicability there are many modelling situations when combination rules may act 
under these conditions (Smith et al., 1993) making them a fairly rich class of structures. 
Here are some cases and examples: 
Case 5.1 : Assume Xl, ..., X,... is a multivariate 
ARIMA(n, p, O) time series with 
known coefficients. Here pa(X1) =0 and for j>2, 
pa pa 
where t= max{1, j- 1- n- p}. One step ahead forecasting by the group now fulfils this 
requirement. These models are in fact very special examples of the class given below. 
Case 5.2 ( The Bayes prequential models) : Prequential specification of a model (Dawid, 
1992) can be used in a wide class of problems. Jn such a specification it is assumed that 
each probabilistic forecaster provides a sequence of probabilistic forecasts, in the form of 
densities, viz. : 
Jl( l)yf2(ZAK1)t... ifr(Xrlxli... ixr-1)i... ; r> 
I, 
i. e. each forecaster gives a one step ahead predictive density for the next observation in 
a series given the whole past history. Any Bayesian time series model, for example the 
dynamic linear model (DLM) of West and Harrison (1989), is designed to be able to provide 
these outputs. But it is worth noting that such outputs are often available implicitly from 
classical models as well. For example current maximum likelihood estimates can substitute 
parameters in the sample density of successive observations. This is called the "plug-in 
rule" by Dawid (1992). 
For such models we can use our established notation to write 
r>1 frýýrlxlý..., x_I) = fr(? rIPa(xr)) ; 
where pa(x,. ) is a vector of statistics based on Xi, ..., X, -, which 
is predictively 
sufficient for X, i. e. those arguments (not x,, ) which appear explicitly in the functional 
form of the density fr defined above. 
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Now in many homogeneous time series we can write 
tr( r-i) = tr-l (Xr-2) +' Er-1 (X -1) 
;r>11 
where tr, T are k-vectors which depend on their arguments only, 1r is a smoothed error 
vector term. Initially, t-0 is a vector of constants and T=0 is a vector of zeros. When 
this property holds, the relationships can be usefully embodied in the CG of Figure 5.4. 
We shall call such a time series state regular. 
FIGURE 5.4. The CG of a state regular time series. 
Here are some examples of state regular time series. 
Example 5.2 : The ARIMA(n, p, O) model of case 5.1 is state regular with 
tr = (X t,...  
x 
-, 
) 
where for r>2, t=m. ax{1, r-1-n- p}. 
Example 5.3 (The constant DLM) : In the notation of West and Harrison (1989), when 
variances are known 
tr=Qr 
where ate, is the one step ahead predictive mean vector of the state vector Or at time r-1. 
For the DLM with unknown observational variance updates, 
tr 
' lard 
R 
where R. =S _1Rr, 
R* = G, Cr_1G' +W*, with G being the state transition matrix, 
C"_i and W* being the covariance matrixes of the prior density of ar and of the state 
error density respectively; S-1 = d,. _1/n,. _1 
is a prior location estimate of the observa- 
tional variance, with d,. _1 and nr_z 
being respectively the mean and variance of the prior 
density for the observational precision matrix. The same argument shows that Dynamic 
Generalised Linear Models (West and Harrison, 1989) are also state regular. 
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Example 5.4 (The multiprocess DLM class II) : In its most common form (Harrison and 
Stevens, 1976) these act on families of growth models. Here set 
1, (i) _ a, (ß) 
where ar is the B predictive mean vector as given above for the i-th model Mi where 
models (Ml, M2i M3, M4) represent respectively, no change, outliers, change in level and 
change in growth, last time step, and i (i) is a2 vector of state means. Then 
tr = (tr(l), tr(2), t, (3), tr(4), S 
where S is the 4 vector of probabilities assigned to Ml, M2, M3, M4 on the basis of the 
first r-1 observations. 
In all the models described above if used for one-step-ahead predictions of Xr all mem- 
bers of a group can be assumed to know t at time r. Hence the group prediction can be 
reasonably assumed to used this fact. 
Example 5.5 (Dynamic junction trees) : In Gargoum and Smith (1994), the Adjust 
Operator, Adj (C(i), S(i)), applied on cliques C(i), i=I, -, nt, of a dynamic 
decomposable 
Gaussian junction tree, updates the mean vectors µt(i) and the covariance matrixes Et(i) 
of the marginal distribution on C(i), as new observations y(i) -informative about C(i) 
only- arrives. Thus, 
tr@ý 
- 
ýul (i), Ell (0) 
where ti *(i) and Eil are the parameters (mean vector and covariance matrix respectively) 
of the distribution of the set of variables in the separator set S(i) C C(i), updated by the 
usual Bayesian approach. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONDITIONAL EXTERNAL BAYESIANITY 
6.1 The Definition of Conditional External Bayesianity. 
Suppose that the k members of a group have agreed in the structure of a decomposable 
PCG GPd(X) relating n random vectors, X= (Kr, ..., 
X) in a certain problem. Let Al be 
the event that the parent nodes of Xj, pa(Xj) have fixed values K1, i. e. Al = {pa(Xj) - 
pa(xj)} for j=1, ..., n. 
Despite believing the common PCG, gpd, each member has 
its own particular opinion about the parameters of his conditional densities, f; 1(X3jA3), 
associated with the graph structure. For technical reasons we shall assume that fib >0 for 
i= 1, ..., 
k and j=I, -, n 
(see Section 2.2.1). The members agree to follow the external 
Bayesianity axiom, satisfying thus formula (2.10) but for sets of conditional densities. 
Hence, according to the probability breakdown in CGs, external Bayesianity on XjjAj 
is required for all possible values of the K1 (j = 11 ..., n). Unlike in our Definition 2.3 
of external Bayesianity in Section 2.2.3, the likelihood over which we demand external 
Bayesianity to hold for these conditional densities, is restricted to the family G(cPd) of 
cutting likelihoods defined in the Section 5.3. Thus we demand condition 5.4 to be satisfied. 
Particularly, this means that external Bayesianity is required only for new information that 
might come from a designed experiment whose design points are the parents or causes of 
that variable. 
We can now define the conditional external Bayesianity property which will charac- 
terise conditionally externally Bayesian (CEB) pooling operators representing combined 
probability density functions associated with a PCG as follows : 
Definition 6.1 (Conditional External Bayesianity). Say a group G obeys the condi- 
tional external Bayesianity property if the joint density f (z) of the variables in its common 
decomposable PCG GPd(X) is combined in the following way. For each component X2 of 
X and each set Aj of possible values of the parents pa(Xi) of X J, each of the conditional 
densities fj(xJA5) is pooled to preserve the external Bayesianity property (j = 1, ..., n) 
with respect to the component lj(jLJA zi) of the common cutting likelihood 1(11z) asso- 
ciated with Gpd(X], where z5 = (zl,..., zz). 
6.2 A Characterisation of CEB Pooling Operators. 
In order to obtain a characterisation of conditional external Bayesianity through a class 
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of pooling operators, we propose, in line with Madansky (1964,1978) and Genest et at. 
(1986), that a CEB pooling operator, Tj, associated with a PCG GP(X), is one which 
is EB but only for data that respect an ordering of conditioning, X jIAj (j 
implicit in that chain when Condition 5.4 is satisfied. 
Define a measure space thereafter denoted with Sl j being the 
product space of spaces related to components of Xj and it being the product reference 
measure associated with the r(j) dimensional vector Xj in Sl, (Rudin, 1986). Let Tj 
OJ -> Aj be a CEB pooling operator, where Oj is the class of all µj*- measurable functions 
fij : Qj -+ (0, oo) with f=j >0(; t a. e. ) such that f """ 
f fijdplj... dp,. ljlj =1 for all 
i, j and r(j). The µgj's (q = 1, ..., r(j) 
for j=1, ..., n) are measures associated with 
components of Xj. If such a pooling operator satisfies the following condition 
Pj( 
jIAj, 
flj(xjIAj),... 
'fkj(xjIAj)] T7[flj,... 
' 
fkj]((X 
jtAj) =i jzj a. e. , 
(6.1) 
f 
... 
f pj[", u i, ... I 
fkj]d/Llj... dµr(j), j 
for each j=I, -, n, where Pj : 
Stj x (0, oo)k -+ (0, oo) is some arbitrary Lebesgue mea- 
surable function, then T= (TI,..., T, ) is said to satisfy the PCG gpd likelihood principle. 
This condition means that, except for a normalisation factor which does not depend on 
Xj, the density of the consensus at XjlAj is required to depend only on XJ and its fixed 
parents pa(X j) as well as on the individual densities at the actual value of the unseen 
quantities given its parents, but not upon the densities of the values which might have 
obtained but did not. 
Similar to Madansky's condition (2.10) for EB pooling operators, the CEB pooling 
operator Tj is required to satisfy the condition : 
T. ( 
l_fij ljfkj 
3 fi'dµi '..., f' ... f' 1ý ý ý... dµ,. (i), i 
f --" .rl. ifkjdµlj ... 
dµ,. (i), i 
ljTj(flj, 
" --, 
fk3) 
(6.2) 
f ... f IjTJ(fij, ..., 
fkj)dµij... dµr(. i), j 
with µj* a. e. for j=1, ..., n and 
for likelihoods 1j component of 1E £(gpd). 
Assuming the underlying measure space (Sl y, µJ) of each vector XJ in Gpd (X) can be 
partitioned in at least four non-negligible sets (that includes the continuous and most of 
the countable cases), it is straightforward to extend the characterisation theorem of Genest 
et at. (1986) for such an operator in the following way : 
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Theorem 6.2 (Conditional modified LogOp). Let (S2 µj*) be a quarternary measure 
space. Let f? (xjlA5) : A3 --ý Aj be a CEB pooling operator representing the k subjects 
combined conditional density for the r(j) dimensional random vector X J, j=1, ..., n, 
given its parents in a PCG cPd(X). If 
Tj[fli,... 
' 
fki](xi(AJ) 
j=1, ..., n, where 
for all f=3 (i = 1, ..., k) in 
Aý and for an existing µJ X Lebesgue mea- 
surable function Pi : Qj X (0, oo)k -+ (0, oo), Tj : 0jk -> Aj satisfies (6.1), then ff takes 
the form 
pjllk 1f 
f- -1zjl A.. 
\1wij(Ai) 
fß(-3 3_f... fpjfli[fei(xjIAj)]w'i(A, )dlcij 
... 
dý, (j), i 
' ýls a. e. , 
(6.3) 
where pj : S2j -4 (0, oo) are essentially bounded functions and wij (Aj) are weights such that 
k w(A3) =1 holds for each index j1n and A are the variables whose values 
are commonly known by the group when the combination rule is applied. Furthermore, 
the weights are nonnegative unless S21 is finite or there does not exist a countably infinite 
partition of (Sl µý) into non-negligible sets. 
proof. The proof is straightforward by a slight adaptation of Theorem 4.4 in Genest et 
al. (1986) individually for each node in gpd associated with the underlying measure space 
(S2 /ij), but conditioned on Xjl Aj (j = 1, ..., n). 
For completeness a full proof is given 
in Appendix A6. Q 
The w=, (Ai) are the weights that should be a measure of the member i expertise 
associated with the vector Xj. They can be possibly a function of other components in 
Xj. We will see in Section 6.3 that in time series problems we can often set Aj so that 
Aj C XI, ... 
Xi_1 for j=2, ..., n. 
As mentioned in Section 2.2.4, it is rather difficult to give an interpretation to p, in 
the context of our group decision problem. However, it is reasonable in the majority of 
problems to require that Ti preserves the group's unanimity. This leads us to setting p, 
equal one. Note that in this case, condition (6.1) can be restricted to 
TxA 
Pj[A>>flj(xiIAi),..., fki(x. IA-i)) 
.*a. e. f... f Pi(", fii,... IfkjIdpii... dpr(i), i 
1 
(6.4) 
thus not allowing Tj to depend on xi directly. 
The following corollary can be stated, with the proof being easily obtained from Theo- 
rem 6.2 : 
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Corollary 6.3 ( Conditional LogOp ). Let (Pi, j) be a quaternary measure space and 
let T; : A. -+ Aj be a CEB pooling operator which preserves unanimity. If there exists a 
µJ x Lebesgue measurable function P1 S2; X (0, oo)'E -+ (0, oo) such that Ti satisfies (6.1) 
for all vectors of conditional opinions (fl;, .., 
fk; ) EL, then T; is a logarithmic opinion 
pool, i. e. 
Z, xA_ 
Ilk (Ai) "- Lf: j 
a. e. 6.5 f ... f Ilj[ft; ( ; jA; )1"''i 
(Ai)dial;... dp, (; ), i 
/j () 
for some arbitrary weights wt i=1, ..., 
k, j=1, ..., n, possibly 
functions of Aj (the 
commonly known past when the densities of Xj are combined) adding up to one. Moreover, 
the weights wij(Aj) are nonnegative unless SZj is finite or there does not exist a countable 
partition of (S2 p.! ) into non-negligible sets. 
6.3 Group Learning in Time Consistent Chains. 
Now coming back to the time series application domain of Section 5.5, in all those types 
of setting, CEB is requiring that if information about X, iarrives between time point r -1 
and r (whose sample distribution is agreed by all members), then it should not matter 
whether the group combines one-step-ahead predictive densities of observations after each 
member has assimilated this information or to combine densities first and then let the 
group assimilate it. 
A valuable point here is that from the characterisation given in the last section, the 
group can agree beforehand about the algorithm they require to make the weights given to 
each expert depend upon the available past, Ar. In this context Ar is just X1, .. -, 
X 
_l. 
As we have already mentioned, such flexibility answers one of the criticisms of the usual 
LogOp pool. On the other hand, this extra flexibility demands that we find other criteria 
that might help the group to choose an appropriate algorithm. 
In the past various classical and Bayesian methods for updating weights in pooling 
rules have been suggested and tested on data (see e. g. Bunn, 1985, and Faria and Souza, 
1995). Although most of these have just been used in conjunction with point forecasting 
methods in linear combining models (Section 2.3), it is possible that many of them could 
be relatively simply adjusted to define methods of combining full probabilistic forecasts. 
Perhaps the simplest such method is the outperformance we described in Section 2.3.2, 
which can be generalised for the n-variate setup described above by just introducing an 
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index j in formula (2.17), that is, for t>1: 
Wij, t = (1 - pi, t-i)w=i, t-i +pi, t_1(t - 1)-'rti, t-i 
where again a component wij, t (i 1, ..., 
k) of the weights vector wj t (j = 1, ..., n) 
is interpreted as the probability that the member i will produce the most appropriate 
forecasting model of Xj, t; rij, t_1 is the number of successes obtained by the member's i 
forecasting model for the variable XX up to time t-1; pij,, = u/[äß, u + u], with cx1, u = 
{=1 a'"tj, u and aij, u are the parameters of the Dirichlet prior 
distribution associated to Ek 
the variable Xi. 
Such a method of updating weights transfers directly onto the conditional LogOp dis- 
cussed above as does other more sophisticated methods such the quasi-Bayes (Section 
2.3.3). 
Although developed for linear combinations, there would be in principle no reason why 
such methods should not be adapted to be employed in CEB pools such as the LogOps 
which are log-linear functions. It seems that at least in the case of Gaussian models, 
when logarithmic pools give linear combinations on the means (see e. g. Example 4.4 in 
Section 4.3), this is case. Nevertheless, this subject requires further investigation. Among 
the methods described in Section 2.3, the outperformance is the least dependent on the 
linearity of the combination rule. 
6.4 How CEB Poolings Appear EB. 
We have already shown in Chapter 5 that in order to ensure that the CEB rules are 
well-defined, the common PCG gP(X) must be decomposable. Note that the CEB rules 
are not based on pooling operators since their arguments are not necessarily just the values 
of the joint densities in those pools. 
The question now is, when t(11z) E . C(9Pd), in what sense, if any, are the CEB combi- 
nations on chain elements, EB on the whole PCG gPd ? 
Certainly, when data Z about X in 7Pd(X) is observed, that evidence must be prop- 
agated through the PCG. Therefore, all the conditional pools Tj(flj,..., 12p-i)] 
on the chain elements Xl and its predecessors on gPd(X), that is must be 
updated to (omitting the members' densities) Tj[xJxJj-1>, z] for j=1, ..., n. 
Suppose we demand that the group agrees to update those conditional densities in 
a backwards sequence. Thus assume that the group agrees to update XnIX("-1) first, 
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Xn_1lX(n-") second, and so on to X 
Let f be the group's combined joint density which takes the individual posterior den- 
sities on pools them, uses the derived (agreed) density of Z'2E(n-1) to 
obtain individual densities of X, i_1 
I[X(n-2), Z], pool these, and so on down to the density 
of X1. Note that to do that the members must adopt the densities (associated to the 
marginal likelihoods) for ZjXj, pa( 1) (j = n, n-1, ..., 1) as common updating factors 
(see the proof of Theorem 6.4 below). 
Also, let f be the group's combined joint density which pools the individual prior 
densities of forms a group's posterior density of XnI[X(n-1), Z] and a density 
of ZIX("-i) , uses this agreed 
density of ZIX(n-1) and the pool of the prior densities on 
X, 
_1 
IX("-2) to obtain the posterior density X_1 ý[X lr-ý1,2j and so on down to the 
pooling of X1. Thus, the question is when does f (x[z) =f (xýz) ? The answer is provided 
by the following theorem. 
Theorem 6.4. Suppose that Property 5.4 is satisfied by the group G for a PCG gpd(X). 
Also assume that the vector of weights wi of the conditional LogOps used to combine the 
beliefs of the members of G on chain elements Xj of CJPd(X), is a function only of variables 
in pa(xi) for all j=1, ..., n. 
Then for the whole graph gpd(X'Z), 
f ýxýzý = 
where the conditional LogOps components of f or f are backwards sequentially updated. 
Note that the above result guarantees that the original PCG structure is preserved after 
new information is incorporated to the model. However, it is important to point out that 
neither f or f are strictly EB in general. When there is agreement on how the graph is 
updated then they are in particular sequentially PPC. The updating is only strictly EB 
when the corresponding graph is completely disconnected. 
proof. Here we use the convention that a function will explicitly depend only on the values 
of its arguments. Also, for simplicity, the argument of wit, that is pa(w), will be omitted 
in this proof. First note that there is a proportionality constant for each 1=1, ..., n, 
hj(pa(x1), z1) = 11f ... 
f rjjý-1 fil" (X41 pa(il), z')dxlj... dXr(1)1, r(l) being the dimension of 
the vector element X j, such that 
k 
ft(gýj lpa(xt),? t) =hl (Pa(xt), z) 
rjf l: º(ýýPa(x1ýý? tý 
i-1 
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Also note that if information Z' about X' is observed then the density of (X +i, ... X 
given X' remains unchanged. 
jive begin the proof by showing that, under the conditions of the theorem, the density of 
X, I (pa(X,, ), Z") does not depend on when Z" is incorporated. Notice that Z" = Z. 
Since g(J ) is a function of x only through gn(znýx, ý, pa(in), zn-1), we can write that 
k 
rfinlxnlpalxn/ý9nlznlpalxnýýxný? 
n-lýlwýn 
fnlýnlpa(1n), zn)-hnlPa(xJ, ? n) L ýinlýalýnýý zný 
i=1 
where throughout we let 
hin(pa(xl)ve) =I... 
I 
fin ýxnlpa(xj)9n(? 
n111n, p[L(xj, z11-l)Clxln... 
dxr(n), 
n 
for k. Noting that Ek 1 win =1 this can be arranged as 
_J 
0r? n 
fnýxnlýaýxnýr? ný =k 
h"(pa(x k ý}non ýxniPaýxnýý9nýznl ýnrTýaýýnýr zn-1ý 
= un(pa(? jr? n)fn(, Knlpa(IJ, e) 
where 
and where 
n(pa(I. ),? n) _h 
(Pa(ýEn)ü n)vn(pa(. ), f) 
ýt_i 
hin 
(pa(? 
n), a7) 
k 
vn(pa(? n), ? 
n) 
... 
f fj'ý`lxnlýaýýnýý9nlZnlxný pa(xn), zii-1)(121n... dxr(n)n 
t=1 
Now we know that f and 1. must integrate to 1 over xn for all values of pa(in) and 
z'. It follows therefore that V(pa(xn), zn) is identically one and so 
fnýznlPaýýnýý zný - fnýxnlPaýxnýý zný (6.6) 
as required for each node of the ID induced by gpd. 
After having shown that whether the combination is done before or after observing Z 
does not affect the conditional density of we next consider the updat- 
ing of X, z_llpa(Xn_i) given 
Z". First note that to update the distribution of Xr-' = 
(X1, X ,..., X _, 
) and hence of Xii_1jpa(Xri_1)] in the light of r, we need to calculate 
the density g(') of An = (z1, ..., z, ti) given x'i-1 = 
(x1, 
..., x, i_i). 
We can then simply use 
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Bayes rule as above. Now since the likelihood of Z is cutting, from the usual probability 
calculus we can write that, 
9tiý ýznlxri-1ý 
=91(z1Jx1)92(K212L2iPa(x2), zl) ... 9n-l( Kn-lIxn-1, Pa(jjn-1), zn-1ý 
where 
9ný? nI xn-1ý Zn-1) 
ý9n(z 
JjjnrPa(IJ, zn-')f,, (xnlpa(xn))dXln... dXr(n) n 
Note that f,, above is unambiguously defined since f,, = fn by equation (6.6) and 
k 
fn(xnl pa(m)) = h(Pa(xn)) fsnýn l nlpaixn)) 
i-1 
Now, provided that wi is a function of x only of terms in pa(x), it is clear that g,, is a 
function of z and pa(x,, ) only. So we can write that 
9n(We-1, zn-1) = 9n(? nIPa(ýEj, 
e-1 
where g is a function of its arguments only. Also, since gpd(X) has a decomposable 
induced ID, it will exhibit the running intersection property (see Lauritzen and Speigel- 
halter, 1988, p. 169). This states that there will exist an index j (n) (say) such that 
pa(in) 9 {xl(n), pa(xl())} with i (n) = 1,..., n- 1. Sog can be further simplified into 
9n(znj? n-1, Zn-l) pa(xj(n)), zn-1 = 9n(znýýi(n)ý) 
Hence 
Jll)ýzll)Ix1)9(1)(z21)122, z11) ... y(l)lýz(1j1I? n-i, Pa(xn-lýoz(l), 
n-2) 
where 
9j 
and Z(1) =Z for 1j (n), I=1, ..., n-1 and 
9i(n) (z i(, ) 
Jx. i(n)' paýxJ(n) ), zi(n)-1 
=9. i(n)ýz. i(n)ýxi(n)ýý'aýxi(n)ý, zJ(n)-1)9nýznýýi(n)ýý'aýxi(n)ýýz"-i) - 
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It follows that g(')(z! x"-1) is a likelihood function which is cutting on x(l) = xn-1 since 
the only changed term is the likelihood arising as if from two conditionally independent 
observations Zýl) = (Zý(n) ,Z) 
Now consider the density of Xn_1ý{pa(Xn_1), Z}. The argument leading to equation 
(6.6) can now be directly applied but with n-1 replacing n, g replaced by g(l) and x by 
. 
(') to give us that 
1n-1(xn-l l pa(xn-1), zn-1) =fý- _1 
IPa(xn-, ), e-1) 
Since the induced ID is decomposable, we can find an index j(n-1) such that pa(xn_1) 9 
We can therefore use an argument exactly analogous to the one 
above, replacing x(') by x(2) = xr-2 = (x1, ..., in-2), 
(n -1) by (n - 2), g by g(1) and g(') 
by g(2) , where 
9(2) (e-ll. 
2) 
= 912, (z(2)I 
. i) ... 
9n2)2ýzn2)2I ýn-2, pa(ýEn-2), 
and where 
9ý2)(z(. 2)1xýoPa(ýj),? (2), i-1ý -9. i(zj(2)Jý>>pa(xj),? 
(2), i-1) 
and z(2) = 
P) for jj (n - 1), j=1, ..., n-2, and 
9i(n -1)V-j(n -i) 
ýýi(n-i), Paýxi(n-i) )ý z(2), i(n-i)-1 
= 9ý(n-i) ( zi(n-i) ýxi(n-i)' Paýxi(n-1)), zj(n-1)-i )9n1- i (? 
ý111I 
Pa(! 9(n-i),? 
(2), i(n-1) ) 
we have that 
n n-1 
, 
fn-2 (Kn-2 I Pa(xn-2) i? 
ý= fn-2 Gxn-2 I pa(xn-2W sz 
It should now be clear that we can proceed inductively bactwards through the indices 1, 
starting from 1= n to prove that 
ftýýtlpaý? ýýý? 
tý = ftýxtýPaýtýýztý I=1,..., n . 
But since the density of 1 is uniquely determined by the product of 11,1= 1, ..., n, and 
f by the product of conditional densities fl, I=1, ..., n, we 
have then proved that 
f 014 =f (xk) 
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i. e. that the required external Bayesianity holds for Gpd(X+Z). Q 
The above results guarantee that provided (i) the common PCG is decomposable and 
(ii) the common likelihood for sampling over ancestral sets associated with the PCG is 
cutting, the original PCG structure is preserved after new information is incorporated 
to the model. Moreover, under these circumstances, if the group is CEB on every chain 
element and agrees to be sequentially PPC then it appears EB on the PCG. 
6.5 CEB Linear Opinion Pools. 
If we impose linear opinion pools (LinOps), that is, pooling operators T which obey 
both MP and ZPP (see Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2), to the Cl preserving PCGs gPd(X), then 
we should have 
k 
T(fl,..., fL. )(? ) wjf=(? )' (6.7) 
t-i 
where fi(x) is the member E= assessed joint density for X and wi his weight in the pool, 
such that all the weights add up to one. Since the PCG is common to the group, f, (x) 
can be factorized accordingly for each i=1, ... ,k and 
(6.7) would give 
n 
T(fi, 
, 
fk)(? ) = {wi11ft, [l, Ipa(K, )]} (6.8) 
j=l 
where fq[x? jpa(xj)] is the member E; assessed conditional density for the chain element 
K. 
Although this formulation preserves the MP, the weights are restricted and the pos- 
sibility of their use to reflect relative expertise on components of Gpd(X) is not allowed. 
In fact, the LinOp (6.8) is not really a combination rule on densities associated to chain 
elements of cpd(X). However, this could be circumvented by imposing the LinOps on the 
PCG's components X1 conditionally on their parent sets pa(Xj) instead (as done for the 
LogOps). In this case we would have that 
k 
Ti(fli,..., fki)[gjijPa(ji)] = 
Ew=i[1'a(xi)]fii[xijPa(xi)] 
, 
(6.9) 
i=l 
where w; j[pa(xj)] is Ei's weight for his assessment for XL given pa(11j) in the pool. The 
restriction Ei 1 wjj[pa(xj)] =1 applies. Note that with this formulation the weights are 
not only allowed to reflect individual relative expertises on components of qPd(X). but also 
to be set according to occurred values of the variables in pa(xj), provided the restriction 
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of adding up to unity remains. This possibility certainly does not violate the MP as 
happens when the weights are allowed to vary with xj (e. g. Genest, 1984b). Also, for the 
same reasons described in Section 2.2.1 for the LogOps, the impossibility results of Dalkey 
(1972,1975) and of Genest and Wagner (1984) do not apply here. See also McConway 
(1981). 
Now, following the probability breakdown of the joint consensus density for all the 
components according to the associations in Gpd(X) gives 
nk 
T(fii, 
.i 
fins 
... Y 
fki:... 
i 
fkn) (1) _ 111 E "w=. i[pa(xj)]fij[gLJpa(xj)]} (6.10) 
j=1 i=1 
Clearly (6.10) does not preserve both the MP and the external Bayesianity property. 
It also does not preserve the product form of the factorization of the joint density into 
conditional densities according to the PCG structure. Also the factors in (6.10) due to 
the cross products of different weighted densities over different components is of difficult 
interpretation. In fact, the products of densities within those factors could possibly be 
seen as components of dependence measurements among different members assessements 
for different variables, but the product of weights are rather arbitrary as weightings for 
those measurements. Consider, for example, the simple case where k=n=2, dim(Xi) = 
r(i) =1 for i=1,2, and the common ID has a directed edge from Xl to X2. Thus, 
according to this 
T[fii, fie, fei, f22](xi, x2) = 'tViw2(xi)fii(xi)f12 (x2Ixi) 
+ wi[I - w2(xl))fii(xi)f22(12j2; 1) 
{ (1 - wi)w2(xi)f2i(xl)fi2(x21xi) 
{ (1 - wl)[l - w2(xi)]f2i(xi). f22(x2lxi) 
Observe that the parcels formed by the products and cross products of the original weights 
in the sum above also add up to one. Now, taking the second factor of the above sum, for 
example, the weights cross-product parcel wl[1 - w2(-Cl)] is itself weighting the product 
of fil(x1) with f22(x2jx1). The issue here is whether the cross-product of densities can 
be interpreted as representing the dependence between El's assessment for X1 and E2's 
assessment for X21 xl. If one chooses to interpret this way then how reasonable would it 
be to take the parcel w1 [1- 702 (xl)], where wl measures El's relative expertise on. Xl and 
1- w2(xl) measures E2's relative expertise on X2(xl, as a weight (or discount) for the 
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relative strength of that dependence. Also, it is not always that the product of densities 
is itself a probability density function. 
In fact, it is well known (Wagner, 1982 and Genest, 1984c) that the linear opinion 
pools (LinOps) are not EB for tertiary o-fields (see Section 2.2.1). This corresponds in 
the univariate setting to (2.8) or (2.9) not satisfying (2.10) unless they are dictatorships. 
Naturally dictatorships are undesirable in that context. However, if in our multivariate 
setting, one member of the group has so much more expertise about certain chain elements 
than the other members then it is natural for the group to choose that member's opinion 
as the consensus (the group's conditional density) on those elements. If this is the case 
for every chain element in cpd, then Theorem 6.4 applies and the joint consensus T on 
the whole PCG Gpd(X) is EB for cutting likelihoods. Note that, the selected model of 
member E, for the element Xj synthesizes his opinion about XjJpa(Xj) and could have 
been obtained from a linear combination of other statistical models. 
Alternatively consider the situation where for each chain element Xj, only one of the 
members' models fij[xlIpa(gj1)] for XjJpa(K) is known to be the `right' model but that 
member identity is unknown. Let ap =i if the member E= model is the `best' (or right) 
model for XJpa(X j). Also, let wj = (w1, ... , wkj) where the weight w=j = 
Pr{aj = i}, 
that is, the probability that E='s model is the best model for XJpa(Xj). Thus, the 
consensus on XJpa(Xj) also conditioned on aj = i, 
fi[x. ijpa(x. i), cx = i] = ftj[xjl pa(xi)] (6.11) 
is CEB regarding the likelihood for wl if all members agree on a distribution for ivj. On 
the other hand, 
k 
f1[x1JPa(zj)) _ 
ý, wtjfi[j1JPa(2jj), a= i] (6.12) 
is a LinOp. 
It seems that the above mentioned cases characterize the only instances where a LinOp 
can be CEB. 
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APPENDIX A6 
Proof of Theorem 6.2 
The proof of Theorem 6.2 needs intermediate results that we state here as lemmas and 
other theorems. Basically, the proof itself is split up to include all possible configurations 
of the underlying measure spaces, that is, the cases in which (9j, j )does not contain 
any atoms, or is purely atomic, or contains atoms but is not purely atomic. Some of these 
intermediate theorems and lemmas themselves need other results and concepts. 
We begin Subsection A6.1 with a characterisation theorem of the conditional LogOp. 
This theorem is used to prove Theorem A6.4, a characterisation of the conditional modified 
LogOp for the case in which ('j) is not purely atomic and condition (6.1) holds for the 
functions Pj (j = I, -, n). In 
Subsection A6.2 we introduce the concept of equivalence 
classes for CEB pooling operators which is useful for the statement of a theorem that 
characterises such operators without imposing any restrictions on the measure space and 
without requiring (6.1) to hold, namingly Theorem A6.6. For instance, this theorem is 
used to demonstrate Lemmas A6.7 and A6.8 which characterise the conditional modified 
LogOp, for the case in which (f2,, 1L) contains atoms but is not purely atomic. Finally, 
Subsection A6.3 proves the Theorem 6.2 . 
A6.1 Characterisation of the Conditional LogOp. 
Theorem A6.1. Suppose that µ! is not purely atomic in the measure space 
(Std, t ). Let fJ : L\! -4 A, j=1, ..., n, 
be pooling operators for which there exists 
Lebesgue measurable functions Pj : (0, oo)k -4 (0, oo) such that 
fi(fijý... 
ýfk. i)(xjIAj) = 
Pj(fi9(xjjAj),... Ifkj(xjIAi)) pý a. e. , 
(A6.1) 
f ".. f Pi (flj, ..., 
fkj)dµl j... dpr(i),. i 
holds for each j=1, ..., n, where xjjAl 
denotes the j-th set of variables given their 
parents in a chain graph G and where fij denotes the group member's conditional density 
function for this set of variables zjIAj. Then fj is EB if and only if there exist weights 
w; l(Aj) > 0, Ek w=j(Aj) = 1, for j=1, ..., n, such that 
Jjjk=j[fjj(xjjAj)]wji(Ai) 
fi(fl>>..., fki)(xj I Ai) = f... f f: '_1(f: 7 (xýýAi))w'i(Ai)dµli ... 
dýt, (i), i 
ýý a. e. , 
(A6.2) 
holds. 
As in Genest (1984a), the proof of Theorem A6.1 is broken up into two lemmas. But 
first note that the function Pj in (A6.1) is the same as in (6.1) except that it is not indexed 
79 
by xjiAj. This condition restricts the value of the likelihood of the combined conditional 
density at a particular point y, in Qj to depend only on a function fib (y), i=1, ..., 
k, 
and a proportionality constant which ensures fj integrates to one. Also notice that since 
pj* is not purely atomic in (Sts, µ, ý) we can choose arbitrarily small disjoint subsets BQ 
(q = 1, ..., s) of Qj such that 0< µý 
(By) < e, E>0. 
The following Lemmas A6.2 and A6.3 are respectively the Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3 in Genest 
(1984) where P3 replaces P, c3 replaces c, zig replaces zi, lj(. 3)Aj) replaces 1, and so far. 
Their proofs are ommited here since apart from the mentioned replacements, they are 
completely analogous to those in Genest (1984a). 
Lemma A6.2. The functions PP : (0, oo)k -+ (0, oo) in (A6.1) are homogeneous, i. e. 
Pj (clzl ..., clzkj) = cjP5 
(zlj,..., zk3) for all cl >0 and zi; > 0, where i=1, ..., 
k and 
j=1, .., n. 
Lemma A6.3. The function P, in (A6.1) satisfies the functional equation 
Pj(sly zi j,..., Sk. i zk7) Pj (1, ..., 
1) = Pi (sly , ..:, ski) 
P3 (z1 ji..., zkj) 
for all si zig in (0, oo), where i=1, ... ,k and 
jý1, :.., n. 
proof of Theorem A6.1. For each j=1, ..., n, 
let 
Hj(zlj,..., zkj) = Pj(1,..., 1)) 
p 
Observe that Hj is Lebesgue measurable and satisfies the functional equation of Lemma 
A6.3 above, Hj(sljzlj,..., skjzkj) = Hi (sij,..., skj)Hj(zlj,..., zkj) on (0,00)k for all j= 
wq) 1, ... , n. 
Therefore for each j=1, ... , n, 
Hj (zl j, ..., zkj) = 
for 1 ij 
lam' for some 
w=j(Aj) E R} (i = 1, ..., 
k), and since Hj(cczli,..., cjzkj) = ejH; (zl..., zkj) for all cj > 
0 and zij >0 (i = 1, ..., k and i=1, ..., n) then 
by Lemma A6.2, F1 wij(Aj) = 1. The 
i= ij 1f 
wjj (j), j < 00 non-negativity of the wij's come from the fact that f ... f[ 
for all possible fij EE (i = 1, ..., k and j=1, ..., n). 
Q 
Theorem A6.4. Assume that (n j, µj*) is not purely atomic and that N is the complement 
set of the atoms. Let Ij: Ak -+ A, j=1, ..., n, 
be externally Bayesian. Assume that (6.1) 
holds for lzj* X Lebesgue measurable functions P5 : Qj x (0, oo)k -> (0, oo), n. 
Then, 
pj(xjI A1) Ili-1[fij(jIAj)1w'i(Ai) fi(flj'... 'fkj)(jýjjAj) _, ti - a. e. on N, 
(A6.3) 
f ... f Pj(", Ail .... 
fkj)d{Lij... dltrlj), j 
where w; i(Aj) >0 and Ek 1 w; J(Aj) = 1, j=1,..., n. 
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proof. Define a new function NPD : Slj x (0, oo)' -4 (0, oa) by 
NPD (x1 jAi, zig, ..., zki) = 
Pi (xJ JAi, z1J, ---I zki)/P(xj 
l AJ, 1, ..., 1) 
for all z;, E (0, oo), i=1, ..., 
k and j= 1,..., n. 
Notice that NP5 (xjjA z1, ..., zkJ), n, 
is a function of the zip's only, i 
1, ..., 
k, i. e. NPD (xjjAj, zlj,..., zkj) = NPD (zl ..., zki), j=1, ... , n. In fact, given 
z=; >0 (i = 1, ..., 
k and j=1, ..., n) we can arbitrarily choose 
0< ej < min{1/2,1/2z=ß : 
i=1,..., k} and let BQj, q=1, ..., 4, 
be a partition of N such that 0< µ3t(Bq j) < Ej 
for k=1,2 ;0<j (B35) < oo and µ j* (B4 j) >0 (j = 1, ... , n). If we define for each 
j=1, -""'n: 
zii = Z(Bi5) +Z(B2i) + 
tij 
*'Yij 
-A (1- 7tj)Z(B3, 
i) N'j(B3))(ý) - A3) 
+ 
ej(1 
- 7ij) "- (ti, - yij)h I(B49) 
Rj(s 
- 
A. 
1) 
where Rj =f """ f I(B4j)hldtclj... dµr(j), j > 0; Z(B) is the indicator function of the set 
B; hj E0 is a fixed arbitrary density; tip = 1/zij ; yJ =i (Bj5) + µj*(B2j) (note that 
0< yj < min{ti1,1 :i=1, ... , 
k} and, )t3 >0 and e< oo are chosen such that 
Al < rain{[1 - ryjil -1(tai - -yii) :i=1, ..., 
k} 
maxi, i{[1 - 'Yijl -i (tj5 -'Y+i) :i=I, ..., 
k} < ýj . 
Considering the likelihood 
lj = 1(Bij) +1 (B2j) + ýjI (B3j) + , 
\]Z(B4j ) 
for each j, we have that f ".. f ljztjdµlj... ditr(j), j = tij (i = 1, ..., 
k). 
Letting hi5 = lj ij/ f ... f lj2ijdµlj... dµr(j), j we have that for (xjjA5) E Bl U B21 
zig (xj I Ai) =1 and Iiij = zij (i = 1, ..., 
k and j=1, ..., n). 
Since fj is externally 
Bayesian then 
f1(hl;, ..., hki) (ýJ RAJ) 
li (xj (bA; )fi (zlj, ..., zki) (xj IA3) 
is constant (Ich - a. e. ); and since 1j(xjjbA; ) =1 on B, U B2, and since (6.1) holds for p 
- a. e. on N, it follows that 
NPi (xi(AI, zli,..., zki) - 
fi (hli, 
..., 
hki) (jLijAi) 
li (xi, bAi)fi (zli, 
..., zki) 
(?, i jAi) 
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on B13 U B2j (j = 1, ..., n), i. e. NPD is essentially constant as a function of xjjAj on 
Bl U B2. To see that this is valid on N, lets assume to the contrary that there exists a 
subset C of N with p ,! 
(C) >0 such that NPj(xJ jA zlj, ..., zkj) > 
(<)NP, (zlj, 
..., z. 
), 
j=1, ..., n, 
for almost all xjAj in C. Choosing a subset of C with positive measure at 
most c and naming it B2 we repeat the above development with B1J being kept the same 
as before. NP, (xjA,, zl ..., zkj) 
for i=1, 
..., n, 
is still essentially constant on B13UB2, 
in contradiction to the assumption that NPD (jjjJAl, zi ..., zkJ) > 
(<)NPj(zlj, 
..., zkj) on 
B2J, j =. 1,..., n. 
Now that we have shown that NPD (x5IA zl j, ..., zk j), 
j=1, 
... , n, is a 
function of the 
zij's only (i = 1, ..., 
k and j=1, ..., n), the proof 
is straightforward by defining a new 
pooling operator f7 : Ak --> A such that 
f; (fi;,..., fkJ)(x; IAJ) = f, f 
NPj(fi; lAj)fk; fd1ti 
... JL)(j)ä 
It is clear that fj* is externally Bayesian and of the form 
fý (fii,..., fki)(xiIAi) x Pj(fi; (? ijAj),...,. fkj( IAj)) ; Fýý-a. e. , 
where the proportionality constant is independent of . 
jAj for each j=1, ..., n, with 
NP5 
replaced by P,. Applying Theorem A6.1 we conclude that 
k 
w; i (Ai) NPD(zl;,..., zki) = rl z=; 
i=l 
for some w=j(A? ) >0 such that Ei 1 wij(A2) =1 for each j=1,..., n. The relation 
(A6.3) is then achieved if we set pj(jLJjAj) = Pi(ILJAi, 1, ..., 1) 
for all xjjAj in N (j = 
1, .., n). O 
A6.2 Equivalence Classes for CEB Pooling Operators. 
The concept of equivalence classes allows the characterisation of a theoretically more 
general class of CEB pooling operators than that of the conditional LogOp. In fact, the 
domain of pooling operators is divided into particular sets of density functions (equivalence 
classes) in such a way that, given the value of an operator at one member of an equivalence 
class, the CEB property defines the value of the operator at all other members of that 
class. 
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Definition A6.5 (equivalence class). Two vectors (fl,..., f,, ) and (fl , ..., fn) in 
Ok 
belongs to the same equivalence class a if and only if there exists a likelihood function 
I: Qj -ý (0, oo) such that 
f'* 
if 
- f ... f1 fidyi j... dpr(. i-), i ' 
I'l - a. e. 
for all i=1, ..., 
k. 
Observe that if (fl,..., f,, ) and f, ) belongs to the same equivalence class a then 
for all k, r there exists Ckr >0 such that 
k 
fr r* 
i 
and, in this case (fl, ..., 
fn) is said to equivalent to (fi , ..., 
fn), i. e. (fl, ..., 
fn) N (fr, ..., 
fn). 
We can now state the following theorem. 
Theorem A6.6. Let A be the space of equivalence classes and let fj : ýk -ý be an 
arbitrary pooling operator for each j=1, ..., n associated with the partially complete chain 
graph GP. Then Ij (j = 1, ..., n) 
is CEB if and only if, for each j=1.,,,. m, 
fj(flj,..., 
Jkj) a 
balvajfýtlj1 , µj - a. e. , 
(A6.4) 
where ai is the equivalence class of (fib, ..., 
f, 3), and for each aiinA, ba, is some essen- 
}, tCý tially bounded function and vag is some function such that va, > max{ fib ,a 
almost everywhere. 
Although formula (A6.4) appears to be f1j's dictatorship, the opinions of all other 
members of the group are considered in the consensus through the knowledge of the 
equivalence class corresponding to the vector Note that each equivalence 
class is characterised by an arbitrary vector (fib , ..., 
fko) in the class or, equivalently, by 
a component fkc and the ratios fJ / fk7 ,i=1, ..., 
k, i k, which are invariant within a 
given class (j = 1, ..., n). 
proof. First, for any fixed bay and vag, f3(fla,..., fkJ) in (A6.. ¢) is well defined and is 
CEB for all j=1,..., n in the chain graph ! 9. In fact, for the common likelihood functions 
1j in 9P, since fi/fi = cl: f, /fa, µJ - a. e. , we 
have that 
fj(ljflj,..., Ijfkj) a bajva1-jFa; c ba9Vaplj 
f 
Jii 
f; 
j 
OC ij (fljI... I k1) 
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and fJ is CEB for all j. 
To prove that if fj is CEB then it is of the form (A6.4), lets for each aj E A, de- 
note h«; = fý (fib , ..., 
f ý) for all j. For arbitrary sets of density functions (fly, ..., fkj) 
equivalent to (f1 j,..., f c"), consider the likelihoods lj = fly/ fi j'. Since for each j, 
f. J /fig = ciijff5/fij, jLj - a. e. , we 
have that f ".. f ljfjJ dlilj... dlLr(. i),. i = c; i5 < o0 
and 
lj f J' /J -J ljfij' duij... dlcr(i), j = fiJ 
for all i and j. From the fact that fj is CEB, we have that 
j li flai fkjaj 
) f (f1i ý ..., fki) f ... J li fib dµli... dµ,. (i), i' .., f ... f lj fkj dlti dg, (S), i 
fiho raj j, µJ - a. e. a ljfi(f1" ,..., fkj) _ 
ii 
is valid as long as (f, j, ..., 
fkj) E a3. 
Now, to see that bay is essentially bounded, assume that for each j, 
va. > rnax °' ai 1 
{f2ý,... 
}fk1} 
Letba, = ha? /vag, pick an arbitrary function pj in t and define flj = pj fiJ /vaj, µt - a. e. 
(j = 1, ..., n). Since 
f ... f fl j fij' /fib dµl j... dµr(j), j < oo for i and j, we can also define 
f2j, 
..., fkj E0 such that (f15, ..., fkj) - (fl 
i,..., fk ") by fij OC f1 jf 
Q' lfl ' for i? 2 and jJJ? - 
j= 1,..., n. Then fj (f1j, ..., fkj) oc pjha, 
/vas, and thus f ... f pjha, /vajdtcl j... d/lr(j), j < 
oo for allpj EA, j= 1,..., n. 
Now, the conclusion follows from Theorem 20.15 in Hewitt & Stromberg (1965 .. 
In 
fact, according to that theorem, if f """ f pjba, dµl;... dµr(j), j < oo for all p, such that 
f """ f pjdµlj ... 
dpr(j) j< co then ba, is bounded. Q 
Lemma A6.7. Let (521, pJ) be a quaternary measure space that contains at least two 
atoms, and let fJ : Ok -4 A be a CEB pooling operator. Suppose there exist pt x Lebesgue 
measurable functions P, : S2j X (0) 00)k -+ (0, oo) such that (6.1) holds for all conditional 
densities fij E A, i=1, ..., k and j=1, ..., n, associated to a partially complete chain 
graph GP. Then for every pair of atoms (xjjA MlD J) in QJ2, the identity 
fi (fei, 
... ý 
fki) (xi ýAJ) 
_ 
fl (hli, 
..., hki) 
(xJ I AJ) 
(A6.5) 
fi(hli,..., hki)(yl(Di) 
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where Di = {7r(Ki) = 7r(y, )} is the set of fixed values for the parent set of) for each j, 
holds for all fib and h;, (i = 1, ..., 
k and j=1, ... , n) in 0 for which 
fij(xjlbAi) 
__ 
h-3(Ki bA5) 
fii(y, (Di) h23(yý1Di) 
(A6.6) 
for all i and j. 
proof. If for each j the vectors of µJ-densities (fl..., fkj) and (hl,,..., hk, ) satisfy con- 
dition (A6.6) and belong to the same equivalence class a then substituting (A6.4) of 
Theorem A6.6 in (A6.6), (A6.5) is obtained. 
Now we have to show that if there exist fi hil in A for all i and j such that (A6.6) 
holds, then such densities belong to the same equivalence class. To do so, set 
sii = fci(x5IAi), u=i = fji(yjDi), s=h; J(xJ! A1) ands = hij(yýtDj) so that 13 
Sig 
- 
uni 
Sid 1Lti 
for all i and j. Choose four sets in Qi for each j, Bqj, with 0<i (Bqj) < oo fork= 1,2,3 
and µ! (B4i) > 0, such that stiµ, t (B15) + uLiµt (B2 j) <1 and sJµß (Bid) + u*ýµý (B2j) <1 
for all i. Make Blj = {xjAj} and B2j = {yýjD1} and construct densities fkj) and 
likelihoods lj for these densities such that f j(xj'Aj) = sf5, fi'j(yý lD5) = uij, h=j (xjjAl) 
si*ý and h; j(y. lD5) = u! - where M, = l5f=, / 
f . ". f ljf; jdµlj... dµr(j), i (for all i and j), in 
a similar way of the preceding proofs. 
Denote ytj = s11 i (Bl3) + uijp (B2J). Observe that s, jp (B1) + u=jµý (BZJ) 
+ ul -p! (B2j)] < tij for all i and j, and thus 0< -yij < min{ti1,1 } for 
each i and j. Also choose Aj >0 and ýi < oo such that 
Ai < min{[1 - yij)-' (t=i - Iii) :i=1, ..., 
k} 
> max{[1- -yij]-1(tij -'Yid) :: =1, ..., 
k} < ýj . 
Fixing an arbitrary density gj E0 we can define for all i and j 
fj- SiiZ(Bli) + ut12(B2j) + 
ttl 
µJ (B3i) (Si Ai)s')1(B45) 
+ 
ei l `-Y+j) _ (t'j _'1si)gil(B4j) 
Rj(ýj - Aj) 
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where R3 =f... f Z(B4j)gjd/Lji... d/Lr(j), 1 >0 and Z(B) is the indicator of the set B. Note 
that f """ f ftjdfLlj... d[cr(j), j =1 and ft! (xifAi) = sti, f j(yjIDi) = uii for all i and j. 
Finally, consider the likelihoods 
li = Z(B )+ 1(B25) + ýi (B3. i) +A 1(B4) " 
It can be seen that f"""flj fjdµlj ... 
dlcr(j), j = its so that for all i and j, hij (xj (Aj) 
and M, j%I D. i) = uýý. Q 
The preceding Lemma A6.7 shows that if f3 : Ak -ý A is CEB and satisfies (6.1) for 
some functions P1 : QJ x (0, oo) -+ (0, oo) then for all pairs of atoms (xjjAj, y. jDj) in Std, 
there must exist Lebesgue measurable functions Qj(x j jA yt jD j) : (0,00)k. -4 (0,00) for 
all j such that for all conditional densities flj, ..., 
fkj E A, 
fi (fli, ... ' fki) (jý, i I Aj) = Qi (xi l Ai, yl Dj) 
jf ii (xi I Ai) 
ý} 
fkj (xi )Aj)1 
(A6.7) 
fki)(yiIDj) ' fl. (yiID. i) fki(yiID.. )J 
In fact, according to (6.1) we have for each j that 
fi(fij_..., fk_)(Ii lAi) pJ(x_lA_, fi? (xjlAj),..., fkj(__IAj)) 
fkj)(y; IDi) Pi(M; IDfij(y; IDj),..., fk; (yIDj)) 
If we replace, for each j, the right-hand side of the above identity for a function of the 
type Qj(xjjAj, yjD1), then Lemma A6.7. allows us to obtain (A6.7). Also notice that 
d, = dien{Aj} = dien{DT} for all j, 'since we have the same chain graph Gp. 
The following lemma derive a more specific form for the right-hand side of (A6.7) and 
allows us to derive a formula similar to (6.2) but for atoms. 
Lemma A6.8. In addition to the hypotheses of Lemma A6.7, assume that (Qj, tcý) con- 
tains at least three atoms. Then, there exist, for each vector j=1, ... ,n of a partially 
complete chain graph g P, constant terms vii(A D3), ..., vkj(A3, 
Dj) such that for all 
functions gi..., gki >0 and every pair of atoms (xjjA yj IDi) in SZJ, we have for each 
j that 
k 
Qi(2jijAi, yijDi)(9ii,... i9ki) =Qi(xijAi, yijDi)(1) 
11 9(A6.8) 
t_i 
where 1= (1, ... 1) is n-dimensional. 
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proof. Define for each j the new functions 1VQJ(xjjAl, yjIDi) : (0, oo)k -+ (0,00) by 
setting for all atoms xjjAj i4 M lDj, 
Q. i(ý1jA. i, y"I Dj)(gij, ..., 9ki) 'Q. i(? ýIA>>y. IDj)(gl,,..., gkJ)= Qi(KiJAi, M, I Di)(1,..., 1) 
Let jjjAi, y. 1D5 and zjjEj be three distinct atoms in Sly where E; = {7r(Zj) = 7r( j)) 
represent fixed values for the parents set of the Zj's. Pick Ej >0 small enough that there 
exist conditional densities in A which assume any of the values Ei, Ejgij, or cj/h; j at any 
of these three atoms. Writing EJ = (EJ, ..., Eý), g. = 
(91j, 
..., gkj) and hj = 
(hl 
..., hk j), 
and assuming that all operations on vectors are carried out component-wise, we have for 
all j that 
Pi( 
jjAi, cg j)/P3(yjDj, Ej/h3) 
Pj(xjjAj, Ej)1Pj(yjjDj, Ei) 
_ 
Pj(zjIEJ, Ej)/Pi(y. IDj, c//) Pj(xilA], Ejgj)11'i(zjjEj, Ej) 
Pj(zjJEj, Ej)lPj(yjjDj, Ej) Pj(zilAj, Ej)lPj(zjiBj, Ej) 
=NQ. i(xjlA. i, yjlDi)(9j)NQj(ijlAj, RjlDj)(4? ) (A6.9) 
for all gj and hj in (0, oo)k and j= 1,..., n. Assuming for a moment (and we will prove it 
later) that for all j, NQj(x3jA;, yjjD3)(. ) = NQi(. ) does not depend on xjlAj or yj)Dj, 
the above equation reduces to Cauchy's functional equation 
NQ1(9. hj) = 11 'Q? (9, )A'Qi(hj) (A6.10) 
and we can use a multivariate extension of Aczel's (1966) Theorem 3 to conclude that 
k 
NQJ(91) 
_ 
j9 ji(Ai, Di) 
i= 1 
for some arbitrary constant terms vii E », possibly functions of the fixed Aj and Di, 
vti(ADi) for all i and j. Notice that for each i and j, v=J(ADj) is neither a function 
of x5IAi nor yjDj. The non-measurable solutions of (A6.10) are ruled out here because 
Q P and hence NQJ were assumed to be Lebesgue measurable. 
Now to see that NQ1(x1 jI A1 x, I A21) (g .)= 
NQl (j) is a function of g. only, consider 
NQi (y1. I D1 y , 
jD2i) for some y1. IDij, y2 .I 
D2j E Qj. Assume without loss of generality 
that gj 01 so that xzjlAi1 x22JA21 and y1ID1; y2jlD21. If {x13lA1ji j2jjA2; } _ 
{y 
jjDi ,y jID2 
}, then either xkjjAkj = yk, IDkj or xkjlAk] = 
_kjlD3_k, 7" 
The 
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former case is trivial, and in the latter case we can choose j3jJA3j ý {x1jIA1 x2jjA2a} 
and apply (A6.9) to obtain successively for each j, 
NQs(x1 IAi. i, x2jIA22)(9j) = NQ. i(x1jjAi>> jjAsj)(1)NQi( jI A3>>x2. iIA2. i)(9) 
= NQi( jlAsj,? ijlAii)(9j)AQi(iýijlAii,? 2jlA2i)(1) 
= NQj (x2 lA2j, 13j IA35) (1)NQi (x2jJA2Si xii lAii) (9) 
= A'Qi(! 2j'IA2jiZjjjAlj)(9j) 
On the other hand, if {x1jjA1 x2jjA2j} iL {y1, jD1ji y2, jD2j}, then at least one of 
yI? 1D1 y23 1D2? must be different from both x1, IA,,, j2jjA2j. Choose, for example, it 
to be y2, I D2j. Using (A6.9) again, we have for each j that 
N'Qi(? iilAii, x2JIAai)(9) _ ATQi(xiilAli, y ilD2i)(9i)NQi(y2jlD2>>j2ijA2i)(1) 
= IVQi (y1 jI 
Dii, xr j lAii) (l)A'Qi (xi j jAij, y21 ID2. i) (a) 
= AQi(J1jIDii, y , 
ID2})(9j) 
and hence NQj(x1j(A1x2jjA2j)(g. ) = NQ3(g, ). Now, by definition we have for each j 
that 
Qi(jjIijAli, x2iI A2i)(9i) =`Gi(jjlilAliºx2ijA2i)(1)NQj(ililAljl12jJA2i)(9i) 
k 
= Q. i(? ijjA1i+x25IA2)(1) 
ý9 s(AýA2, ) 
=i 
for all xIjjA1j, x2jjA2i E Q;, and the proof is complete. 0 
Moreover, if for all j we fix an atom yj JD1 E Pi and choose Ej >0 such that cj < 
i/Fcl (y, lD j), we can define for all atoms xjjAj Efj the functions 
P}(xjjAi) =Q(xjlAj, yjlDj)(l)Pj[yjlD>>Ej]E-,,; 
(AD; ) 
where vj (A D3) =Ei vii(Aj, Dj). Then for atoms xjAj, we have that 
k 
pi(xijAi, 9ii, -"", Ski) =Pi(giilAj) 
11 g vii 
(Ai) 
t-1 
for all 0< glj,..., gkj < 1/, J (. JA1). This implies that for all j, 
pj(xjI Aj) rI 
fJ (fi j, .., fkj) (xJ AJ) = ý'7 k v: s (A; ) dd 
(A6.11) 
Ij.., µr( ), j ... 
f pi lli-1 
fij p 
for all vector of atoms xjAj in Std. 
We are now in position to prove Theorem 6.2 . 
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A6.3 The Proof of Theorem 6.2. 
If (52i, lCj*) contains no atoms at all then the proof is immediate from Theorem A6.4. 
If (52i, Fei) is purely atomic, then (6.3) is easily obtained from (A6.11) with w; j(Aj) _ 
v; 3(Aj) for all i=1, ..., 
k and j=1, ..., n. 
Moreover, from the fact that fj is CEB, it is 
easy to verify that the weights must sum to one for each j, i. e. 1 w; i(Aj) = 1. 
If (cl,, t) has atoms but is not purely atomic, we use Theorem A6.4 to obtain the 
result on the set N, the complement of the atoms set of (Qj,; i ). Consider the atoms 
xjjjAij, xzjjA2j,... and let P; j (g11,..., gkj) denote Ptj(x; i I Aij, gl..., gkj) for all gij such 
that 0< gij < 111tj* (x; jjAj5) with i=1, ..., k and j=1, ..., n. 
From the definition of 
CEB for a chain graph g we have for each j that 
li(ijlAj)Pj[xjlAi, fli(xjlAj),..., fki(iijlAj)) 
_- 
Pi[x, ýIAj, hj( 
/x"IAJ),... 
' hkj(xjIA 
constant , µi a. e. , 
(A6.12) 
- 7)] 
whenever h; j oc ljfjj for all i and j. From (A6.3) and for xjjAJ on N, the left-hand side 
of the above equation equals fk1t ! ý" 
(A), 
where ttj =f... f lifi j dµlj ... 
dIr(j), j for all i 
and j. 
Now, fix t1i, ..., tkj, pick a single atom xkj 
JAkj in St and let cj be small enough such 
that 0< Ej/t, j < 1/ICj*(xkjlAkj) for each i and j. Then, let B2, = {xkjjAk; }, and setting 
s; J = cj and s, j = cj/tij for each i and j, construct the same densities and likelihoods as 
in the proof of Lemma A6.7 . 
Using the fact that (A6.12) also holds on all of SZj, we have 
Pki (EJ, 
... 1 Ei) 
k 
tw: i 
(AIi ) 
11 t2 Pk9 (EJltlii ..., Ejltkj) {mal 
for each j and an arbitrary k. This means that for all gl j, .., gkj 
between 0 and 
l1Pj(xkjIAkj), Pkj(glj,... 
'gkj) = 
Pkj((j,..., Ej)Ej 
l11 
1g=, 
i(Aýl Let Pj(2kjIAkj) _ 
Pkj(Ej, ..., E1) EJ 1 and (6.3) is proved. 
About the weights we can say that for all j, they are constant relative to xj jAj, but 
can possibly vary with the fixed values Aj. Also observe that they must be nonnegative if 
µý is not purely atomic. This same statement can be done if (S2j, µý) is purely atomic but 
includes a countably infinite number of atoms, for which we can easily construct densities 
fit, 
..., 
fkj which will make the integrals 
k 
J i=1 
89 
infinite unless all the weights are nonnegative. However, these integrals are always finite 
when ci is finite and fad is a counting type measure and the weights can take negative 
values in this case. Furthermore, pj must be essentially bounded, or else there exist ff such 
that the above integrals are infinite when all the fjj are equal to fj for each j, according 
to Hewitt & Stromberg's (1965) Theorem 20.15 .0 
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CHAPTER 7 
GRAPHICAL MODELS FOR 
THE EXPERT PROBLEM 
In this chapter we show a graphical representation for the expert judgement problem 
in general and make use of influence diagrams (IDs) to represent some special situations. 
In particular, we deal with degenerate situations where the experts report to the supra- 
Bayesian (SB) only their summaries (and not opinions) of the outcomes of experiments 
which are informative about the underlying parameters of interest and which are com- 
ponents of their information bases. The SB represents each situation according to the 
way the experts' information bases overlap, as well as through considerations about the 
sufficiency of the experts' reports for the estimation of the underlying parameters. In 
certain cases, if the SB cannot obtain statistics of the experts' shared information, then 
the reconciliation rule must account for all possible outcomes of those. 
Although degenerate, the situations we describe are useful enough to give some insight 
on how the dependencies induced by the overlapping of information can influence on the 
form of the SB's reconciliation rules. Also, the graphical modelling approach is quite useful 
to show how rich the class of expert judgement problems is, pointing out the complexity 
of such problems and the potential for future research in this area. 
7.1 Conditional Independence Structures for the Expert Problem. 
The SB by making use of IDs to represent her view of the associations between vari- 
ables is able to represent relevance statements which are usually obscured in the generally 
complex modelling approach of the expert judgement problem (see Smith, 1995). In fact, 
the SB's aim is to find relatively simple descriptions which are easier to manipulate and 
yet contain all the information relevant to the problem. In our context, the SB's ideal ID 
representation of the problem would be one which is capable of simultaneously capturing 
both (a) the way various sources of expert's information are related to each other, as well 
as (b) how the information contained in those sources become available to her (according 
to the problem's configuration) such that she could estimate the unknown parameters with 
the resources she has in the best possible manner. 
The description of the expert problem made in Section 2.4.2, stands for a general 
multivariate set-up. In that setting, a representation of the expert problem is that shown 
91 
I 
FIGURE 7.1. The general ID Z of a subclass of expert problems. 
by the ID I in Figure 7.1. 
Now, referring to Section 2.4.3, associated to the above ID Z, the posterior density for O, 
given Q, z and ý, has the form (2.22). However, as mentioned before, to obtain (2.22) the 
SB needs to engage in the difficult task of specifying a conditional joint likelihood function 
for (Q, z, -1)) given 0. Although this is difficult even in one-dimensional problems, that 
task could be facilitated if the SB is prepared to make additional Cl statements about 
those variables as we shall see. 
The notation we use here for Cl statements obtained from IDs is that introduced in 
Section 3.3. Within considerations of sufficiency that notation could have an alternative 
interpretation. For example, if B is a parameter and both A and C are random variables 
then AH BIC could read: C is sufficient for B relative to A. 
7.1.1 A particular subclass of expert problems. 
In the following sections, we shall consider a particular subclass of the general expert 
problem for which, using the notation of Section 2.4.2, X=X with n=1, e==0 
with d(1) = d'(1) = 1, Z= (Zi, ..., Zm) and Q=q= 
(ql, 
..., qk). In this setting, the 
formula corresponding to (2.22) would be 
f(6Jq, z) «f(glz, 8)f(elz) , (7.1) 
where f (qlz, 0) is the SB's joint likelihood function for q for all possible values of z, 8 and 
f (Bjz) is her density for B posterior to observing K and prior to receiving q (and observing 
x). 
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In this context, we define the subclass of problems we shall be dealing with by imposing 
restrictions on the form of f (q+z, 0). We start with the definition of expert information base 
and introduce some of the notation as well as an example that shall be used throughout 
this chapter. 
Definition 7.1 (Information base). An expert's E= information base It consists of the 
set of experiments (usually a subset of Z) related to 0 that E; performs or necessarily 
observes, and in which he bases to make his statement qi about 0 (i = 1, ... 1 
k). 
We can now define our problem. Formally, each expert Ei is supposed to report to 
the SB his statement qi about B which is based on his information base Ii, where I; CZ 
and Z= (Z1, ..., Z,,,, 
) (i = 1, ..., 
k). The statements q= (ql, ..., qk) are assessed by the 
experts based on the outcomes of random samples of components of Z which the SB does 
not observe. However, the SB knows what the information base I= of each expert Ej is. 
Therefore she knows together with I= (Il, ..., j 
), the set S= (Slz, ..., 
S 
_l, k, ..., 
SI... k) 
of all information shared by experts, where SL.. 
_, 
represents the subset of the information 
shared by experts Ei ""- El, i. e. S=... i = Ii n"--n I1. To make it clearer, consider the 
following example describing the problem above in the context of a coin tossing experiment: 
Example 7.1 ( coin tossing experiment) Suppose that the SB is interested in determining 
the probability 0 that the outcome will be a head in a coin tossing experiment X she 
performs or observes. She does not know whether the coin is fair. However, she knows that 
the same coin has already been used in other independent experiments Z= (Zl, Z2, Z3) 
whose outcomes are were partially observed by two experts El and E2 but not observed 
by the SB. Although the SB did not observe any outcome zj of ZZ (j = 1,2,3), she 
knows what the experts' information bases are, i. e. which experiment ZJ each expert has 
observed (and, thus, all the experiments that EI and E2 share). The SB also knows 
that each expert's statement qi about 9 is based on the number of heads occurred in the 
outcomes he has observed. For instance, if El has observed I1 = (Z1, Z2) and E2 has 
observed L2 = (Z2, Z3) then S= (S12) = Z2 is the information they share, and their 
statements q= (Q2, q2) are based on the number of heads occurred in their respective 
information bases. 
A graphical representation of a coin tossing experiment similar to that of Example 7.1 
but for when S=0, can be seen in the ID Zl of Figure 7.2. From Zl the SB can state, by 
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Z1 
FIGURE 7.2. The ID ZI for 2 experts observing (Z1, Z2) and Z3 respectively, 
which they use to make their statements qI and q2 about 0 
using the d-separation theorem (see Section 3.4), the following useful relevances : 
(i) Zl Li Z2 H Z3 H X9 , representing the conditional independence of the experi- 
ments. Also, note that given ql, Zl and Z2 are no longer conditionally inde- 
pendent, that is Zl XIZ2 19, ql. In general for k experts and m experiments, 
III 1ZZlO and Z, , 
YIZIlgi, O for j01 and {ZJ, Z, } E I;, where I; is the ex- 
pert E, information base compounded of only those experiments Zj he observes 
(j, 1= 1,..., m; i = 1,... ak); 
(ii) qH OI z, meaning that if given, the experiments z would be sufficient for the SB 
to estimate 0 relative to q= (ql, q2), that is, knowing z, q would bring no further 
information for the SB regarding 0. Also note that q1 II Oj] and q2 II OI 2i where 
I1=(Z1, Z2)andl2=Z3; 
(iii) ql II g210, i. e. the experts statements are independent given 0. For k experts, 
u1 gi(0, c'; and 
(iv) q II X I9. 
The consideration of sufficiency described in item ' (ii) above is a bit awkward in the 
context of expert opinion assessment, since usually the experts consider factors, such as 
intuition and experience, other than the observation of objective experiments alone in 
order to assess their opinions. Certainly, in this setting the experts opinions would bring 
further information to the SB other than that just contained in the experiments they 
observe. This is also supposedly valid when considering the choice of experts. However, 
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a tightened concept of sufficiency can be used in this regard (see Section 7.2). Also, in 
the degenerate situation we shall examine, it is not unreasonable at all to consider the 
sufficiency of experts' statements. 
Taking the above Cl statements for general k and m, and from the fact that the SB 
does not observe Z, her posterior density for 0 given q when the experts do not share any 
experiment would be the simplified version of (7.1) : 
.f 
(el9) a f(4JB)f (©) = .f 
(©)11 fi(9il e) 
, 
(7.2) 
i=1 
where fi (gt1B) is the SB's likelihood function for the expert E_ (i = 1,2). 
Note that even in the above simpler case, restrictions on the form of ft (qt jO) are required 
if q corresponds to a vector of probability densities as commented in Section 2.4.3. Obvi- 
ously, this includes the commonly considered case when the only extraneous information 
available to the SB are the experts' probability statements. 
7.2 Common Knowledge, Value of Information and Sufficiency. 
An issue worth pointing out here is the concept of common knowledge (CK) (Aumann, 
1976) which was originally developed in the context of game theory and the economics of 
information, for the study of the interactions between people concerning their exchange 
of information and opinion. In the group decision problem, where the whole group of 
experts is responsible for taking decisions, it is appropriate to consider the events of 
interest as being CI{ to all members of the group. In fact, EB groups must have a common 
likelihood function for their agreed Cl structure for the events they observe (Chapter 6). 
On the other hand, in the expert judgement problem where interactions between experts 
are in general coarser than in the group problem, CK would generally be a rather strong 
assumption. Usually, the SB consults experts who may share some information but who do 
not necessarily interact and exchange opinions. Nevertheless, there are certain situations 
in which the expert problem can be seen as a Bayesian cooperative game where CI{ can 
occur at a certain level. In cases where the SB knows that some experts have the same 
priors and that their posteriors for certain events are CK, then according to Aumman's 
(1976) theorem, those posteriors must be equal and the SB may well consider discarding 
experts opinions from the reconciliation process. 
As far as the choice of experts is concerned, the criterion of value of information (Raiffa 
and Schlaffer, 1961), where the increase in utility which would result from learning an 
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expert's opinion is computed, will not be applied here. According to Clemen and Winkler 
(1985), when costs of consulting experts are not considered, "consulting an extra expert 
can never be detrimental in a value-of-information sense, regardless of whether the experts 
are dependent or independent. " 
When the criteria for choosing (or discarding) experts is solely based upon sufficiency, 
DeGroot and Fienberg (1983) found out that information could be lost. That is, even if an 
expert A is sufficient for another, B, in the sense that "from A's prediction together with 
a simple. auxiliary randomisation, one can simulate a prediction with the same stochastic 
properties as B's prediction", it is possible that by learning the prediction of B in addition 
to the prediction of A, more information might be gained than from the prediction of A 
alone. This could be the case if for example A is known to be uncalibrated while B is 
well-calibrated. We shall see in Section 7.6 a situation where this is the case even for 
`perfectly calibrated' experts. 
Also, as mentioned before in Section 7.1.1, another type of sufficiency is that of the ex- 
perts' opinions relative to their information bases for estimating 9. We shall consider here 
that for the SB, an expert's statement gi(BJIJ is sufficient for 0 relative to his information 
base Ii (i = 1, ..., 
k) if no additional information would be given were Ii observed by her 
directly. However, the fact that each q; is sufficient for 0 relative to IL (i = 1, ..., 
k), does 
not guarantee that q is sufficient for 0 relative to Z in all cases as we shall see. This is 
closely related to the issue of non-independence among experts. 
Certainly it is easier to process information if the SB knows that expert judgements 
are independent. A question that arises here and which will also be dealt with in this 
chapter, is when it is possible to discard those experts who introduce dependence and 
whose statements do not bring any extra information for the SB in obtaining statistics 
which are sufficient regarding all the experiments the experts have observed. 
7.3 Degenerate Situations in the Expert Problem. 
We shall assume here, in the context of the problem modelled by Winkler (1981) -see 
Section 2.4.4- and as also described in Clemen (1987), that the SB is supposed to only 
know 
(i) what the experts information bases are, and thus all the information they share, 
but she does not actually observe any information on those bases;. and . 
(ii) that the experts statements q are summary statistics obtained from their informa- 
9G 
tion bases and not their subjective opinions. 
Note that because the experts' statements q are objective summaries rather than prob- 
ability statements per se, Winkler's problem is degenerate in the context of the Bayesian 
paradigm. Despite that, it is very useful to the understanding of the role that dependence 
of expert information bases and sufficiency of expert statements play in the expert problem 
to start at this point. 
Formally, each expert Ej (i = 1, ..., 
k) is supposed to report to the SB his statistic qj 
which is a summary of his information base I,. Each statistic qj = hi(Ii), where hi is a 
function of its arguments only (i = 1, ..., 
k), is obtained by Ei from Ii. 
The dependence between experts information bases can be modelled for the above 
described problem, in three basic distinct situations which are characterised by the way 
the experts share information. Those are when the experts have 
(1) non-overlapping information bases, with each expert observing his own indepen- 
dent set of experiments (e. g. coin tosses) when there is no experiment being shared 
by the experts, i. e. Si 
... I = 
0, for all i1(i, 1= I, -, k) ; 
(2) overlapping structure with experts sharing experiments although no expert's infor- 
mation base is subsumed by any other, i. e. S is non-empty and for any two experts 
E; and Ei, neither Ii 0I nor Ii 5L Ii for i : /: 1 (i, 1= 1, ..., 
k), and finally ; 
(3) overlapping with dependent information bases, where an expert's base is subsumed 
by other, i. e. there is at least one expert El whose experiments are also observed 
by another expert EL such that Stl = Ii fl Ii = I1 implying that Il C I= for i =A1. 
In the following Sections 7.4,7.5 and 7.6, we make use of Example 7.1 to illustrate the 
modelling of the above cases (1), (2) and (3) respectively. Particular types of reconciliation 
rules are obtained in each case. 
7.4 Non-overlapping Information Bases. 
Suppose that in Example 7.1, the experts El and E2 do not perform or observe any 
experiment together, that is, they share no information (i. e. S12 = 0). If their information 
bases are I= (Z1, Z2) and I= Z3, respectively, then the SB's ID representing this 
problem could be T2 in Figure 7.3(a). Note that apart from the double-circled nodes used 
to represent deterministic variables, the ID 12 in Figure 7.3(a) is the same as Zl in Figure 
7.2. Because of that, the Cl statements (i)-(iv) in Section 7.1.1 are also valid here. The ID 
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13 in Figure 7.3(b) is equivalent to 12 since we can rewrite ql = Zl + Z2 as Zi = ql - Z2. 
Thus, we can also say that once q1, q2 and Z2 are given, Zl and Z3 bring no further 
information about 9. 
(a) 12 (b) Zs 
FIGURE 7.3. Two IDs representing the same problem for 2 experts' non- 
overlapping information bases when ql = Zl + Z2 and q2 = Z3 
Observe that from the SB's point of view, Z3 I{Ztf qi, B for {Z Z1} E Li, j 54 1 (j, l= 
1, ..., M; i=1, ..., 
k), i. e. the fact that an expert Ej observed two or more experiments 
and is reporting a summary of the outcomes, introduces a conditioning factor amongst 
the components of his information base I. For example, if in a coin tossing experiment, 
it is given that qi = (Z1 + Z2) =1 then Zl =1 -Z2- 
Therefore, the SB's posterior distribution for 0 given q, f (G(q), is obtained by formula 
(7.2) in which the SB's task of assessing f (q10) is rather simplified by that factorisation. 
Also, regarding the example above, since S12 = 0, if T(Z) = Zi + Z2 + Z3 (the total 
number of heads occurred in Z) is a sufficient statistic for 0 with respect to Z= Il U 12, 
then t(q) = ql + q2 is also sufficient for 0. This is because t(q) = U(Z) where q is a 
one-to-one function. In terms of an ID representing this sufficiency we would have Z4 of 
Figure 7.4 below, where q separates 9 from Z. 
It is worthwhile pointing out here that the fact that for some expert Et, qj is sufficient 
for his information base I. CZ (i =1,..., k), where U= ji=Z does not necessarily 
imply, in general, that a function of the vector q of all experts statements is for the SB, 
sufficient for Z concerning 0 as we shall see. In the next section, conditions are derived 
in order to allow a function t (not necessarily a function of q only) to be such a sufficient 
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FIGURE 7.4. ID Z4 representing the sufficiency of the experts' statements ql, q2 
for 0 relative to (Zi, Z2, Z3) when there is no overlap of information. 
statistic. 
Now, examples in which the SB's posterior density function is obtained for the coin 
tossing Example 7.1 and for the normal case are shown. 
Example 7.2 (Bernoulli model). Consider that in Example 7.1, Il = (Zl, Z2) and 
I2 = Z3 as the case in this section. Also, each of the binary variables X, Z1, Z2 and Z3, 
is defined as 1 if a head occur and 0 otherwise, in its respective coin toss, have each a 
Bernoulli density with parameter 0= Pr[head]. Thus, the SB's joint distribution for the 
experts' statements ql = (z1+z2) and q2 = z3 conditioned on 0 is binomial with parameters 
(3,0). Note that an usual sufficient statistic with respect to Z is U(Z) _ (Z1 + Z2 + Z3) 
and that after receiving ql and q2, the SB can obtain t(q) = (ql + q2) = U(z). In fact, 
from the relation q, lI q2 10, 
f(q10) =f (9i IO)f (q2I B) OC 0(171+q2)(1 - 0)[3-(ql+q2)] 
If the SB chooses a beta (a, ß) as a prior for 6, then, according to the usual conjugate 
analysis, the posterior density is also a beta but with parameters (a*, Q*) where a* _ 
a+ (q, +q2) and /3* =, 6+3- (qi +q2). 
In a general setting with k experts, where qi given 0 would have a binomial density with 
parameters (ni, 0) with ni being the number of experiments (coin tosses) Ei observed, the 
posterior density for 0 given q would also be a beta density with parameters 
k 
a* = a+F4j (7.3) 
and 
kk 
ß" =Q-I 
ýnc-ý4t (7.4) 
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If the SB had taken the LogOp pool of her posterior densities fl(Bjgj) and f2(G(g2) for 
B given the statements of El and E2, which are beta densities with parameters (al = 
a -}- ql, ßl =P -{- ni - ql) and (a2 =a+ q2, #2 =N+ 712 - q2) respectively (where a and 
ß are the parameters of the SB's prior for 0), the combination would give 
T(fi, f2)(elq) a f1(O q1)" 2(e192) 
where T is a pooling operator and wl and w2 are weights such that w1 + w2 = 1, would 
be a beta density with parameters (a*, ß*) where 
«' = a+wigi +wzgz 
and 
ß* =ß+ (wlnal + w2n2) - (wigi + w2g2) . 
For k experts, 
k 
a*=a+>wi4i (7.5) 
i=l 
and 
kk 
Q*_/ý`FEwent-lwigj 
" 
(7.6) 
i=l i=l 
Note that (7.5) and (7.6) basically differ of (7.3) and (7.4) respectively in that implicitly 
in the later the weights are all unity and sum to k instead of one as in the latter. 
Although, rigorously the LogOp should be employed in the context of the group decision 
problem when a group of experts agrees to be EB and there is no individual decision maker, 
the use of (7.5) and (7.6) by the SB would for example allow the inclusion of her confidence 
on the experts' statements and expertises in her aggregation rule. 
Now consider the case, similar to the one mentioned in Section 6.5, in which the SB 
believes that one of the experts' statements is the true probability of heads but she does 
not know the identity of that expert. Thus, The SB will use a combination rule which is a 
LinOP. In this case, the `weight w; ' assigned to the expert Ei (i 1, ..., 
k) would represent 
the SB's probability that Ei's statement is the one based on the largest data set. Clearly 
if the SB knows that the expert Ej* observes a set of experiments which contains all the 
other experts' experiments (see Section 7.6) then the SB need only employ this expert's 
statement q; which would be sufficient for the SB by the usual statistical arguments. 
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The LinOp for k experts, 
k 
T (fi, 
..., 
fk) aE WifR (Oigi) , (7.7) 
i=I 
where 1 wi = 1, would be a mixture of beta 
densities since fp(O qi) is a beta density 
function with parameters (a + q;, ß+n; - q=). Note that the updating rule for w is now 
automatic if the SB has her own data on which to check the different experts' predictions 
and to is invariant under different experiments. 
The other example for the normal case is introduced next : 
Example 7.3 (Normal model). Suppose that the SB and k=2 experts know that 
the variable of interest X is normally distributed with unknown mean 0 but with known 
precision rte, i. e. X- N[B, Tx], and each of the variables Zj, j=1,2,3, informative about 
0, are all normally distributed with means µj(B), which are known linear functions of the 
unknown 0, i. e. µi(6) = aj9 + bi, where ai and b3 are fixed, and known precisions rr 
(j = 1,2,3), i. e. ZZ - N[pi(9), rj] for each j=1,2,3. Assume two experts El and E2 
observe Il = {Z1, Z2} and L2 = Z3 reporting ql =2 (z1 + z2) and q2 = z3, respectively to 
the SB (who does not observe Z). 
Assume that before hearing the experts' reports, the SB has a normal prior density for 0 
with parameters (mo, Tp). According to Winkler's (1981) model described in Section 2.4.4, 
the likelihood function in (7.2) f(qlB) is Gaussian with mean µq(9) = (µq, (0), µ42(6))', 
where It., (B) = f[/4 (0) + /i2 (0)] and µ92 (0) = 113 (9), and precision matrix 
4ý-r2 0 
0 T3 
Notice that T is known just because the SB knows (i) rZ = (71,72, r3)', and (ii) which 
variables Z each expert observed to report his summary of the form above (i. e. as the 
arithmetic average of the observed data). 
It is easy to see that f (OI q) is normally distributed with parameters (µ*, T *) where 
according to (2.25) and (2.26), 
u* _ *z lrý-ý4 =- 1'T4 (7.8) 
and 
T'" = 1'T1 (7.9) 
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with, in the k-variate setup, 1= (1, ..., 
1ý' and q= (ql, ..., qk)' 
being k-dimensional. 
This leads to 
IL: 
4 T1T2 
[_r3(ri 
+T2 [ 
(4r1T2+T1T3+T2T3)]gl+ (4T1T2'+T1T3+T2T3) 
I 
q2 ý7.10ý 
and 
T: - 
4r1T2 +T1T3 +T2T3 
Tl + T2 
in our example. If Tj _ Tr for j=1,2,3 then p* =t=U=3 (2ql + q2) and r* = 3r. 
If the SB does not know the Ii's and the Sij's (i j; i, j=1, ..., 
k) and consequently 
is not able to assess T, then she might be able to make use of subjective judgement 
and past data to determine a prior density for T. For instance, assuming a diffuse prior 
distribution for 0 and that 0 II T (note that this seems reasonable since T does not relate 
to the process generating 0 but to the expected deviations and partial correlations of the 
experts' opinions) we have that, 
f (B, Tl4) « .f 
(9I T, 9)f (T) , (7.12) 
where, in the natural conjugate analysis, f (T) is the SB's Wishart prior density for T 
with So +k degrees of freedom and with symmetric positive definite precision matrix To. 
The density f (qIT, 9) is the SB's multivariate normal prior density for qIT, 9 with mean 
µm(9) and precision matrix T. Thus, according to Winkler's (1981) results described in 
Section 2.4.4, the posterior density for Olq is a Student-t as in (2.27), with S* = bo +k-1 
degrees of freedom. Replacing EO ' by To and p by q in formulas (2.28) and (2.29), we 
have the mean and s*2 in the precision (5* - 2)/8*s*2, respectively Also, as in Section 
2.4.4, if f (9) is a normal or at distribution, then f (9Iq) is a Poly-t distribution. 
Note that the above approach for unknown T differs from the approach that should be 
employed in the case of considering a second unknown parameter, i. e. B1 = (9, Ts) when 
d(1) = 2. 
The configuration with non-overlapping information bases described above can be seen 
as an orthogonal design experiment (see e. g. Geramita and Seberry, 1979, and Montgomery, 
1991) with the experts' statements q, treated as data by the SB, forming a separable like- 
lihood function (Smith, 1990). Winkler (1981), Clemen (1987) and Clemen and Winkler 
(1985) among others, have shown this design to provide the smallest posterior variance 
102 
for 0, being, thus, optimal for incorporating relevant information into the SB's prior dis- 
tribution for 0. No available information is lost in the process due to overlap. 
7.5 Overlapping Information Bases. 
Now, assume that the experts are allowed to share information without however one 
completely encompassing any other expert's information base, i. e. there is at least one 
non-empty set Sij, i 0i (i, j=1,..., k), such that It ý Ij, for all ij (i, j 
In this setting, the problem described in Example 7.1 can be represented by the ID Z5 
of Figure 7.5(a). Also, because Zl = q1- Z2 and Z3 = q2 - Z2, we can draw an equivalent 
ID Zs of Figure 7.5(b). 
(a) Zs (b) '6 
FIGURE 7.5. Two IDs representing the same problem for 2 experts' overlapping 
information bases when ql = Zl + Z2 and Q2 = Z2 + Z3 
From Z5i we can make the same CI statements as in (i)-(iv) in Section 7.1.1 except 
(iii). This is because now, ql 121g210, since there is a path from q1 to q2 (ql-Zl -Z2-q2) 
in the moral graph of the smallest ancestral set of qj, q2 and 0 obtained from 4, which 
is not being separated by 6. In fact, this statement is in accordance with the fact that 
both El and E2 are now sharing a common experiment Z2 and therefore their statements 
are not independent anymore conditionally on 0. However, note that if Z2 is also given 
together with 0, then ql II q2 19, Z2. This suggests that if the SB could somehow be able 
to obtain a sufficient statistic for Z2, then this would correspond to the introduction of a 
new variable in the system which could then separate the experts opinions as we shall see 
below (Figure 7.6). 
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Note that for general k and m, since S is non-empty, U(Z), the SB's desired sufficient 
statistics for 0, cannot be written as a function of q only (q is not one-to-one anymore). 
In many cases this may be implicit, since different experts may have access to certain 
information bases unavailable to and unknown by the SB. It is easy to see that although 
each qj is sufficient for 0 with respect to 1, t(q), a function of q only, is not sufficient for 
0 with respect to Z, unless k=n, i. e. the number of experts assessments qj equals the 
number of variables Z3 C Z, when the SB could deduce every Z3 (j = 1, ..., n) 
from q. 
In fact, summary statistics will be insufficient unless they enable the identification of the 
observations that overlap. Therefore, in the situations where the SB can obtain summary 
statistics Y(S) of the shared data, then this would enable her to obtain a statistic u(q, y) 
which is sufficient for 0 relative to Z. 
7.5.1 When the shared information is given. 
For instance, assume that for m=5 and k=3 such that Il = (Z1, Z2), I2 = (Z2, Z3) 
and I= (Z3i Z4, Z5), thus with the experts sharing the experiments S= (12'23) 
where S12 = Z2 and 523 = (Z3, Z4). Notice that Ii ýLj, i0j (i, j=1,2,3). Now, 
let Y(Y12, Y23) = (Z2, Z3 + Z4) be the SB's summary statistic of S obtained from some 
information source, then the SB can construct the statistic u(q, y) = ql +q2 ß--q3 - Y12 - Y23, 
where ql = Zl + Z2, q2 = Z2 + Z3 + Z4 and Q3 = Z3 + Z4 + Z5, which is sufficient for Z. 
In this context, assuming that the SB is able to obtain Y, the situation above can be 
represented by the ID 17 of Figure 7.6, from which the following interesting relevances can 
be stated by using the d-separation theorem: 
(i) ql II q2 II q310, Y7 i. e. the experts' summaries are independent given 0 and Y. In 
general, ll 1 q; 10, Y; 
(ii) Y12 II Y23 10 for the conditional independence of the statistics of shared information. 
If we let L= 112,..., 1k,..., 123,.. -1 ". k} be the set of indexes of components 
of Y, then in general IIJELYJI9; and 
(iii) Z II 01q, Y, meaning that q together with Y are sufficient for 0 relative to Z. 
Now, making use of the above relations (i) and (ii) and applying Bayes theorem, we 
have that the SB's posterior density for 0 is 
f(elq, y)=c(9, y)f(B)rjf(yjIe)flfi(gi18, y), (7.15) 
jEJ i=1 
where c(q, y) = [f (q, y)]-1 is constant relative to 0. 
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17 
FIGURE 7.6. ID 17 of overlapping experts' information bases representing 
their statements ql, q2 and q3 which together with the SB's access to Y12 and 
Y23, the summaries of the shared information, are sufficient for 0 relative to 
(Z1,7+2, Z3, Z4, Z5) 
Formula (7.15) most naturally compares with (7.2) when each yj (j E J) is taken as 
an extra expert's honest statement. Also, f, (giJO, y) has a deterministic part for certain 
values of y. For instance, if we consider the Example 7.1 with Y=Y= Z2 then for y=1, 
the SB would expect either qj =1 or q; =2 with higher probability if she consider the 
experts to be honest. On the other hand, if the SB believes some experts to be inaccurate 
in their statements then she could make use of fi(giJ9, y) to assess this. 
7.5.2 Accommodating the shared information. 
Nevertheless, if the SB cannot obtain the outcomes of shared information by redesign- 
ing the experiment or consulting other sources of information, then one possible ap- 
proach is to combine all the densities (or probabilities) for all possible outcomes of the 
shared information. This can be done through the introduction of the auxiliary vari- 
ables S" = (Si', ..., 
Sk, Si2, 
.., Sik, Sikj, ..., S*... k), where 
S; 
,i 
is the set of experi- 
ments observed exactly by the experts E_... I = Ei fl ... fl El (i 1). Also, call J= 
{1, 
..., 
k, 12,..., 1k,... , 1- -- k} the set of indexes of components of S. Those variables 
which separate I= Ui 1Ii into disjoint sets and are conditionally independent given 0, 
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can be integrated (or summed) out of f (q, 0, e) to give the posterior 
f(gIO) =f f(gl©, s) jZ f(s, IO)ds 
jEJ 
where the integration sign stands for multiple integration over the domain of S`. Note 
that integration methods as Gibbs sampling can be used here to obtain f (01q). 
This is the approach adopted by Clemen (1987) who shows that in the Bernoulli case, 
the discrete version of formula (7.16) with the summation replacing the integration, gives 
ri Ti... k 
f(410) a L... Z f(9Ie, s)f(s 10), (7.17) 
where n, is the number of observations seen only by experts E;... 1. After observing that 
f (qJO, ?) equals one if the e 1's add up correctly to each q=, and zero otherwise, and that 
f (e10) is a joint probability of non-overlapping independent binomial samples, he obtains 
a mixture of beta distributions when the SB has an improper diffuse prior for 0, viz. 
m 
f (e19) => vafp (01a, m) , 
(7.18) 
a=o 
where va obtained form (7.17) can be interpreted as the posterior probability, conditional 
on q, that the total number of Heads in the m trials is equal to a, and fß (6Ia, m) is a beta 
distribution with parameters (a, m). 
The normal case for a situation as in Example 7.3 but with overlapping information 
is straightforward by the application of Winkler's (1981) model (see Section 2.4.4) which 
was obtained in a way similar to the above formulation which led to (7.16). In this case, 
the covariance matrix r, in formulas (2.25) and (2.26) is such that its ith diagonal element 
is 1/ni and the (i, j)th off-diagonal element is n=j/n=nj for i, j=1,.. ., 
k as in Clemen 
(1987). Therefore, according to them, the posterior density f (61q) is also Gaussian. 
7.6 The Choice of Experts. 
The particular case of the overlapping information bases of the previous section, when 
there are at least two experts E= and EJ such that one's information base is completely 
contained into the other's, i. e. S=- = I. n Ij =L (Ij g It) for i j, can sometimes help 
the SB with the selection of experts and some other times with determining the shared 
information. 
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This is because if Y(S), the summary statistics of shared information, could be provided 
by some experts, then they should be consulted by the SB. On the other hand, if IJ is 
subsumed by It and Ei does not share information with nobody else, then qj would 
bring to the SB's aggregation rule no information which were not already provided by 
other experts. In the case of our Example 7.1 when L2 C Il this mean that the expert 
E2 statement plays no part whatsoever in SB's posterior density function for B given q. 
However, if i and/or L contain information which is shared with other experts, then qj 
must be considered as we shall see. 
We shall make use of another example to illustrate some possibilities in this context: 
Example 7.4 (not choosing an expert). Consider the situation where k=3, m=4 and 
L2 C I1 (S12 = I2) such that ql = Zl + Z2 + Z3, Q2 = Z2 + Z3 and Q3 = Z4. Note that E2 
does not share information with E3 (S23 = S13 = 0). An ID for this case could be Z$ of 
Figure 7.7(a). 
(a) is (b) Zs 
FIGURE 7.7. (a) Z8 for I2 C L, but S23 = 0, and (b) T9 for L2 C (Il, b) but 
5123 = Z3 in Example 7.4. 
Observe that u(q) = ql + q3 is sufficient for 0 relative to Z, and from 18 the SB can 
state that (i) q2 II B(ql, that is given q1, q2 brings no further information about B, and (ii) 
g3119219. 
However, if for example q3 = Z3 + Z4 instead, then Z9 in Figure 7.7(b) would represent 
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the case, and although I2 C L1, (i) and (ii) above would not hold since q2 lV01 ql neither . 
q3 I, dg210, q1. On the other hand, q2 11 81g1, Y123. Therefore, q2 should be considered. In 
particular, it brings partial information about y123 to the model. 
zoo 
FIGURE 7.8. An ID Zio representing the case where I2 C (11,13) but S123 = 92 
Certainly in the situation where one expert's information base I= is encompassed by 
another expert's j 1but that base corresponds to the information shared between EE and 
another expert Ei, qj would bring valuable information to the SB in order to separate qj 
of qi. As an example of this situation refer to 110 in Figure 7.8 where L2 C (LI, I2) but 
q2 = Z3 = S123 is crucial for the SB to have q sufficient for B regarding Z. Note that, (i) 
ql II q3 10, q2 but qi lAg3 19 and, (ii) Z II 91q. This corresponds to the case of Section 7.5.1 
when the shared information is given to the SB by one of the experts' statements, 
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CHAPTER 8 
EXTERNALLY BAYESIAN 
RECONCILIATION RULES 
In this Chapter we make a link between the axiomatic and the modelling approaches 
to the problem of aggregating opinions. It is done by showing that it is possible (via the 
SB analysis of uncalibrated experts in non-degenerate situations) to obtain reconciliation 
rules for the experts' opinions which can be identified with EB LogOps as if performed by 
those experts as a group. 
Let's start by assuming that the members of a group of k experts have non-overlapping 
information bases. Each member Ei considering his information base Ii (i = 1,.. ., k), 
reports to the SB his subjective opinion about the unknown parameter 0 of his statistical 
model for X. It is assumed that the SB and the experts adopt the same dominating 
measure for their statistical models in a problem. 
The opinion of the expert member Ei is expressed by the report of either 
(i) his assessment of the hyper-parameters of his posterior density for 0 given Ii,. or 
(ii) the outcomes of experiments in his information base h (i = 1, ... , 
k) and which 
characterise his likelihood function for the components of li, together with his 
prior density qi (e) for 0. 
From this later type of reports, the SB can build up her likelihood function for Et, £( O), 
and apply Bayes theorem to obtain Ei's posterior density function for 0 given I= 
4=(01Li) a £(Ii 10)4i (0) " 
(8.1) 
Note that even if, unlike Ei, the SB does not observe It directly, she is able to assess a 
likelihood function for I given 0 from Ei's statements (i = 1, ... , 
k) as in (ii) above. 
8.1 The Experts' Miscalibration. 
Although each member Ei reports what he thinks is his opinion about the true pa- 
rameter 9, the SB knows that it is, in fact, his opinion about qi = hi(9), where hi is an 
increasing function of 9 (i = 1, ..., 
k). Therefore, the SB treats each MO ILO in (8.1) above 
as qt (O ji) - 
It is well known that in many practical situations "people are overconfident with general- 
knowledge items of moderate or extreme difficulty" (Lichtenstein et al., 1982 and references 
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there in). Although experts tend to be better calibrated than non-experts, the above quote 
still apply (not as extremely) for expert judgements. 
With this in mind, the SB really believes that the experts will choose either extreme 
values for their probability assessments or rather small variances for their probability 
densities for 0, or too, small interquartile ranges for their quantile assessments, depending 
on the problem. 
Therefore, following Savage's (1971) suggestion that "you might discover with experi- 
ence that your expert is optimistic or pessimistic in some respect and therefore temper his 
judgement", the SB adopts in line with Morris (1977) an approach in which she `corrects' 
for the experts' over-confidence (that causes inaccuracies and miscalibration in their as- 
sessments) by obtaining the function hi (0) for each member Ei of the group (i = 1, ..., 
k). 
The SB is assumed to be an accurate, well calibrated and coherent assessor. Another 
situation which reinforces the SB's belief about the experts' being miscalibrated occurs 
when those experts condition their assessments on the fact that they all see the same 
information even with this not being the case (and the SB knows it). 
8.2 Independence and Over-confidence. 
Since the experts have non-overlapping information bases we can make the following 
assumption: 
Assumption 8.1. The SB treats all the experts' uncalibrated statements qi(q; IL) (i = 
I, -, k) as 
being independent conditionally on 0. 
Note that even if the experts had overlapping information bases it would not be com- 
pletely unreasonable to the SB to adopt Assumption 8.1. This is because the experts are 
inaccurate and miscalibrated in their statements and also because their assessments are 
subjective opinions and not objective reports, such that even if they all have the same in- 
formation bases they could still produce completely diverging statements (reflecting their 
diverging beliefs). The simplest model by the SB in this case would be one which chooses 
to treat their statements as being independent conditionally on 0. Observe that this choice 
is a maximum entropy choice for the SB on the densities associated to such assessments 
(see e. g. Newbold and Granger, 1974, Winkler, 1981, and Clemen, 1987). 
Another assumption which supports the experts' miscalibration and therefore is useful 
for the analysis in this section is : 
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Assumption 8.2. The SB, when assessing qi (Oilli) (i = 1,..., k), believes that the expert 
Ei believes that all other experts' observed information are equivalent to an independent 
replication of the information he observed. 
Assumptions (8.1) and (8.2) together mean that although the SB knows that EL observes 
I= to make his statement q= about what he thinks is B but she knows is 4j = h=(O), she 
believes that: 
(i) the experts have disjoint information bases, i. e., Ii n L, _0 for ij (i, j= 
1, ... , 
k), and 
(ii) E thinks that the other experts' experiments gave the same result as his did. 
For instance, this corresponds to the SB believing that each expert is substituting his 
maximum likelihood estimator of the result of the other experts and using this inputted 
data to calculate his posterior distribution. 
Note that the above Assumption 8.2 also supports the SB's belief about the experts 
over-confidence. Another possibility for Assumption 8.2 would be that the SB believes that 
each expert E; conditions his statement on the belief that IL =I is common knowledge 
to everyone. See also comments on Aumann (1976). 
In the above context, if the SB adopts the Bayesian modelling approach, thus treating 
the experts' statements q= [ql (Odh), ..., gk(OkLLk)] as 
data, then her posterior density 
for 0 is given by (7.2) which applied here gives 
k 
f(OIq) a jlfi[gi(cilli)IB]f(B) , (8.2) i=1 
where ft[gt(O=jl=)101 is the SB's likelihood function for the experts' statements about O_ 
hi(0) given their information bases, and f(0) is the SB's prior density for 0. 
8.3 External Bayesianity and Reconciliation Rules. 
We shall see in the following Sections 8.4 and 8.5 that with the above considerations 
about the members' miscalibration together with Assumptions 8.1 and 8.2, the SB can 
obtain at least in certain specific cases (such as for the binomial and normal models), 
reconciliation rules which are EB LogOp pools (see Section 2.2.4). Those LogOp pools 
also obey the unanimity condition. 
Naturally, for the EB property to hold, the likelihood function must be common knowl- 
edge between the SB and the experts in all future data acquisition. Note that, the demand 
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on the reconciliation rule being EB implies in B and 0 being identified to one another after 
new data is commonly observed. Therefore the modified LogOp for the group of k experts 
would be 
f (BID) = T[q, (ells), ".., gk(ellk)](OI D) k 
oc g(e) f[9t(O j)]w* , 
(8.3) 
i= I 
where D is the data set {I, w}, with I= (I1, ..., Ik) and weights w= 
(w,.... 
i wk) such 
that Ei _1 w; = 1. T is a pooling operator, and g(O) is a bounded function of 9 only. 
8.4 The Binomial Model. 
To illustrate the binomial case we make use of a coin toss experiment in which we assume 
that each expert Ei after observing n; tosses of a coin whose unknown true probability is 
B, reported to the SB that he had observed ri heads (H) and ni - ri tails (T) (i = 1, ... , 
k). 
Notice that those reports are not necessarily the outcomes of the coin tosses Ei observed 
but could be his opinion formed after that observation (i. e. including the parameters of 
his prior density for 6). Each expert's information base L is compounded of the outcomes 
of all coin tosses E; has observed. The SB does not observe Li but only the experts' 
statements. 
8.4.1 The case of exchangeable experts. 
If the SB considers the experts El, ..., 
Ek to be exchangeable in terms of their lack of 
calibration (i. e. they are equally miscalibrated), then q; =0 for all i=1, ..., 
k. Thus, 
under Assumptions 8.1 and 8.2, the SB's probability table for the experts possible state- 
ments about the possible outcomes of a coin toss Z, would be like that in Table 8.1. There, 
the first row corresponds to the number of Heads (NoH) seen by 0,1,2, ..., 
k experts si- 
multaneously. For instance, if we define 0= Pr{HIZ}, then the second row shows the 
SB's probability : c(0)0 that all will report H; c(B)tl (0) that just one expert will report 
H; c(0)t2 (0) that two experts will report H; and so on to c(0) (1- 0) that all will report T. 
The terms c(0) and ti(0) thereafter denoted by just c and t= (i = 1..., k), are functions 
of 0 only. The third row shows the total number of combinations (TNC) and the fourth 
and fifth rows show the number of combinations with H and T (respectively) in a given 
margin (NCH and NCT), all associated with the first row. 
The terms c and ti (i = 1, ..., k) can be fixed by using Assumption 8.1 and 
0= h(8) 
obtained as in the following theorem : 
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NoH 0 1 2 """ r k-1 k 
Pr. c(1 - 0) ctl ct2 ctr """ ctk_1 co 
TNC ( ) (k (k) ( k ( ) 0 r) lk l/ k 
NC (k 1) k-1) 1) 1k 
( ) 
0 2 r k-1 
Ný'i 0 (kýl) (k1-l) ( ý 
\r-11 k-2) k-11 
TABLE 8.1. The SB's probabilities for k exchangeable uncalibrated experts in 
a binomial experiment. 
Theorem 8.3. Suppose that the SB considers the members of a group of k experts to be 
exchangeable in their lack of calibration on their statements about an experiment whose 
outcomes are binomially distributed with true probability B. If the Assumptions 8.1 and 
8.2 hold then, the probability of success for which each member produces a statement is 
OF 
6F + (1- 9) T. 
(8.4) 
Proof. 
From rows 4 (NCT) and 5 (NCII) of the Table 8.1 we have that 
and 
k-1 
- P(H) C 
LB 
+Er1\) tr] a 
(8.5) 
r=0 
P(T) = c[(1- B) +EPr 
1) 
tr+1] , 
(8.6) 
r=O 
where c= [1 -}- (k)t,. ]-1. 
Let A= y(H) 
, then 
for the independence hypothesis of Assumption 8.1 we must have 
that 
CO = [P(H)]k 
and 
c(1 - 0) = [P(T)]k . 
(8.7) 
(8.8) 
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From the above equations (8.7) and (8.8) we can obtain A= (1 BBB) Also, we must have 
for the diverging opinions that 
ctr = [P(T)]r[P(H)]k-r (8.9) 
for r=1, ..., 
k-1. Equations (8.9) and (8.7) imply that t,. = Ba'' = O'jL (1 - O) i. 
Consequently, 
C=[or(1-0) r]-k 
Finally, substituting (8.10) in (8.5) and (8.6) we have that 
P(H) or P 
01-+(1-B)r 
and 
respectively. Q 
(8.10) 
, 
Notice that in particular this sets the re-calibration function of each expert so that 
ý1 0)} log 
[(1 
c5)1 -'log[ 
In particular, the LogOp pool arising from this set of assumptions, has the uncomfortable 
implication that the SB assures the more experts the more extreme are their misspecifi- 
cation, i. e. by the SB adding another expert makes the other more optimistic. However, 
adjustments can be made to the SB's assumptions so that a LogOp is obtained with 
weights adding up to some value between 1 and k and thus lie somewhere between the 
case above and Winkler's (1981) model with independent sources of variation. This will 
incidentally sacrifice the EB property for the weaker prior-to-posterior coherence (PPC) 
-see Section 2.2.3. Alternatively one could consider this result as questioning the LogOp 
when the number of experts was large, if the assumptions above were believed reasonable. 
A detailed analysis of such models will be the topic of further research. 
This above result leads, in our case, to the argument that just enough experts should 
be employed such that their mutual independence confirmation convinces the SB that an 
event has occurred. 
The Theorem 8.3 can now be used to characterise the SB's EB reconciliation rule 
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Theorem 8.4. Under the hypotheses and result of Theorem 8.3, also assume that 
(1) the likelihood function for the outcomes of the binomial experiment is common to 
the SB and to the experts in all new data acquisition ; 
(2) the weights associated to the modified LogOp (8.3) obtained by the group of experts 
is such that wl ="= Wk = k, and 
(3) g(O) in (8.3) equals g'(O) f (B) where g'(B) = [0* + (1- 0) *]-Zn, n=k Ek 1 ni and 
f (9) is the SB's prior density for 0 as in (8.2). 
Then the SB's posterior density f (01q) is a reconciliation rule which is also an EB 
modified LogOp pool. 
proof. 
First, under Assumption 8.1, the SB -s likelihood function for the experts' statements in 
(8.2) can be obtained from her knowledge of n= (nl,..., nk) and r= (rl,..., rk), giving 
J 
(z 
, rI 
e) a 
i-1 
Substituting (8.4) in (8.11) gives that 
i1-r f (n, rib) oc g'(0)0F (1-0) 
where r=k1r;, n=kE1 ni and g'(6) = [9* + (1- B) 
*]-2s. Therefore, the SB's 
posterior density in (8.2) becomes 
f(BIa, r) a Br(1 - 0)n-, g 1 (0) f (0) " 
(8.12) 
On the other hand, the modified LogOp pool (8.3) for the experts binomial densities has 
the form 
f(OW) a 9ýe)Býk=i wer, (1 - 0)ý =1 "': (n: -r: ) (8.13) 
Now, for the modified LogOp (8.13) to be identified with the reconciliation rule (8.12) 
the requirements (2) and (3) of Theorem 8.4 must hold. To be EB this pool also requires 
that (1) holds. 0 
Notice that because the pooling should be performed by the group itself, the densities 
in (8.13) are not `corrected' by h(9). They consider themselves as being well calibrated 
experts. 
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If the SB has a diffuse prior density for B then g(B) = g'(B) and (8.13) equals (8.12) if 
just w= =, for i=1..., k. This choice w; =1 is coherent with with the experts' being 
considered exchangeable. Also, the result above gives a precise interpretation for g(O) in 
the modified LogOp pool as corresponding to a weighted prior density function of a SB. 
The only restriction here is that this prior must be such that 
f 
9(O)BEk=1 w r' (1- 0)E'=1 w, (n. -r. )ae 
is finite (see Genest et at., 1986). 
For k=2, 
B1/2 
h(O) = 91/2 + (1 - 
8)1/2 
Note that h(O) really `smoothes' the values of 9 specially on the boundaries of the extremes 
0 and 1, `correcting' the overconfident experts as can be seen in Figure 8.2. 
1 
0.8 
0.6 
0.4 
0.2 
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 
FIGURE 8.2. The function q= h(9) of two exchangeable uncalibrated experts 
in the binomial case. 
8.4.2 Non-exchangeable experts. 
If the SB thinks the experts have different degrees of miscalibration then they cannot 
be considered exchangeable anymore. Under the Assumptions 8.1 and 8.2, the joint prob- 
ability table for their possible statements would be for example for k=2 that of Table 
8.3 in which 
(i) cO is the probability that both experts will report H, 
(ii) cß'°1(1 - O)w2 is the probability that E1 will report H and E2 will report T, 
(iii) cOV'2 (1 - 0)" is the probability that E2 will report H and El will report T, and 
(iv) c(1- 9) is the probability that both will report T. 
Again here c= c(9). The terms wi and w2 are weights such that wl t w2 = 1. It is 
through those weights that the SB express how relatively miscalibrated the experts are. 
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E21 
HT 
H Co cl(©) 
T ci(©) c(1 - 0) 
TABLE 8.3. Joint probability table for two non-exchangeable experts in a 
binomial experiment. 
Using the axiom of probability which says that P[ 1] =1 we can obtain c(9) _ 
[1I2 j_1 9wi (1 - 9)w. 
]-1 The SB could then assess her calibration function for each ex- 
pert regarding the true probability as 
Oi 
Bwi 
(8.14) = owi + (1 - 9)w, 
where Ei_l wi =1 for i= 1,2. 
Now, using the same notation as in Section 8.4.1, analogous to (8.13), the modified 
LogOp pool for the group of experts obtained from their stated densities is 
101 12) a 9(e)ei; (1- e)n-F 1 (8.15) 
with r= Ei_1 wir;, n=F, =_1 w=ni and g(B) being a bounded function of 0 only. 
On the other hand, the SB's reconciliation rule analogous to (8.12) is 
(8.16 f (0Jni7 ri, n2, r2) a g'(e)O"(1 - 9)1`-r f (0) 1 
where g'(B) = 1/c(9) and r and n are defined as above. Thus, setting g(9) = g'(9) f (9) 
gives our identity again. 
For k experts, set ct as (8.14) above but with i=1, ..., 
k and ý= 1 wi = 1. 
Then 
again using independence and resolution of margins gives the identity between (8.15) and 
(8.16) but with r= Ei 
k 
w=ri, n= wing and c(9) = ýti 1[6wi + 
(1 - 8)wi]. Also, 
for i r, tr(8) = e'1', fl[B"'i + (1 ` O)"'iJ (f = 2, ..., 
k- 1). 
In fact, we have just proved the following theorem : 
Theorem 8.5. Suppose that Assumptions 8.1 and 8.2 hold for k non-exchangeable un- 
calibrated experts. Also, assume that the SB calibrates each expert's likelihood function in 
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her reconciliation rule (8.2) by using 
Oi = 
ow, 
(8.17) 
6wi +(I-9)wi 
where Ek 2 wi =1 for 
k, Then the SB's reconciliation rule (8.2) identifies with 
the experts' EB modified LogOp pool (8.3), if and only if 
(1) g(O) = g'(9) f (B) where gß(9) = {rjj[O-i + (1 - and f (O) is a prior 
density function for B; 
(2) =1 wi =1; and 
(3) the likelihood of all new data acquisition in the binomial experiment is common to 
the SB and to all the experts. 
Notice the interesting point here that, under this model, the weights w reflect not the 
quantity of information available to each expert but his lack of calibration in communi- 
cating his information. 
8.5 The Gaussian Case. 
Assume it is CK that X is Gaussian with unknown mean 0 but with known precision 
r. Thus, each expert Ej, based on his information base Ii, assesses his mean µL and 
precision T, for a normal density for 0 (i = 1, ..., 
k). The Assumptions 8.1 and 8.2 lead 
to a posterior distribution for SB of the form (8.3). 
Assuming initially that the experts are exchangeable in their lack of calibration, they 
all report Tt =r (i = 1, ..., 
k). 
Because of the Assumption 8.1 , the 
SB's likelihood function for the experts can be 
factorized as f (II, TIO) = Ilk 1 fi(j. lt, TIO), where µ= 
(µl, 
..., µk)' and 
0 is the parameter 
that the SB knows the experts' assessments are about. Therefore, this function has the 
form of a normal density with mean µ and precision T, where p= Ejý-1 Mi. However, 
the SB is interested in f (µ, r'19) where T' = T/k is her `correction' for the experts' stated 
precisions when B and not 0 is considered. This likelihood also has the form of a normal 
but with parameters (µ, r'). 
Notice that unanimity is preserved here and the correction r' on the experts precisions 
corresponds to the experts having in fact assessed their opinions for 
0 fi= 
vfk- 
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instead. 
The modified LogOp for the uncalibrated experts with the weights wi = 1/k for all 
i=1, ... ,k gives 
f (9I Ft, T) a exp {- 2 
(Ft - B)' }9(e) 
which identifies with the Bayesian reconciliation rule when g(O) =f (0), i. e. the SB's prior 
for 0. 
Again here, this gives an interpretation to g(O) in the modified LogOp. Although Genest 
et al. (1986) point out that g(8) must be essentially bounded and the there is no reason 
why a prior density should be bounded, in many practical situations this is the case. 
When the experts are not exchangeable, the SB can choose 
c5i =8 'wt , 
where w= corresponds to the SB's weight or `correction' factor for the expert E. In 
this case, the identity between the Bayesian and the pooling approaches occurs when 
g(B) =f (9) and the weights in the LogOp pool are wi (i = 1, ..., 
k). 
8.6 The CEB Reconciliation Rules. 
The previous results for Q=B most naturally extend for when fl = {O , ..., 
9, } and 
the conditional independence structure of associations between the variables in X= 
(X1i 
..., X) is a decomposable PCG of the 
form defined in Section 5.2, with the group of 
experts obeying Condition 5.4 (see Section 5.3) for cutting likelihoods which are common 
to the group. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
In this concluding chapter the results obtained in the thesis are discussed. The extend 
of their applicability is commented and directions for further research are indicated. 
We begin in Section 9.1 by discussing the conditionally externally Bayesian (CEB) 
pools defined in Chapter 6. We comment on the flexibility of their weights as well as 
on their application to complete chain graphs, to non-decomposable influence diagrams 
induced from partially complete chain graph and to decomposable non-complete induced 
influence diagrams. The issue of likelihoods in decomposable structures is also discussed. 
The discussions on the CEB linear pools end the section. In Section 9.2 the results which 
allow a link between the axiomatic and the Bayesian modelling approaches are discussed. 
9.1 The CEB Pools. 
9.1.1 The flexibility on the weights. 
One of the main features of a CEB pool when applied to a variable X of the group's 
graphical model, is that its weights can vary according to the occurred values of variables 
in the parent set of X. This suggests the development of methods for obtaining weights 
which would also consider the group's members expertise on those variables related to 
X. Alternatively, an interpretation of the weights in terms of the members' calibration 
would be plausible, with the difference that in this case the auxiliary experiments usually 
employed for calibrating an expert need not be purely independent. Another question here 
is whether this flexibility would also allow an interpretation which would include measures 
of dependence among the group's members. 
Although the extension of the externally Bayesian (EB) to the CEB pools is more gen- 
eral in terms of the flexibility on the weights, it imposes some restrictions on their domain 
of application. However, those restrictions are useful in order to avoid the impossibility 
results of non-preservation of independence for general pooling operators. 
Immediate natural extensions of this thesis would be to consider the implications of 
other cases such as when: 
(i) the commonly agreed graph is a chain graph and undirected edges are allowed 
within incomplete chain elements of the partially complete chain graphs,. 
(ii) the use of mixed graphs (Lauritzen, 1996) with both discrete and continuous vari- 
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ables being represented, 
(iii) the weights, included as variables in the common partially complete chain graph 
of a problem, are themselves object of group consensus, and 
(iv) the members do not agree on the same conditional independence structure for the 
problem. 
9.1.2 Complete graphs. 
Complete chain graphs are always decomposable and make no statements about condi- 
tional independence being probabilistically valid for all situations. So, for complete chain 
graphs, Theorem 6.4 implies that all CEB rules are EB to general likelihoods. This is 
not in contradiction to the original theorems of Genest et al. (1986) because they make 
an additional requirement that the combination rule must be achieved through a pooling 
operator. In particular, the value of a pooled density at a point x depends only on x and 
on the values of the joint densities fl (x) and f2 (x) at that point x for the first and second 
expert. 
The CEB pools are not formed as pooling operators on joint densities on all the variables 
of a system. They act as components of pooling operators on conditional densities. The 
argument that a pooling should be a pooling operator on a joint density appears to be 
weak. 
Each ordering of variables in a complete induced influence diagram gives a different 
class of EB pool, so with n variables there are n! different classes of EB pools defined by 
different chain graphs. Therefore, the class of EB pools is extremely rich, a fact obscured 
by the insistence that a pooling should be an operator on a joint density. 
This multiplicity in the complete case is, in one sense, a problem, since we need to 
choose which CEB pool to use. But this will largely be determined by the time order in 
which the random variables are observed. We need this to fix the weights w(j) associated 
with the jth variable X(j) since w(j) is allowed only to depend on the parents of X(j). 
In the complete case this is X(1), ..., X 
(i - 1). And for all possible pools to operate in 
the class of CEB pools associated with this graph, X(1),..., X (j - 1) will not need to be 
known before the pooling takes place. 
9.1.3 The non-decomposable chain graphs. 
An influence diagram is just a set of conditional independence statements. When the 
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influence diagram induced by the underlying partially complete chain graph is not decom- 
posable, assimilation of data tends to destroy that agreed structure. Within the context 
of external Bayesianity, which addresses the group's behaviour when assimilating informa- 
tion, it is natural therefore to work only with information in the influence diagram which 
is not destroyed by such assimilation. 
An agreed non-decomposable influence diagram I can always be made decomposable 
by marrying parents and adding directed edges until it is decomposable (see e. g. Lauritzen 
and Spiegelhalter, 1888). By using this derived influence diagram ,7 as a 
basis for the CEB 
pools instead of Z, we do not deny that the conditional independence statements supplied 
by I but not ,7 
do not exist. Rather we say that it is only sensible to explicitly formulate 
the pooling on those agreed conditional independencies which can reasonably be assumed 
to be preserved after simple types of sampling. 
9.1.4 Using CEB pools not based on complete graphs. 
One legitimate question that might be asked is : why use chain graphs whose induced 
influence diagrams are not complete ? 
Because an influence diagram is always acyclic there will always be a complete dimen- 
sional graph which has it as a subgraph and so is a valid influence diagram description 
of the problem. Furthermore, the CEB pools which are associated with complete graphs 
have the advantage that they are EB with respect to all likelihoods. On the other hand, 
CEB pools related to incomplete graphs are only EB to data which gives rise to a certain 
structure of likelihood (the cutting likelihood). There are three answers to this question : 
(i) Simplicity. If the type of information you expect to receive will automatically pre- 
serve conditional independence structures it seems perverse to demand methods of combi- 
nation of densities which exhibit individual's dependence structures they will never believe. 
(ii) Preservation of symmetry. Suppose two random variables X;, Xj in the random 
vector X are agreed to exhibit conditional independence and are symmetric in the sense 
that there is no clear order of causality or association between them. So, to introduce 
such an association into the pooling algorithms seems to be artificial and undesirable. 
(iii) Fixing a frame. In a given problem, experts will agree a set of random vectors 
X1i 
..., 
X on which they will pool their opinions. However, in most circumstances, they 
will also each have beliefs about other variables X*, agreed as independent of X. Implicitly 
in any pooling, they will ignore the disparity between their beliefs about X*. Similarly 
122 
at a future time if asked to combine their beliefs about X"` they will choose to ignore the 
disparity in their beliefs about X. But to do this implies the use of a CEB rule which 
explicitly demands in its associated chain graph that X II X. 
So if we do not allow incomplete cases, in different and independent forecasting problems 
about X and X* then we would need to prioritise X and X*. 
Despite the restrictions imposed to our problem and thus to the pooling operators 
discussed here, they are quite general to be useful in practical situations as we have 
seen. For instance, the assumption of a common partially complete chain graph structure 
is a rather mild restriction for one can fairly easily devise situations where this is the 
case. Moreover, as we have already mentioned, non-decomposable partially complete 
chain graph can always be made decomposable. 
The class of decomposable graphical models introduced by Lauritzen et al. (1984), is the 
one which under certain restrictions on the form of input data, retains the structure (coded 
in terms of conditional independence statements) in a prior-to-posterior analysis. This 
fact is used extensively to create quick algorithms for calculating posterior distributions 
in high dimensional problems (see e. g. Dawid, 1992, Jensen et al., 1994, and Smith and 
Papamichail, 1996). Here we have used this same property to define classes of combination 
rules which are, in a partial sense, externally Bayesian. 
The demands on certain forms of input data (cutting likelihoods) together with de- 
composability for the graphical model are necessary and sufficient conditions for the a 
posteriori preservation of the group's conditional independence structure. Decomposabil- 
ity alone is not a sufficient condition. However, depending on the problem, the demand 
on sampling over ancestral sets can be relaxed. This is the case when the likelihoods in a 
problem are separable. 
9.1.5 The CEB linear pools. 
We have seen that even allowing the marginalization property to hold for set of variables, 
the application of linear pools to elements of conditional independence structures brings 
other difficulties associated to the odd form that the resulting joint pool in general takes. 
It seems that the only instances when the linear pools can be CEB 'are when they are 
dictatorships on elements of the agreed structure. In this case the joint pool breaks down 
nicely and is EB with the difference that the weights can reflect relative expertises on 
different components of the structure. 
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Further research could possibly lead to interpretations of the cross-product of weights 
and densities in the joint pool, which would allow the incorporation to the pooling of 
various correlations that might occur between the members' assessments, their expertises 
and the diverse variables of the problem. It may not be an elegant approach for treating 
the dependence issue but could answer the problem of modelling dependencies in axiomatic 
approaches. 
9.2 A Link of the Modelling with the Axiomatic Approach. 
9.2.1 General expert problems. 
Because expert judgement problems are in general quite complex with diverse possibil- 
ities of associations among their various underlying components, the graphical modelling 
approach shows to be extremely useful in helping both the characterisation and the un- 
derstanding of the situation being modelled. 
We have investigated the class of expert problems for which a variable X and the 
components of the vector Z of variables informative about X are conditionally independent 
given the parameter 0 of the models associated to X and Z. The results obtained can 
be extended for more general structures of association between those variables. In fact, 
the graph of Figure 7.1, that represents a general subclass of expert problems, suggests 
several other possibilities for further investigation in this area. For example, the issue of 
Z having associated models with parameters t1 distinct but informative about 0 implies 
that the supra-Bayesian (SB) decision maker also has to assess f (OIc ). 
Also, considerations of sufficiency of expert opinions regarding their individual infor- 
mation is a quite interesting issue to be developed, as there are not many works in this 
area. 
9.2.2 The SB analysis of uncalibrated experts. 
We have shown that a supra-Bayesian (SB) analysis of uncalibrated experts with con- 
siderations resembling game theory allows a connection of the results obtained for CEB 
pools with combination rules obtained via the Bayesain paradigm applied to the expert 
problem. In fact, a SB calibrating experts via calibration functions seems to be one of 
the few, if not the only, way in which such a connection can be achieved. This subject is 
actually under investigation and all the related concepts and the material presented here 
(in Chapters 7 and 8) are actually being further developed. 
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